The War Beneath the War, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

When the rivalry involving the United States, Israel and Iran is discussed in newspapers or on television shows, the focus is almost always on dramatic moments—missile launches, air strikes, nuclear negotiations, or the activities of proxy militias in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. Yet these visible episodes tell only a fraction of the story. Beneath them lies a far more consequential contest fought through technology, intelligence systems, covert engineering and cyber operations. It is a war fought not just with weapons, but with code, algorithms, sensors and the manipulation of industrial machinery.

Over the past two decades, the confrontation has gradually transformed into what security analysts describe as systems warfare. The aim is not merely to defeat an enemy army on the battlefield but to sabotage the technological foundations on which a modern state depends its infrastructure, communications networks, scientific programmes and financial systems. This quiet technological instance has unfolded largely outside public attention, even though it has shaped the strategic balance in the Middle East.

The moment that revealed this hidden battlefield most clearly occurred in June 2010 when cybersecurity researchers identified an unusual computer worm circulating across networks around the world. The malware was later named Stuxnet. At first glance it appeared to be another sophisticated cyber intrusion. But detailed analysis soon revealed something far more alarming. Stuxnet had been designed not merely to steal data or disrupt computers; it was built to destroy physical industrial equipment.

The target of the malware was Iran’s uranium enrichment complex at the Natanz Nuclear Facility, located roughly 250 kilometres south of Tehran in Isfahan Province. Natanz housed thousands of centrifuges used to enrich uranium gas for Iran’s nuclear programme. These centrifuges, delicate machines spinning at extremely high speeds were controlled by programmable logic controllers produced by the German engineering company Siemens.

Stuxnet infiltrated the facility’s control systems and subtly altered the instructions regulating centrifuge speed. At specific intervals, the malware forced the centrifuges to accelerate far beyond their normal operational limits before abruptly slowing them down again. This repeated stress caused mechanical failure. At the same time, the virus fed false data to monitoring screens so that Iranian technicians would see readings indicating that everything was functioning normally.

By the time the attack was discovered, the damage had already been done. Security analysts later estimated that approximately 1,000 centrifuges, roughly one-fifth of Iran’s installed capacity at Natanz in 2009 had been destroyed. Subsequent investigative reporting revealed that the operation was part of a covert cyber programme known as Operation Olympic Games, initiated during the presidency of George W. Bush and later expanded under Barack Obama. Although neither United States nor Israel officially acknowledged responsibility. Although it was later confirmed that the operation was a joint effort by both Countries’ cyber specialists.

The importance of Stuxnet cannot be overstated. It represented the first publicly known cyber weapon capable of causing physical destruction to industrial infrastructure. In effect, it proved that lines of computer code could function as strategic weapons. Before Stuxnet, cyber warfare was generally associated with espionage or data theft. After Stuxnet, it became clear that cyber tools could sabotage factories, power plants and transportation systems.

This revelation carried profound implications. Modern societies depend on complex networks of industrial control systems which are software platforms that manage electricity grids, water treatment plants, oil pipelines, manufacturing facilities and transportation networks. Many of these systems were designed decades ago with minimal cybersecurity protections. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, technologically advanced countries can potentially disrupt entire sectors of national infrastructure without firing a single missile.

Yet cyber sabotage is only one dimension of the technological struggle involving the United States, Israel and Iran. Intelligence gathering has also undergone a profound transformation with the rise of artificial intelligence and advanced data analysis. Modern intelligence agencies collect staggering volumes of information: satellite imagery, intercepted communications, digital transactions, social media activity and geolocation data from billions of mobile devices. Processing such enormous datasets would overwhelm human analysts.

To solve this problem, intelligence organisations increasingly rely on machine learning algorithms capable of detecting patterns within massive streams of data. Israel’s signals intelligence division within the Israel Defense Forces, widely known as Unit 8200, has invested heavily in such technologies. These systems help analysts identify suspicious logistical movements, map covert networks and monitor scientific activities linked to Iran’s missile and nuclear programmes.

Artificial intelligence has therefore become a powerful tool in identifying individuals and facilities associated with sensitive research. Over the years, several Iranian nuclear scientists have been targeted in covert operations. One of the most dramatic incidents occurred on 27 November 2020 when Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a senior physicist widely regarded as the architect of Iran’s nuclear weapons research, was assassinated near the town of Absard east of Tehran. Iranian officials later claimed that the attack involved a sophisticated remote-controlled machine gun mounted on a vehicle, demonstrating the increasing role of advanced technology in covert operations.

