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Analysis

The Electoral Act and the Crisis of Electoral Confidence, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman

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The Electoral Act and the Crisis of Electoral Confidence, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman

 

Nigeria’s electoral laws have always mirrored the country’s uneasy relationship with democracy itself: hopeful in intention, fragile in execution, and controversial in outcome.

 

From the annulled June 12, 1993 election to the disputed polls of 2003, 2007, 2019 and, more recently, 2023, electoral legislation has remained both a tool of reform and a battlefield of political interest. The Electoral Act 2022, currently at the centre of renewed controversy, was enacted to correct decades of systemic flaws, but its implementation and the subsequent attempts to amend it have reopened old wounds about trust, transparency and the true commitment of Nigeria’s political elite to credible elections.

 

The Electoral Act 2022 replaced the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), which had governed Nigeria’s elections for over a decade. The 2010 Act was widely criticised for being outdated in the face of evolving electoral manipulation techniques, weak in enforcing penalties for offences, and largely silent on the use of modern technology.

 

Between 1999 and 2019, election tribunals nullified hundreds of election results across all levels of government, presenting how deeply flawed the process had become. According to data from the National Judicial Council, more than 40 per cent of governorship elections conducted between 1999 and 2015 ended up in court, with several overturned. This pattern exposed the limits of electoral administration under existing laws and created an urgent demand for reform.

 

Against this background, the Electoral Act 2022 was introduced as a reformist statute designed to restore confidence in Nigeria’s electoral process. It introduced innovations such as the legal backing for electronic accreditation of voters through the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS), the possibility of electronic transmission of results, stricter timelines for party primaries, clearer campaign finance limits, and stiffer penalties for certain electoral offences. For the first time, Nigerian electoral law appeared to acknowledge that technology could serve as a bulwark against manipulation rather than a threat to sovereignty.

 

Yet, even at birth, the Act was controversial. Section 84, which barred political appointees from voting or being voted for at party primaries unless they resigned their appointments, generated intense legal and political resistance. While reform advocates argued that it would curb abuse of state power during primaries, opponents saw it as discriminatory. The provision was eventually nullified by the courts, making a recurring weakness in Nigeria’s electoral reform efforts: ambitious laws that collide with entrenched political interests and constitutional ambiguities.

 

The controversy surrounding the Act deepened after the 2023 general elections. Although BVAS significantly reduced incidents of over-voting, with INEC reporting that accreditation figures matched votes cast in most polling units, the failure to consistently upload polling-unit results to the INEC Result Viewing Portal in real time ignited nationwide outrage. INEC blamed technical glitches and connectivity challenges, but many Nigerians interpreted the delay as evidence that old habits had merely adapted to new tools. According to observer reports by the European Union Election Observation Mission, while BVAS improved transparency at the polling unit level, the collation process remained vulnerable to manipulation, particularly where results were moved physically without immediate electronic verification.

 

It is within this climate of suspicion that the National Assembly’s recent attempts to amend the Electoral Act have drawn fierce public scrutiny. Central to the controversy is the issue of electronic transmission of results. The Act currently empowers INEC to determine the manner in which results are transmitted, a provision that reformers argue is too discretionary. Civil society organisations, opposition parties and segments of the electorate insist that mandatory electronic transmission from polling units should be explicitly stated in the law to eliminate human interference during collation. Their argument is rooted in history: most electoral fraud in Nigeria has occurred not at the polling unit, where party agents and observers are present, but during result collation at ward, local government and state levels.

 

Supporters of legislative discretion counter this argument by pointing to Nigeria’s uneven infrastructure. They note that, according to the Nigerian Communications Commission, broadband penetration stood at 43.71% as at December 2023,, with significant disparities between urban and rural areas. From this perspective, making electronic transmission mandatory without addressing connectivity and power supply challenges could disenfranchise voters in remote communities. This disparity between ideal reform and practical constraints lies at the heart of the Electoral Act debate.

