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Analysis

What Are Our Universities Producing? By Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

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What Are Our Universities Producing? By Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

 

There was a time in Nigeria when education was not merely a pathway to employment but a cultural badge of intellectual distinction. The University of Ibadan in the 1960s did not simply produce graduates; it produced thinkers. Today, however, a quiet but consequential shift has occurred. The Nigerian educational system appears to be producing more certificates than competence, more graduates than thinkers, and more qualifications than knowledge. This raises a difficult but necessary question: what exactly are we learning?

 

To interrogate this question meaningfully, one must begin with the most honest indicator of national priorities which is budgetary allocation. Education funding is not just a fiscal decision; it is a philosophical statement about what a country values. In Nigeria, that statement has been consistently ambiguous. In the 2025 federal budget, education received roughly 7 percent of total allocation, a figure far below the 15–20 percent benchmark recommended by UNESCO. This is not an anomaly but a pattern. Historical data shows that between 1960 and 2023, Nigeria’s average allocation to education hovered around 5.94 percent, significantly below global standards.

 

Even more revealing is the comparative picture. Between 1999 and 2021, countries such as Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal consistently outperformed Nigeria in educational investment, with Ghana allocating over 24 percent on average, and Kenya exceeding 21 percent. These figures are not just statistical contrasts; they are explanatory variables. They help explain why Nigeria, despite being Africa’s most populous nation, struggles to produce globally competitive graduates at scale.

 

Paradoxically, Nigeria’s education budget has increased significantly in absolute terms. From ₦602 billion in 2019 to about ₦1.59 trillion in 2024, government spending on education has nearly tripled. Yet, outcomes have remained largely stagnant. Classrooms remain overcrowded, infrastructure is inadequate, and teacher quality is inconsistent. The problem, therefore, is not merely how much is spent, but how it is spent. A large portion of the budget is consumed by recurrent expenditure like salaries and administrative costs, leaving minimal investment in research, infrastructure, and innovation.

 

This funding structure has profound implications for universities, which are supposed to serve as engines of knowledge production and innovation. Nigeria currently has over 200 universities, spanning federal, state, and private ownership. On paper, this expansion suggests progress. In reality, it reflects a quantitative response to demand without a corresponding qualitative framework. The proliferation of universities has not translated into global competitiveness. Rankings consistently show Nigerian universities trailing behind their African counterparts, with limited presence in global top-tier listings.

 

The issue here is not merely about rankings, but about what rankings represent. Globally competitive universities are evaluated based on research output, citation impact, faculty quality, international collaboration, and graduate employability. Nigerian universities struggle in these areas, largely due to underfunding and systemic inefficiencies. Research funding, for instance, accounts for less than 1 percent of Nigeria’s GDP, a figure that severely constrains innovation.

 

What, then, is expected of universities in a global context? At their core, universities are not degree-awarding factories; they are knowledge ecosystems. Institutions like the University of Cape Town in South Africa or the University of Nairobi in Kenya have increasingly aligned their curricula with global standards, emphasizing research, critical thinking, and interdisciplinary learning. Nigeria’s universities, by contrast, often remain trapped in outdated curricular models that prioritize rote memorization over analytical reasoning.

 

This pedagogical gap is perhaps the most critical dimension of the certification-versus-education debate. In many Nigerian classrooms, success is measured by the ability to reproduce information rather than to interrogate it. Students are trained to pass examinations, not to solve problems. The result is a generation of graduates who possess certificates but lack the competencies required in a global knowledge economy.

 

To understand the gravity of this issue, one must consider the expectations placed on graduates in today’s world. The 21st-century workforce demands more than subject-specific knowledge. It requires critical thinking, digital literacy, adaptability, collaboration, and innovation. Employers are increasingly interested in what graduates can do, not just what they know. In this context, a certificate becomes merely an entry point, not a guarantee of competence.