Drone technology has also become a critical instrument in the shadow conflict between Israel and Iran. Unmanned aerial vehicles have evolved rapidly over the past two decades, becoming smaller, cheaper and more versatile. Intelligence reports suggest that Israeli operatives have occasionally smuggled drone components into Iran through clandestine networks. Once assembled near strategic installations, these drones can be launched to attack radar systems, missile launchers or ammunition depots.

Such operations represent a new form of warfare sometimes described by analysts as “inside-out attacks.” Instead of launching strikes from outside a country’s borders, covert assets positioned within the target state create vulnerabilities that can later be exploited. By disabling air defence radars or surface-to-air missile batteries, these drones can make it easier for conventional aircraft to operate if a broader conflict erupts.

Another largely invisible battlefield lies within telecommunications networks. Modern military forces rely on secure communication systems linking field units with central command structures. If those communications are disrupted, even highly capable armed forces can struggle to coordinate operations. Cyber units therefore often attempt to infiltrate telecommunications infrastructure before or during military operations.

Such attacks may involve manipulating network routing systems, penetrating data centres or disrupting fibre-optic communication nodes. Although details are rarely disclosed publicly, analysts widely believe that telecommunications systems in the Middle East have periodically been targeted during periods of heightened tension between Israel and Iran. The goal is not necessarily permanent destruction but temporary paralysis—disrupting an adversary’s ability to respond quickly during a crisis.

Financial infrastructure has also become a target in this technological contest. Banking systems, electronic payment platforms and cryptocurrency exchanges now form essential parts of modern economies. Disrupting these systems can generate economic instability and public frustration. Cyber operations targeting financial databases or digital payment networks can therefore serve as instruments of strategic pressure.

Iran’s economy, already strained by international sanctions, is particularly vulnerable to such disruptions. Government subsidy programmes for fuel and basic commodities rely heavily on digital infrastructure. If cyber attacks interrupt payment systems or corrupt financial records, millions of citizens may suddenly find themselves unable to access essential services. In this way, cyber warfare can exert pressure not only on governments but also on societies.

Another rarely discussed aspect of the confrontation involves supply-chain sabotage. Nuclear programmes depend on highly specialised equipment—centrifuge components, electronic sensors, control circuits and advanced materials. Because these components are difficult to manufacture domestically, procurement networks often span multiple countries and intermediaries.

Taken together, these various operations reveal how profoundly warfare has changed in the twenty-first century. In earlier eras, military power was measured primarily by the size of armies, the number of tanks or the range of missiles. Today, power increasingly depends on technological expertise—cyber capabilities, data analysis, advanced electronics and intelligence networks capable of penetrating the digital architecture of modern states.

The rivalry involving the United States, Israel and Iran therefore provides an early glimpse into the future of conflict. The most decisive battles may not occur on visible battlefields but within the hidden systems that sustain national power: computer networks, industrial machinery, telecommunications infrastructure and financial databases.

This reality poses difficult challenges for policymakers. Cyber attacks can be extremely difficult to attribute with certainty, allowing states to conduct covert operations without openly acknowledging responsibility. This ambiguity complicates traditional deterrence strategies. In conventional warfare, identifying an attacker is usually straightforward; in cyberspace, digital footprints can be manipulated or disguised.

Moreover, the vulnerabilities exploited in operations like Stuxnet are not unique to Iran. Similar industrial control systems operate in power plants, transportation networks and factories across the world. As cyber capabilities continue to evolve, the possibility of attacks targeting critical infrastructure in other countries—including major global economies—becomes increasingly real.

Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com

Tinubu in Windsor, Nigeria in Flames, by Boniface Ihiasota 

President Bola Tinubu’s state visit to the United Kingdom, which commenced on Tuesday, March 17, 2026, was always destined to be symbolically significant. It marks the first full state visit by a Nigerian leader to Britain in decades, with engagements scheduled at Windsor Castle under the auspices of King Charles III. Diplomatically, the visit signals continuity, relevance, and a desire to reposition Nigeria within a rapidly shifting global order shaped by trade realignments and post-Brexit economic recalibrations. Yet, the timing of the visit has cast a long and troubling shadow.