 

Beyond technology, the Act also touches on the persistent problem of electoral offences. Vote-buying, ballot snatching and voter intimidation have become entrenched features of Nigeria’s elections. During the 2023 elections, Yiaga Africa documented widespread vote trading across several states, with prices reportedly ranging from ₦2,000 to ₦10,000 per vote. The Electoral Act prescribes fines and prison terms for such offences, yet enforcement remains weak. Nigeria has recorded very few convictions for electoral crimes since 1999, a fact acknowledged by INEC itself.

 

The implications of these legal controversies for future elections, particularly the 2027 general elections, are profound. Electoral credibility is not built on election day alone; it depends on clarity and stability of the legal framework long before ballots are printed. INEC is required by law to release its election timetable at least 360 days before a general election. Persistent uncertainty about the final shape of the Electoral Act complicates planning, procurement and training. It also increases the likelihood of pre-election litigation, which has already become a defining feature of Nigerian politics.

 

In the 2023 election cycle, INEC recorded over 1,200 pre-election cases, many of which stemmed from ambiguities in party primaries and candidate selection rules.

 

Public trust is another casualty of the ongoing controversy. Voter turnout in Nigeria has been declining steadily, dropping from about 69 per cent in 2003 to roughly 27 per cent in 2023, according to INEC figures. This decline reflects growing voter apathy driven by the perception that votes do not count. When electoral laws appear malleable or subject to political bargaining, they reinforce cynicism and disengagement. For a country where over 60 per cent of the population is under 30, sustaining such distrust poses long-term risks to democratic stability.

 

Still, it would be unfair to dismiss the Electoral Act 2022 as a failure. The Act represents the most comprehensive attempt at electoral reform Nigeria has undertaken since 1999. The legal recognition of technology in voter accreditation marked a decisive break from the past, and the reduction in over-voting during the 2023 elections is a measurable achievement.

 

The clearer timelines for party primaries and candidate nominations have also improved internal party discipline, even if enforcement remains inconsistent. Compared to elections conducted under the 2010 Act, the 2022 framework has narrowed some avenues for manipulation, even as it exposed others.

 

The negative side, however, lies in what the Act leaves unresolved. Ambiguity in critical areas creates room for discretion, and discretion in Nigeria’s electoral history has rarely favoured transparency. The absence of decisive enforcement mechanisms for electoral offences undermines deterrence. The tendency to amend election laws close to election seasons fuels suspicion that reforms are driven by immediate political calculations rather than long-term democratic consolidation.

 

Nigeria’s electoral journey is ultimately a reflection of its broader governance challenges. Laws alone cannot guarantee credible elections, but weak laws almost certainly guarantee flawed ones. The controversy surrounding the Electoral Act is therefore less about technical clauses and more about political will. Countries such as Ghana and Kenya, which have faced similar challenges, have shown that sustained reform, backed by enforcement and civic education, can gradually rebuild trust. Ghana’s consistent improvement in election credibility since 2000, for instance, has been supported by clear electoral rules and visible consequences for violations.

 

As Nigeria looks ahead to future elections, the Electoral Act remains a pivotal instrument. Whether it becomes a foundation for democratic consolidation or another missed opportunity depends on how sincerely it is implemented, clarified and respected.

 

Electoral reform is not an event but a process, and Nigeria is still very much in the middle of that process. What is at stake is not just the outcome of the next election, but the credibility of the democratic project itself. In that sense, the controversy over the Electoral Act is not a distraction from Nigeria’s democratic journey; it is the journey, unfolding in real time, with all its contradictions, hopes and unresolved questions.

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Analysis

Bianca Ojukwu and Nigeria’s Firm Stand Against South African Xenophobia

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Bianca Ojukwu and Nigeria’s Firm Stand Against South African Xenophobia

 

By Boniface Ihiasota

 

In the troubled history of African migration and xenophobic violence, few developments have tested Nigeria’s diplomatic resolve in recent years like the renewed attacks on Africans in South Africa. For many Nigerians in the diaspora, the recurring hostility against fellow Africans in a country once rescued from apartheid partly through African solidarity has become both painful and deeply ironic. At the centre of Nigeria’s latest diplomatic response is the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bianca Odumegwu-Ojukwu, whose handling of the crisis has drawn attention across the continent.