 

Nigeria’s educational system, however, often operates on an outdated assumption—that possession of a degree equates to employability. This assumption is increasingly untenable. With a literacy rate estimated between 62 and 70 percent and significant disparities in educational quality, the system produces graduates who are often ill-equipped for global competition. The consequence is a widening gap between education and employment, a gap that manifests in high graduate unemployment and underemployment rates.

 

A comparative look at other African nations further underscores this point. Countries like Tunisia and South Africa allocate approximately 20 percent of their budgets to education and have invested heavily in curriculum reform and teacher training. Botswana and Namibia emphasize continuous teacher development and critical thinking skills, while Mauritius has integrated technology into its educational framework. These countries are not without challenges, but they demonstrate a deliberate alignment between educational policy and global standards.

 

Nigeria’s challenge is not simply that it lags behind; it is that it has not clearly defined what it aims to achieve with its educational system. Is the goal to produce graduates in large numbers, or to produce globally competitive individuals? The current trajectory suggests the former. The emphasis on expanding access to higher education, while commendable, has not been matched by a commitment to quality assurance.

 

This disparity between access and quality is at the heart of the certification dilemma. The more universities are established without adequate funding and oversight, the more diluted the value of the degree becomes. A certificate, in this context, risks becoming a symbol of attendance rather than achievement.

 

Yet, it would be overly simplistic to attribute all responsibility to government policy. The culture of learning itself must also be interrogated. In many instances, students approach education as a transactional process—attend lectures, pass exams, obtain a certificate. Intellectual curiosity, independent research, and critical inquiry are often secondary considerations. This cultural orientation is both a product of the system and a contributor to its perpetuation.

 

The role of educators is equally significant. Teacher quality remains a critical determinant of educational outcomes. In Nigeria, only a small percentage of teachers are considered highly trained, and the teacher-student ratio remains high, particularly in public institutions. Without substantial investment in teacher training and professional development, any attempt at systemic reform is likely to be superficial.

 

Infrastructure also plays a crucial role. A university without functional laboratories, libraries, and digital resources cannot effectively compete in a global knowledge economy. Yet, many Nigerian institutions operate with facilities that are decades behind contemporary standards. This infrastructural deficit is not merely a logistical issue; it is a constraint on intellectual development.

 

The global standard for universities today extends beyond teaching to include research and community impact. Universities are expected to generate knowledge that addresses societal challenges. In this regard, Nigeria’s universities face a dual challenge: limited funding and limited integration with industry. The absence of strong university-industry linkages means that research often remains theoretical, with little practical application.

 

This disconnect further reinforces the certification culture. When education is not linked to real-world outcomes, it becomes an abstract exercise. Students learn to pass exams, not to solve problems. Graduates enter the workforce with theoretical knowledge but limited practical skills, creating a mismatch between supply and demand.

 

To move beyond certification, Nigeria must undertake a fundamental rethinking of its educational philosophy. This requires not only increased funding but also strategic investment. Resources must be directed toward infrastructure, research, teacher training, and curriculum reform. Universities must be granted greater autonomy to innovate, while also being held accountable for outcomes.

 

Equally important is the need to redefine success within the educational system. Success should not be measured solely by graduation rates or the number of degrees awarded, but by the quality of graduates produced. Are they capable of critical thinking? Can they adapt to new challenges? Are they equipped to contribute meaningfully to society?

 

Until those questions are answered with honesty and urgency, the certificates will continue to accumulate, but the knowledge they are meant to represent will remain elusive.

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Analysis

Bianca Ojukwu and Nigeria’s Firm Stand Against South African Xenophobia

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Bianca Ojukwu and Nigeria’s Firm Stand Against South African Xenophobia

 

By Boniface Ihiasota

 

In the troubled history of African migration and xenophobic violence, few developments have tested Nigeria’s diplomatic resolve in recent years like the renewed attacks on Africans in South Africa. For many Nigerians in the diaspora, the recurring hostility against fellow Africans in a country once rescued from apartheid partly through African solidarity has become both painful and deeply ironic. At the centre of Nigeria’s latest diplomatic response is the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bianca Odumegwu-Ojukwu, whose handling of the crisis has drawn attention across the continent.