Barely twenty-four hours before the president’s departure from Abuja, Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State and long regarded as the epicentre of Nigeria’s insurgency crisis, was rocked by coordinated terrorist attacks on Monday, March 16, 2026. The explosions, which began at approximately 7:02 p.m. local time, struck multiple civilian locations, including the bustling Monday Market, parts of the Kaleri neighbourhood, and medical facilities within the city. By early Tuesday morning, official figures confirmed at least 23 fatalities and more than 100 injured, many of them critically.

The scale and coordination of the attacks point to a resurgence of operational capability by insurgent groups, widely believed to include Boko Haram factions and elements linked to the Islamic State West Africa Province. For a city that has endured over a decade of violence but had recently experienced relative calm, the bombings were both a psychological and strategic setback. They exposed vulnerabilities in intelligence gathering, urban security, and rapid response coordination within one of the most militarised zones in the country.

Against this backdrop, the president’s departure for London presents a difficult paradox. On one hand, governance demands international engagement. Nigeria’s economic challenges, from foreign exchange instability to infrastructure deficits, require external partnerships and financing arrangements that visits of this nature are designed to secure. Reports indicate that discussions during the visit may include substantial investment frameworks, particularly in port modernisation and trade facilitation.

On the other hand, leadership is deeply tied to presence, especially in moments of national distress. The optics of leaving the country within hours of a deadly terrorist attack are inevitably jarring. While it is neither unusual nor inherently wrong for a head of state to proceed with scheduled diplomatic engagements during crises, the immediacy and severity of the Maiduguri attacks elevate the expectation of visible, decisive, and empathetic leadership at home.

Members of the president’s entourage reportedly include First Lady Oluremi Tinubu and senior government officials, alongside at least one state governor, Dauda Lawal of Zamfara State. Their presence underscores the importance attached to the visit, but it also amplifies the contrast between the formalities of state banquets abroad and the grief unfolding in northeastern Nigeria.

From a diaspora perspective, where Nigeria’s image is constantly interpreted through the lenses of security, governance, and economic viability, this moment reinforces a persistent tension. The country often appears outwardly ambitious yet inwardly constrained by recurring instability. Each incident of mass violence not only claims lives but also erodes confidence among investors, partners, and observers who weigh risk as heavily as opportunity.

The Maiduguri attacks are not isolated. Since the insurgency began in 2009, tens of thousands of lives have been lost, and millions displaced. Despite repeated assurances from successive administrations that terrorist capabilities have been degraded, incidents such as the March 16 bombings suggest a more complex reality. Insurgent groups have adapted, shifting tactics and exploiting gaps in surveillance and community-level intelligence.

This raises pressing questions about strategy and accountability. How do multiple explosive devices detonate across a city under heavy military watch without prior interception? What systemic weaknesses allow such coordination to occur? And perhaps most importantly, how can the state move beyond reactive responses to build a genuinely preventive security architecture?

There is also the matter of communication. In crises, tone matters as much as action. Citizens expect not only policy responses but also reassurance, clarity, and a sense that leadership is fully engaged with their plight. The absence of immediate, high-visibility presidential presence can create a vacuum that fuels public frustration and erodes trust.

None of this diminishes the importance of international diplomacy. Nations do not pause their external engagements indefinitely because of internal challenges. However, the sequencing and sensitivity of decisions become critical when lives have just been lost. Leadership must constantly balance competing demands, but it must also recognise moments when symbolism carries as much weight as substance.

As events unfold in London, Nigeria confronts a dual reality. One is a nation seeking relevance and renewal on the global stage, eager to attract investment and strengthen alliances. The other is a country still grappling with persistent insecurity, where citizens in places like Maiduguri continue to bear the brunt of violence.

Bridging these realities requires more than policy declarations. It demands coherence between domestic stability and international ambition. Until that alignment is achieved, each diplomatic success abroad risks being overshadowed by unresolved crises at home, leaving observers to question which narrative truly defines the Nigerian state.

Nigeria’s Stakes in a Fractured Middle East, by Boniface Ihiasota 

As confrontation among the United States, Israel and Iran deepen, the tremors are being felt far beyond the Middle East. What may appear, at first glance, as a distant geopolitical rivalry carries significant consequences for economies like Nigeria’s, for Nigerians working across the Gulf, and for a government already grappling with fiscal, security and inflationary pressures at home.