 

The recent wave of anti-immigrant protests in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban reopened old wounds. Foreign nationals, particularly black Africans, were again accused of taking jobs, contributing to crime and burdening public services. Nigerians, as in previous episodes of xenophobic unrest, found themselves among the major targets. In response, Bianca Ojukwu adopted a tone that combined diplomacy with unmistakable firmness.

 

Unlike the cautious language that often characterises African diplomacy, the minister spoke with unusual clarity. She declared publicly that Nigeria “cannot stand by and watch the systematic harassment and humiliation” of its citizens in South Africa. That statement resonated strongly among Nigerians abroad who have long complained that African governments often react too slowly whenever migrants become victims of mob violence or political scapegoating.

 

Her intervention went beyond rhetoric. Nigeria summoned South Africa’s acting High Commissioner in Abuja to explain the situation and demanded full investigations into the deaths of two Nigerians allegedly assaulted by South African security personnel. The Federal Government also requested autopsy reports, legal documentation and accountability measures where wrongdoing is established. These actions signalled that Abuja was no longer willing to treat attacks on Nigerians abroad as isolated incidents.

 

More significantly, Bianca Ojukwu moved swiftly to establish protective mechanisms for Nigerians living in South Africa. Following consultations with President Bola Tinubu and South African authorities, Nigeria directed its diplomatic missions to create crisis response and notification channels for threatened citizens. Nigerians were advised to contact security authorities immediately whenever they felt endangered.

 

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the government’s response was the decision to begin voluntary repatriation for Nigerians who wished to leave South Africa. According to the minister, at least 130 Nigerians initially registered for evacuation following the protests. While some critics viewed the evacuation plan as a retreat, others saw it as a practical humanitarian measure aimed at protecting lives before violence escalated further.

 

What distinguishes Bianca Ojukwu’s response from previous official reactions is her attempt to redefine the conversation. She questioned whether the attacks should still be described merely as “xenophobia,” arguing that the hostility appeared directed mainly at black Africans. Her suggestion that the crisis increasingly resembles “Afriphobia” touches a sensitive but important continental debate. Why are fellow Africans, rather than Europeans or Asians, often the principal victims of anti-foreigner mobilisation in parts of South Africa?

 

Another remarkable dimension of her intervention was the emphasis on the psychological impact of the crisis on children. The minister disclosed reports that Nigerian children, including those born to Nigerian-South African parents, were allegedly bullied in schools and told to “return to their country.” By highlighting this aspect, she shifted the discourse from statistics and diplomatic statements to the human cost of intolerance.

 

For Nigerians in the diaspora, the significance of this moment goes beyond South Africa alone. It raises broader questions about African unity, migration and the responsibility of governments toward citizens abroad. Diaspora communities often contribute immensely through remittances, investments and international networks, yet many still feel vulnerable whenever crises erupt in host countries.

 

Bianca Ojukwu’s response may not immediately end xenophobic tensions in South Africa, but it has demonstrated a more assertive Nigerian diplomacy, one that seeks not only to protest injustice but also to actively protect citizens. In an era where Africans increasingly migrate within the continent in search of opportunities, governments can no longer afford silence or symbolic outrage. The safety and dignity of Africans, wherever they reside on African soil, must become a continental obligation rather than a diplomatic afterthought.

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Analysis

NDC As A New Bride, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

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NDC As A New Bride, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

 

In Nigerian politics, new parties arrive the way comets appear in troubled skies. They appear suddenly, brightly and with exaggerated promises of redemption. Every election cycle births another coalition of disappointed politicians, frustrated elites, restless youths and displaced loyalists seeking what they call a “new direction.” Yet history has not been kind to many of them. Most vanish into the crowded cemetery of political irrelevance even before the next electoral season matures.

 

But the emergence of the Nigeria Democratic Congress, NDC, appears different in timing, symbolism and political calculations. Whether it ultimately becomes a genuine ideological alternative or merely another temporary shelter for ambitious politicians remains one of the defining political questions ahead of the 2027 general elections. The metaphor of a “new bride” fits perfectly.