 

The recent wave of anti-immigrant protests in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban reopened old wounds. Foreign nationals, particularly black Africans, were again accused of taking jobs, contributing to crime and burdening public services. Nigerians, as in previous episodes of xenophobic unrest, found themselves among the major targets. In response, Bianca Ojukwu adopted a tone that combined diplomacy with unmistakable firmness.

 

Unlike the cautious language that often characterises African diplomacy, the minister spoke with unusual clarity. She declared publicly that Nigeria “cannot stand by and watch the systematic harassment and humiliation” of its citizens in South Africa. That statement resonated strongly among Nigerians abroad who have long complained that African governments often react too slowly whenever migrants become victims of mob violence or political scapegoating.

 

Her intervention went beyond rhetoric. Nigeria summoned South Africa’s acting High Commissioner in Abuja to explain the situation and demanded full investigations into the deaths of two Nigerians allegedly assaulted by South African security personnel. The Federal Government also requested autopsy reports, legal documentation and accountability measures where wrongdoing is established. These actions signalled that Abuja was no longer willing to treat attacks on Nigerians abroad as isolated incidents.

 

More significantly, Bianca Ojukwu moved swiftly to establish protective mechanisms for Nigerians living in South Africa. Following consultations with President Bola Tinubu and South African authorities, Nigeria directed its diplomatic missions to create crisis response and notification channels for threatened citizens. Nigerians were advised to contact security authorities immediately whenever they felt endangered.

 

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the government’s response was the decision to begin voluntary repatriation for Nigerians who wished to leave South Africa. According to the minister, at least 130 Nigerians initially registered for evacuation following the protests. While some critics viewed the evacuation plan as a retreat, others saw it as a practical humanitarian measure aimed at protecting lives before violence escalated further.

 

What distinguishes Bianca Ojukwu’s response from previous official reactions is her attempt to redefine the conversation. She questioned whether the attacks should still be described merely as “xenophobia,” arguing that the hostility appeared directed mainly at black Africans. Her suggestion that the crisis increasingly resembles “Afriphobia” touches a sensitive but important continental debate. Why are fellow Africans, rather than Europeans or Asians, often the principal victims of anti-foreigner mobilisation in parts of South Africa?

 

Another remarkable dimension of her intervention was the emphasis on the psychological impact of the crisis on children. The minister disclosed reports that Nigerian children, including those born to Nigerian-South African parents, were allegedly bullied in schools and told to “return to their country.” By highlighting this aspect, she shifted the discourse from statistics and diplomatic statements to the human cost of intolerance.

 

For Nigerians in the diaspora, the significance of this moment goes beyond South Africa alone. It raises broader questions about African unity, migration and the responsibility of governments toward citizens abroad. Diaspora communities often contribute immensely through remittances, investments and international networks, yet many still feel vulnerable whenever crises erupt in host countries.

 

Bianca Ojukwu’s response may not immediately end xenophobic tensions in South Africa, but it has demonstrated a more assertive Nigerian diplomacy, one that seeks not only to protest injustice but also to actively protect citizens. In an era where Africans increasingly migrate within the continent in search of opportunities, governments can no longer afford silence or symbolic outrage. The safety and dignity of Africans, wherever they reside on African soil, must become a continental obligation rather than a diplomatic afterthought.

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Analysis

NDC As A New Bride, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

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NDC As A New Bride, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

 

In Nigerian politics, new parties arrive the way comets appear in troubled skies. They appear suddenly, brightly and with exaggerated promises of redemption. Every election cycle births another coalition of disappointed politicians, frustrated elites, restless youths and displaced loyalists seeking what they call a “new direction.” Yet history has not been kind to many of them. Most vanish into the crowded cemetery of political irrelevance even before the next electoral season matures.

 

But the emergence of the Nigeria Democratic Congress, NDC, appears different in timing, symbolism and political calculations. Whether it ultimately becomes a genuine ideological alternative or merely another temporary shelter for ambitious politicians remains one of the defining political questions ahead of the 2027 general elections. The metaphor of a “new bride” fits perfectly.