The rivalry between Israel and Iran has simmered for decades, manifesting through proxy conflicts in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza. The United States, Israel’s closest ally, has repeatedly confronted Iran over its nuclear programme, regional influence and support for armed groups. Periodic flare-ups — including airstrikes, missile exchanges and targeted assassinations — have raised fears of a broader regional war. Each escalation has renewed concerns about the stability of the Gulf, which remains the artery of the global oil market.

The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow shipping lane between Oman and Iran, is one of the most strategic chokepoints in the world. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, roughly 20 per cent of global petroleum liquids consumption — about 20 million barrels per day — transits through that corridor. Any threat to traffic through the Strait immediately sends oil prices upward. In previous episodes of heightened tension, Brent crude prices have jumped sharply within days of military confrontations.

For Nigeria, higher oil prices present a paradox. Crude oil still accounts for the overwhelming bulk of Nigeria’s export earnings — typically between 80 and 90 per cent — and about half of government revenues. When global prices rise above budget benchmarks, the Federation Account stands to gain additional inflows. In times of fiscal strain, such windfalls can temporarily ease pressure on foreign reserves and public finances.

However, history teaches caution. Oil price spikes driven by conflict are often volatile and short-lived. Markets respond quickly to diplomatic signals, ceasefire talks or de-escalation efforts. Nigeria’s production constraints further limit how much benefit can be captured. The country has struggled in recent years to consistently meet its OPEC quota due to oil theft, pipeline vandalism and infrastructure challenges. Without sustained production above 1.5 million barrels per day, revenue gains from price increases may not fully translate into fiscal stability.

Beyond government revenue, there is the inflationary dimension. Rising global oil prices increase the cost of refined petroleum imports, shipping and logistics. Although Nigeria is expanding domestic refining capacity, it still imports a portion of its refined products. Higher energy costs globally can translate into higher prices for food, manufactured goods and transportation. In an economy already facing elevated inflation, any additional imported cost pressure could worsen living standards.

There is also the human dimension. Millions of Nigerians reside and work across the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, particularly in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Remittances from Nigerians abroad are a critical pillar of household income and foreign exchange. The World Bank has estimated Nigeria’s annual remittance inflows in recent years at around $20 billion, making it one of the largest recipients in Sub-Saharan Africa. Any prolonged regional instability that disrupts employment, air travel or financial flows in the Gulf would directly affect Nigerian families.

During previous Middle Eastern crises, airspace closures and airline suspensions disrupted travel routes that many Nigerians rely upon for business, education and pilgrimage. Escalation between major regional powers raises the risk of similar disruptions. The Nigerian government must therefore maintain accurate records of its citizens in vulnerable areas and strengthen consular responsiveness.

Security considerations also demand attention. Nigeria is a religiously diverse society with historical sensitivities that can be inflamed by international events. Conflicts in the Middle East sometimes trigger protests or polarised rhetoric at home. Authorities must be vigilant to ensure that global tensions are not exploited by local actors to deepen sectarian divides or spread misinformation. In an age of social media amplification, narratives from distant battlefields can travel rapidly and distort domestic discourse.

Diplomatically, Nigeria occupies a delicate position. As Africa’s largest economy and a longstanding contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions, Nigeria traditionally supports peaceful resolution of disputes and adherence to international law. Escalation between the United States, Israel and Iran will test the country’s diplomatic balancing act, particularly given its economic ties to Western partners and its solidarity with developing nations in multilateral forums.

Preparation, therefore, is essential. Fiscal prudence must accompany any temporary oil windfall. Excess revenues, if realised, should strengthen reserves and reduce debt vulnerabilities rather than fund unsustainable spending. Production security in the Niger Delta must remain a priority to ensure that Nigeria can benefit legitimately from favourable market conditions. The Central Bank and fiscal authorities must also anticipate currency volatility linked to global risk sentiment.

At the same time, diaspora engagement should be proactive. Clear communication channels, emergency response planning and coordination with host governments can mitigate risks to Nigerians abroad. Intelligence and community outreach at home will help preserve social cohesion.

The confrontation among the United States, Israel and Iran may unfold thousands of kilometres away, but its economic currents, security implications and political symbolism flow directly toward Nigeria. In an interconnected global system, distance offers no insulation. What remains within Nigeria’s control is preparedness — the capacity to convert short-term opportunity into long-term stability, and to shield its citizens from the unintended consequences of distant wars.