 

In African culture, especially within the Nigerian sociopolitical imagination, a new bride arrives adorned with admiration, expectations, curiosity and suspicion. Everybody wants to see her. Everybody praises her beauty. Everybody speculates about her future. But beyond the wedding glamour lies the difficult burden of sustaining a home. That is precisely the present condition of the NDC in Nigeria’s political arena.

 

Officially recognised by the Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC on February 5, 2026, the NDC emerged alongside the Democratic Leadership Alliance after a prolonged legal and administrative process. INEC Chairman, Professor Joash Amupitan, disclosed that while DLA passed the conventional registration requirements, the NDC secured recognition through a Federal High Court order from Lokoja, Kogi State. That detail is politically important.

 

Unlike parties organically nurtured through ideological evolution, the NDC entered the national consciousness through judicial intervention. In Nigeria, where courts increasingly shape political destinies from governorship victories to legislative leadership tussles, the judiciary has become an unofficial co-author of democratic processes.

 

Nigeria’s political atmosphere today resembles a nation exhausted by recycled promises. The ruling All Progressives Congress, APC continues to face criticism over inflation, insecurity, unemployment and rising public frustration. Meanwhile, the opposition Peoples Democratic Party, PDP remains weakened by prolonged internal crises, leadership disputes and ideological confusion. The Labour Party, despite its emotional 2023 momentum, has struggled to convert populist enthusiasm into durable institutional structure. That vacuum created the perfect political maternity ward for another party. And Nigerians, perpetually hopeful despite repeated disappointments, naturally turned their attention toward the newcomer.

 

Already, the NDC is being discussed not merely as another registered party among Nigeria’s political parties, but as a possible coalition platform for displaced opposition figures seeking a stronger vehicle for 2027. The discussion intensified dramatically in early May 2026 following the formal defection of two of Nigeria’s most influential opposition politicians, Peter Obi and Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso. Their entrance transformed the NDC overnight from a little-known political organization into a major national conversation.

 

On May 3, 2026, both politicians were formally welcomed into the party during a high-profile political gathering held at the Abuja residence of former Bayelsa State governor, Seriake Dickson, who now serves as the NDC’s national leader. The event attracted political stakeholders, party officials and supporters from different regions of the country. During the gathering, Obi and Kwankwaso received their membership cards and addressed supporters on the future of the party.

 

Kwankwaso reportedly urged Nigerians interested in contesting future elections to register with the party immediately, while Obi spoke about building “a united, secure and prosperous Nigeria.” The symbolism of that event was impossible to ignore.

 

Obi remains one of the most influential opposition figures among Nigerian youths, especially after his remarkable performance in the 2023 presidential election under the Labour Party. Kwankwaso, on the other hand, commands a formidable grassroots structure in Northern Nigeria through the Kwankwasiyya movement. Their movement into the NDC instantly gave the party national visibility, regional balance and electoral seriousness. But the NDC did not stop there.

 

In recent weeks, the party has increased nationwide consultations and political receptions aimed at attracting defectors from other parties. Reports indicate that politicians from the APC, PDP, ADC and other opposition platforms have begun gravitating toward the NDC amid growing dissatisfaction within their former parties.

 

One of the earliest prominent figures to join was Amanda Pam, a notable Federal Capital Territory politician and former Deputy National Legal Adviser of the PDP. Senator Dickson personally received her into the party in April, describing the NDC as a growing ideological platform for national renewal.

 

More recently, the party also welcomed activist and social commentator Aisha Yesufu into its fold. On May 6, Yesufu announced her resignation from the ADC and formally declared for the NDC, revealing plans to contest the FCT Senatorial seat under the party’s platform.

 

Aisha Yesufu is not merely a politician. She represents a generation of activist-driven political consciousness that gained prominence during the Bring Back Our Girls campaign, the EndSARS protests and the Obi political movement of 2023. Her entrance into the NDC signaled the party’s attempt to combine elite political experience with activist energy.