 

In African culture, especially within the Nigerian sociopolitical imagination, a new bride arrives adorned with admiration, expectations, curiosity and suspicion. Everybody wants to see her. Everybody praises her beauty. Everybody speculates about her future. But beyond the wedding glamour lies the difficult burden of sustaining a home. That is precisely the present condition of the NDC in Nigeria’s political arena.

 

Officially recognised by the Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC on February 5, 2026, the NDC emerged alongside the Democratic Leadership Alliance after a prolonged legal and administrative process. INEC Chairman, Professor Joash Amupitan, disclosed that while DLA passed the conventional registration requirements, the NDC secured recognition through a Federal High Court order from Lokoja, Kogi State. That detail is politically important.

 

Unlike parties organically nurtured through ideological evolution, the NDC entered the national consciousness through judicial intervention. In Nigeria, where courts increasingly shape political destinies from governorship victories to legislative leadership tussles, the judiciary has become an unofficial co-author of democratic processes.

 

Nigeria’s political atmosphere today resembles a nation exhausted by recycled promises. The ruling All Progressives Congress, APC continues to face criticism over inflation, insecurity, unemployment and rising public frustration. Meanwhile, the opposition Peoples Democratic Party, PDP remains weakened by prolonged internal crises, leadership disputes and ideological confusion. The Labour Party, despite its emotional 2023 momentum, has struggled to convert populist enthusiasm into durable institutional structure. That vacuum created the perfect political maternity ward for another party. And Nigerians, perpetually hopeful despite repeated disappointments, naturally turned their attention toward the newcomer.

 

Already, the NDC is being discussed not merely as another registered party among Nigeria’s political parties, but as a possible coalition platform for displaced opposition figures seeking a stronger vehicle for 2027. The discussion intensified dramatically in early May 2026 following the formal defection of two of Nigeria’s most influential opposition politicians, Peter Obi and Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso. Their entrance transformed the NDC overnight from a little-known political organization into a major national conversation.

 

On May 3, 2026, both politicians were formally welcomed into the party during a high-profile political gathering held at the Abuja residence of former Bayelsa State governor, Seriake Dickson, who now serves as the NDC’s national leader. The event attracted political stakeholders, party officials and supporters from different regions of the country. During the gathering, Obi and Kwankwaso received their membership cards and addressed supporters on the future of the party.

 

Kwankwaso reportedly urged Nigerians interested in contesting future elections to register with the party immediately, while Obi spoke about building “a united, secure and prosperous Nigeria.” The symbolism of that event was impossible to ignore.

 

Obi remains one of the most influential opposition figures among Nigerian youths, especially after his remarkable performance in the 2023 presidential election under the Labour Party. Kwankwaso, on the other hand, commands a formidable grassroots structure in Northern Nigeria through the Kwankwasiyya movement. Their movement into the NDC instantly gave the party national visibility, regional balance and electoral seriousness. But the NDC did not stop there.

 

In recent weeks, the party has increased nationwide consultations and political receptions aimed at attracting defectors from other parties. Reports indicate that politicians from the APC, PDP, ADC and other opposition platforms have begun gravitating toward the NDC amid growing dissatisfaction within their former parties.

 

One of the earliest prominent figures to join was Amanda Pam, a notable Federal Capital Territory politician and former Deputy National Legal Adviser of the PDP. Senator Dickson personally received her into the party in April, describing the NDC as a growing ideological platform for national renewal.

 

More recently, the party also welcomed activist and social commentator Aisha Yesufu into its fold. On May 6, Yesufu announced her resignation from the ADC and formally declared for the NDC, revealing plans to contest the FCT Senatorial seat under the party’s platform.

 

Aisha Yesufu is not merely a politician. She represents a generation of activist-driven political consciousness that gained prominence during the Bring Back Our Girls campaign, the EndSARS protests and the Obi political movement of 2023. Her entrance into the NDC signaled the party’s attempt to combine elite political experience with activist energy.

