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Analysis

The Economics of Terrorism in Nigeria, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

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The Economics of Terrorism in Nigeria, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

 

The Nigerian state has spent well over a decade chasing terrorists through forests, mountains and isolated villages. Thousands of soldiers have been deployed, billions of naira have been committed to military hardware, while countless gallant officers have paid the supreme price in the battle against Boko Haram, the Islamic State West Africa Province, ISWAP and other violent groups. Yet, amid these sacrifices, one question has remained unanswered: how do these terrorists continue to fund their operations despite sustained military offensives?

 

It is a question that has become increasingly difficult to ignore. Terrorism is not sustained by ideology alone. It thrives on money. Every attack carried out in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Kaduna, Niger or Zamfara is financed somewhere. Every rifle procured, every motorcycle purchased, every informant recruited and every explosive manufactured has a financial trail. The insurgent carrying an AK-47 in the bush is merely the visible face of a sophisticated financial network stretching from local collaborators to international facilitators.

 

This reality explains why the Federal Government has, over the last three years, shifted considerable attention from merely confronting terrorists on the battlefield to dismantling the financial ecosystem that keeps them alive. It is perhaps the least celebrated but arguably the most strategic aspect of Nigeria’s counter-terrorism policy.

 

The legal foundation had already been strengthened with the signing of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022, by former President Muhammadu Buhari. The legislation consolidated previous anti-terrorism laws, expanded the definition of terrorism financing, strengthened the powers of investigators and prosecutors, and established clearer procedures for freezing assets linked to terrorism. It also empowered the Nigeria Sanctions Committee to designate individuals and entities involved in financing terrorist activities.

 

President Bola Tinubu inherited this framework in May 2023 and, rather than allowing it to gather dust, has encouraged greater institutional coordination among the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), the Department of State Services (DSS), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The emphasis has become unmistakable: if terrorists cannot access money, their operational capacity will gradually diminish.

 

The results are becoming evident as security agencies have intensified investigations into suspicious financial transactions, illicit cash movements, informal money transfer networks and businesses suspected of serving as conduits for terrorist funds. Financial institutions have come under greater pressure to report unusual transactions, while designated non-financial institutions have equally been subjected to stricter compliance requirements. The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has become more proactive in analysing suspicious transaction reports and sharing intelligence with both domestic and international security agencies.

 

One of the strongest indications that Nigeria’s campaign has acquired an international dimension came with increased cooperation between Nigeria and foreign governments on terrorism financing investigations. The arrest of separatist agitator Simon Ekpa by Finnish authorities in November 2024 over allegations connected to terrorist activities demonstrated that financial and operational support for violent groups can no longer be viewed as purely domestic matters. International law enforcement agencies are increasingly collaborating to monitor financial flows across borders.

 

Equally significant has been Nigeria’s determination to improve its standing under the Financial Action Task Force, the global body responsible for setting standards against money laundering and terrorist financing. Nigeria’s inclusion on the FATF grey list in 2023 served as a diplomatic embarrassment and an economic warning that weaknesses in financial regulation could undermine investor confidence. Since then, the country has implemented several reforms aimed at strengthening anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing mechanisms. Those efforts culminated in Nigeria’s removal from the grey list in October 2025 after the FATF acknowledged substantial progress in addressing identified deficiencies.

 

That achievement deserves more public attention than it has received. Countries placed on the FATF grey list often face increased scrutiny by international banks, higher compliance costs for businesses and reduced investor confidence. Exiting the list therefore represents more than a diplomatic success; it signals growing confidence in Nigeria’s capacity to detect, investigate and disrupt illicit financial flows.

 

Yet, despite these gains, the challenge remains enormous because terrorism financing in Nigeria has become increasingly decentralised.

 

Gone are the days when insurgent groups depended almost exclusively on foreign sponsors. Boko Haram and ISWAP have developed self-sustaining financial models that resemble organised criminal enterprises. They generate revenue through kidnapping for ransom, illegal taxation of farming communities, cattle rustling, extortion of traders, smuggling, illegal mining, fishery activities around the Lake Chad Basin and cross-border commercial transactions. Some communities living under insurgent control reportedly pay levies not because they support terrorism but because survival demands compliance.

 

This evolution has complicated the work of security agencies. Financial transactions supporting terrorism are no longer confined to formal banking channels. Cash dominates rural economies where banking infrastructure remains weak. Informal value transfer systems operate outside conventional financial regulations, while technological innovations have introduced new risks associated with digital assets and online financial platforms.

 

The uncomfortable truth is that terrorism survives not only because of hardened extremists but also because ordinary citizens sometimes become willing collaborators. Transport operators who knowingly move weapons, traders who supply logistics to insurgents, businessmen who facilitate illicit financial transfers and corrupt officials who compromise security operations all become silent partners in sustaining violence. Their motivations are often economic rather than ideological, yet the consequences remain equally devastating.

 

It is here that Nigeria’s counter-terrorism strategy must become even more courageous.

 

Arrests alone cannot substitute for successful prosecutions. Nigerians have witnessed numerous announcements of suspects apprehended for alleged terrorism financing, only for many cases to disappear into the slow wheels of the justice system. The deterrent value of arrest diminishes significantly when prosecution is uncertain or endlessly delayed. The judiciary must therefore recognise terrorism financing cases as matters requiring exceptional urgency.