 

The party has also recorded gains within legislative circles. Several members of the House of Representatives reportedly defected to the NDC shortly after Obi and Kwankwaso joined the party.

 

In another notable development, serving lawmakers from Edo State, including Natasha Osawaru Idibia, were formally received into the NDC during a political gathering in Abuja where Dickson warned against what he described as “transactional politics.” Former Gombe State Deputy Governor, John Lazarus Yoriyo, also joined the party at the same event. These activities have helped project the image of a party aggressively building momentum ahead of 2027. Yet the “new bride” metaphor remains politically dangerous.

 

Nigerians have a troubling habit of romanticising political newcomers. Every emerging movement is prematurely treated as a revolutionary salvation before its ideological foundation is properly interrogated. The country witnessed this phenomenon during the formation of the APC in 2013 when many Nigerians celebrated it as the coalition that would permanently rescue the nation from PDP dominance. Yet barely a decade later, many citizens who once celebrated that coalition now lament worsening economic hardship and democratic disappointments.

 

The NDC must answer difficult questions beyond the excitement of novelty. What exactly does it ideologically represent? Is it socially democratic? Progressively reformist? Or merely an emergency political apartment for frustrated elites seeking electoral shelter and survival?

 

So far, public discourse surrounding the party appears driven more by personalities than philosophy. That is Nigeria’s recurring democratic tragedy. Parties often revolve around influential politicians rather than coherent ideological convictions. In advanced democracies, voters can reasonably predict policy directions from party identity. In Nigeria, politicians migrate between parties with the emotional attachment of passengers changing commercial buses at Ojota.

 

Today’s progressive becomes something else tomorrow without ideological explanation. That is why Nigerians increasingly struggle to distinguish one party from another beyond slogans, logos and campaign colours. The NDC therefore faces an urgent intellectual responsibility: defining itself before defections define it.

 

A political party cannot sustainably survive on borrowed popularity alone. Emotional momentum without ideological infrastructure eventually collapses under the weight of ambition. The Labour Party’s post-2023 internal turmoil demonstrated this reality vividly. Popular movements may win elections, but only organized institutions sustain political relevance. This explains why many observers remain cautiously curious about the NDC.

 

Although there is undeniably a growing appetite among young Nigerians for alternative politics. Nigeria possesses one of the world’s youngest populations, with a median age below 20 years. Yet governance remains dominated by older political establishments. The frustration among youths over unemployment, inflation, educational instability and migration pressures has intensified demands for political renewal. Under such conditions, a disciplined opposition platform can become electorally dangerous to incumbents. But danger to incumbents alone does not equal democratic transformation.

 

Nigeria does not merely need another election-winning machine. It needs parties capable of institutionalizing governance culture, respecting internal democracy and nurturing ideological clarity. Without these, power simply changes occupants while dysfunction retains ownership of the system.

 

This is why the NDC must resist the temptation of becoming merely an anti-APC emotional coalition. Opposition built solely around anger eventually collapses after electoral seasons. Sustainable parties require philosophical substance beyond resentment against incumbents.

 

Equally important is the moral burden now facing the NDC’s emerging leadership. Nigerians are increasingly skeptical of political migration motivated purely by electoral convenience. When politicians defect without explaining ideological disagreements, citizens interpret movements as elite survival strategies rather than principled repositioning.

 

Social media discussions surrounding Obi and Kwankwaso’s movement to the NDC reflect this division clearly. While supporters view the party as a fresh opposition alternative, critics argue that repeated defections among Nigerian politicians expose the absence of ideological discipline within the political class. Such skepticism is understandable.

 

Nigeria’s democratic history contains too many abandoned promises. Yet democracy itself thrives on the possibility of renewal. Citizens cannot permanently surrender political hope simply because previous experiments failed. The challenge lies in balancing optimism with critical vigilance.

 

That balance is exactly how Nigerians should approach the NDC. Admire the bride if you wish. Celebrate the wedding if necessary. But do not ignore the marriage questions.