 

The party has also recorded gains within legislative circles. Several members of the House of Representatives reportedly defected to the NDC shortly after Obi and Kwankwaso joined the party.

 

In another notable development, serving lawmakers from Edo State, including Natasha Osawaru Idibia, were formally received into the NDC during a political gathering in Abuja where Dickson warned against what he described as “transactional politics.” Former Gombe State Deputy Governor, John Lazarus Yoriyo, also joined the party at the same event. These activities have helped project the image of a party aggressively building momentum ahead of 2027. Yet the “new bride” metaphor remains politically dangerous.

 

Nigerians have a troubling habit of romanticising political newcomers. Every emerging movement is prematurely treated as a revolutionary salvation before its ideological foundation is properly interrogated. The country witnessed this phenomenon during the formation of the APC in 2013 when many Nigerians celebrated it as the coalition that would permanently rescue the nation from PDP dominance. Yet barely a decade later, many citizens who once celebrated that coalition now lament worsening economic hardship and democratic disappointments.

 

The NDC must answer difficult questions beyond the excitement of novelty. What exactly does it ideologically represent? Is it socially democratic? Progressively reformist? Or merely an emergency political apartment for frustrated elites seeking electoral shelter and survival?

 

So far, public discourse surrounding the party appears driven more by personalities than philosophy. That is Nigeria’s recurring democratic tragedy. Parties often revolve around influential politicians rather than coherent ideological convictions. In advanced democracies, voters can reasonably predict policy directions from party identity. In Nigeria, politicians migrate between parties with the emotional attachment of passengers changing commercial buses at Ojota.

 

Today’s progressive becomes something else tomorrow without ideological explanation. That is why Nigerians increasingly struggle to distinguish one party from another beyond slogans, logos and campaign colours. The NDC therefore faces an urgent intellectual responsibility: defining itself before defections define it.

 

A political party cannot sustainably survive on borrowed popularity alone. Emotional momentum without ideological infrastructure eventually collapses under the weight of ambition. The Labour Party’s post-2023 internal turmoil demonstrated this reality vividly. Popular movements may win elections, but only organized institutions sustain political relevance. This explains why many observers remain cautiously curious about the NDC.

 

Although there is undeniably a growing appetite among young Nigerians for alternative politics. Nigeria possesses one of the world’s youngest populations, with a median age below 20 years. Yet governance remains dominated by older political establishments. The frustration among youths over unemployment, inflation, educational instability and migration pressures has intensified demands for political renewal. Under such conditions, a disciplined opposition platform can become electorally dangerous to incumbents. But danger to incumbents alone does not equal democratic transformation.

 

Nigeria does not merely need another election-winning machine. It needs parties capable of institutionalizing governance culture, respecting internal democracy and nurturing ideological clarity. Without these, power simply changes occupants while dysfunction retains ownership of the system.

 

This is why the NDC must resist the temptation of becoming merely an anti-APC emotional coalition. Opposition built solely around anger eventually collapses after electoral seasons. Sustainable parties require philosophical substance beyond resentment against incumbents.

 

Equally important is the moral burden now facing the NDC’s emerging leadership. Nigerians are increasingly skeptical of political migration motivated purely by electoral convenience. When politicians defect without explaining ideological disagreements, citizens interpret movements as elite survival strategies rather than principled repositioning.

 

Social media discussions surrounding Obi and Kwankwaso’s movement to the NDC reflect this division clearly. While supporters view the party as a fresh opposition alternative, critics argue that repeated defections among Nigerian politicians expose the absence of ideological discipline within the political class. Such skepticism is understandable.

 

Nigeria’s democratic history contains too many abandoned promises. Yet democracy itself thrives on the possibility of renewal. Citizens cannot permanently surrender political hope simply because previous experiments failed. The challenge lies in balancing optimism with critical vigilance.

 

That balance is exactly how Nigerians should approach the NDC. Admire the bride if you wish. Celebrate the wedding if necessary. But do not ignore the marriage questions.