 

Can the party survive beyond electoral convenience? Can it manage internal imbroglio, if any arise? Can it resist godfather domination? Can it build structures beyond social media enthusiasm? Can it offer governance ideas beyond opposition rhetoric? Can it institutionalize internal democracy better than existing parties?

 

Those questions matter far more than registration certificates and ceremonial declarations. For now, however, the bride remains attractive because she is still largely undefined. And perhaps that is both her greatest strength and most dangerous weakness.

 

Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com

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Analysis

Why Plot Against Peter Obi Will Fail, by Boniface Ihiasota

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Why Plot Against Peter Obi Will Fail, by Boniface Ihiasota

 

From the diaspora, Nigeria’s political trajectory is often assessed with a mix of distance and clarity. The patterns are familiar—elite coalitions, shifting loyalties, and strategic calculations ahead of every electoral cycle. Yet, as the 2027 general elections begin to gather, one constant remains: the enduring relevance of Peter Obi. Despite recurring narratives about efforts to edge him out of contention, the structural and political realities suggest that such plots are unlikely to succeed.

 

A central reason lies in the nature of Obi’s political base. Unlike traditional candidates whose influence is tied to party machinery or regional kingmakers, Obi’s support cuts across demographics, particularly among young voters and urban professionals. This base, which gained visibility during the 2023 elections under the Labour Party, is not easily dismantled by conventional political maneuvering. It is decentralized, digitally connected, and ideologically driven—qualities that make it resilient in the face of elite opposition.

 

Looking ahead to 2027, this evolving voter bloc could become even more significant. Nigeria’s youth population continues to expand, and with it, a growing demand for governance defined by accountability and economic competence. Obi’s consistent messaging around prudent management of resources and institutional reforms positions him as a natural beneficiary of this demographic shift. Attempts to sideline him risk underestimating how deeply this sentiment has taken root, both within Nigeria and among its diaspora.

 

The diaspora itself remains a critical factor in shaping Obi’s political future. Nigerians abroad, many of whom actively supported his 2023 campaign, have sustained advocacy through funding, media engagement, and policy discourse. Their influence, amplified by digital platforms, has helped maintain Obi’s visibility beyond election cycles. As 2027 approaches, this network is likely to play an even more strategic role—not only in mobilization but also in shaping narratives that counter attempts to delegitimize his candidacy.

 

Equally important is the broader transformation within Nigeria’s political landscape. The 2023 contest, which featured Obi alongside Bola Tinubu and Atiku Abubakar, marked a departure from the long-standing dominance of two major parties. Obi’s performance challenged the assumption that electoral success must always flow through established structures. As political actors recalibrate for 2027, this disruption cannot be easily reversed. Any strategy aimed at marginalizing him must contend with an electorate that has already demonstrated a willingness to embrace alternatives.

 

Another reason such plots are likely to fail is Obi’s personal political brand. His tenure as governor of Anambra State continues to serve as a reference point for supporters who view him as disciplined and comparatively transparent.

 

While critics remain, his reputation has proven relatively durable in Nigeria’s often volatile political environment. This consistency makes it difficult for opponents to construct narratives that significantly erode his credibility ahead of another electoral cycle.

 

However, the road to 2027 is not without challenges. For Obi to convert goodwill into electoral victory, he will need to strengthen party structures, expand his reach in rural areas, and possibly build strategic alliances. Nigerian elections are not won on sentiment alone; they require organization, negotiation, and adaptability. The resilience of his support base does not eliminate the need for political pragmatism.

 

Yet, even these challenges reinforce the central argument: efforts to plot against Obi are unlikely to achieve their intended outcome because they often focus on the individual rather than the movement. What emerged in 2023 was not just a candidacy but a shift in political consciousness. That shift—driven by a demand for competence and accountability—has continued to evolve beyond the ballot.

 

In all, Obi’s prospects for 2027 will depend less on the success or failure of political plots and more on how effectively he harnesses the forces already working in his favor. For many in the diaspora, his continued relevance reflects a broader transformation within Nigeria’s democracy—one that is still unfolding, but increasingly difficult to reverse.

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