 

Can the party survive beyond electoral convenience? Can it manage internal imbroglio, if any arise? Can it resist godfather domination? Can it build structures beyond social media enthusiasm? Can it offer governance ideas beyond opposition rhetoric? Can it institutionalize internal democracy better than existing parties?

 

Those questions matter far more than registration certificates and ceremonial declarations. For now, however, the bride remains attractive because she is still largely undefined. And perhaps that is both her greatest strength and most dangerous weakness.

 

Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com

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Analysis

Why Plot Against Peter Obi Will Fail, by Boniface Ihiasota

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Why Plot Against Peter Obi Will Fail, by Boniface Ihiasota

 

From the diaspora, Nigeria’s political trajectory is often assessed with a mix of distance and clarity. The patterns are familiar—elite coalitions, shifting loyalties, and strategic calculations ahead of every electoral cycle. Yet, as the 2027 general elections begin to gather, one constant remains: the enduring relevance of Peter Obi. Despite recurring narratives about efforts to edge him out of contention, the structural and political realities suggest that such plots are unlikely to succeed.

 

A central reason lies in the nature of Obi’s political base. Unlike traditional candidates whose influence is tied to party machinery or regional kingmakers, Obi’s support cuts across demographics, particularly among young voters and urban professionals. This base, which gained visibility during the 2023 elections under the Labour Party, is not easily dismantled by conventional political maneuvering. It is decentralized, digitally connected, and ideologically driven—qualities that make it resilient in the face of elite opposition.

 

Looking ahead to 2027, this evolving voter bloc could become even more significant. Nigeria’s youth population continues to expand, and with it, a growing demand for governance defined by accountability and economic competence. Obi’s consistent messaging around prudent management of resources and institutional reforms positions him as a natural beneficiary of this demographic shift. Attempts to sideline him risk underestimating how deeply this sentiment has taken root, both within Nigeria and among its diaspora.

 

The diaspora itself remains a critical factor in shaping Obi’s political future. Nigerians abroad, many of whom actively supported his 2023 campaign, have sustained advocacy through funding, media engagement, and policy discourse. Their influence, amplified by digital platforms, has helped maintain Obi’s visibility beyond election cycles. As 2027 approaches, this network is likely to play an even more strategic role—not only in mobilization but also in shaping narratives that counter attempts to delegitimize his candidacy.

 

Equally important is the broader transformation within Nigeria’s political landscape. The 2023 contest, which featured Obi alongside Bola Tinubu and Atiku Abubakar, marked a departure from the long-standing dominance of two major parties. Obi’s performance challenged the assumption that electoral success must always flow through established structures. As political actors recalibrate for 2027, this disruption cannot be easily reversed. Any strategy aimed at marginalizing him must contend with an electorate that has already demonstrated a willingness to embrace alternatives.

 

Another reason such plots are likely to fail is Obi’s personal political brand. His tenure as governor of Anambra State continues to serve as a reference point for supporters who view him as disciplined and comparatively transparent.

 

While critics remain, his reputation has proven relatively durable in Nigeria’s often volatile political environment. This consistency makes it difficult for opponents to construct narratives that significantly erode his credibility ahead of another electoral cycle.

 

However, the road to 2027 is not without challenges. For Obi to convert goodwill into electoral victory, he will need to strengthen party structures, expand his reach in rural areas, and possibly build strategic alliances. Nigerian elections are not won on sentiment alone; they require organization, negotiation, and adaptability. The resilience of his support base does not eliminate the need for political pragmatism.

 

Yet, even these challenges reinforce the central argument: efforts to plot against Obi are unlikely to achieve their intended outcome because they often focus on the individual rather than the movement. What emerged in 2023 was not just a candidacy but a shift in political consciousness. That shift—driven by a demand for competence and accountability—has continued to evolve beyond the ballot.

 

In all, Obi’s prospects for 2027 will depend less on the success or failure of political plots and more on how effectively he harnesses the forces already working in his favor. For many in the diaspora, his continued relevance reflects a broader transformation within Nigeria’s democracy—one that is still unfolding, but increasingly difficult to reverse.

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