 

Another area demanding greater attention is border security. Nigeria shares long and porous borders with Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin Republic. These frontiers have facilitated not only the movement of fighters but also the trafficking of cash, fuel, livestock, food supplies and weapons. Effective border management requires stronger intelligence sharing, modern surveillance technology and closer collaboration with neighbouring countries.

 

Political neutrality is equally indispensable. Counter-terror financing cannot become selective depending on the influence, ethnicity, religion or political affiliation of suspects. Once credible evidence exists, investigations should proceed without fear or favour. Nothing undermines public confidence more than the perception that powerful individuals enjoy immunity while less influential suspects face the full weight of the law.

 

There is also the question of financial literacy within vulnerable communities. Many Nigerians remain unaware that seemingly harmless commercial activities can inadvertently support terrorist operations. Accepting suspicious payments, facilitating anonymous cash transfers or ignoring reporting obligations may ultimately strengthen violent organisations. Public education must therefore become an integral component of national security policy.

 

Equally important is economic development. Terrorist organisations flourish where legitimate economic opportunities disappear. Unemployment, illiteracy, weak governance and chronic poverty create fertile recruiting grounds for extremist groups. Countering terrorism financing must therefore go beyond freezing bank accounts to expanding access to education, agriculture, infrastructure, healthcare and youth employment. A young man earning a decent livelihood is far less susceptible to recruitment by insurgent organisations promising quick financial rewards.

 

Perhaps the greatest lesson from Nigeria’s experience over the last three years is that modern terrorism is sustained less by ideology than by economics. Terrorists may preach religion, ethnicity or political grievances, but they cannot wage war without money. Every disrupted financial transaction, every frozen asset, every suspicious transfer intercepted and every financier successfully prosecuted weakens the operational capability of violent groups far more quietly than military offensives ever could.

 

The war against terrorism will not be won solely on the battlefield. It will also be won inside banks, courtrooms, intelligence centres, border posts, regulatory agencies and financial institutions. Soldiers may neutralise terrorists, but investigators who follow the money prevent the next generation of attacks.

 

Nigeria has made commendable progress in recognising this reality. The challenge now is consistency. Financial investigations must become more sophisticated, prosecutions more decisive, institutions more coordinated and political commitment more unwavering. Terrorism is ultimately an expensive business. The day Nigeria permanently cuts off the flow of money into the hands of violent extremists is the day the guns will begin to fall silent.

 

Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com

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Analysis

Tinubu, EFCC and the Danger of Political Interference, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

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Tinubu, EFCC and the Danger of Political Interference, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

 

There are moments when the intention behind an official decision may be defensible, yet the decision itself opens a door that ought to concern every citizen. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s intervention in the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission’s freezing of an Osun State Government account is one of those moments.

 

On August 6, 2026, with the Osun governorship election only nine days away, Tinubu directed the EFCC to return to court, vacate the order freezing an account belonging to the Osun State Government and discontinue the action it had instituted. The President said he was “deeply embarrassed” not by the EFCC’s exercise of its mandate, which he acknowledged was backed by a court order, but by its timing.

 

His explanation was understandable. Tinubu said actions taken by federal institutions were ordinarily attributed to him as President, whether or not he had prior knowledge of them. Since the election was approaching, he argued, nothing should be done that could create the impression that the EFCC or another Federal Government agency was being used to influence the election.

 

The argument is “morally” correct. But it also creates a difficult constitutional and institutional question: where does legitimate presidential concern about an election end and operational interference in an anti-corruption agency begin?

 

The EFCC did not arbitrarily descend on Osun. The commission said it had observed “huge transfers of funds into different corporate entities” from the state account and had acted to halt what it considered suspicious movement of public money. It argued that the approaching election could not become an excuse for an anti-corruption agency to ignore suspected movement of public funds.

 

Governor Ademola Adeleke, however, said the account was used for workers’ salaries and had been placed on a “Post No Debit” status. He demanded an explanation from EFCC Chairman Ola Olukoyede and described the action as another assault on Osun’s democracy.

 

The political atmosphere surrounding the matter had also been poisoned long before the account was frozen. In June, the Diaspora Committee of the All Progressives Congress Governorship Campaign Council in Osun asked the EFCC to freeze accounts allegedly connected with a reported N13.7bn annual ghost-workers payroll scandal. The committee claimed the money could be diverted to finance vote-buying ahead of the August 15 election. That background makes the EFCC’s action politically sensitive. But sensitivity is precisely why institutional independence matters.

 

The EFCC is a creation of statute. Under the EFCC (Establishment) Act, its chairman and members are appointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, while the law also provides for the chairman’s tenure and removal. The Presidency therefore has substantial influence over the commission’s leadership. That, however, does not make the President the operational head of every EFCC investigation.

 

There is an important distinction between constitutional authority over an institution and operational control of its investigations. A President may appoint the EFCC chairman, exercise statutory powers concerning the office, formulate broad government policy and demand accountability from federal agencies. But an anti-corruption agency must retain sufficient operational independence to determine whom to investigate, what evidence to pursue and what enforcement action to take.

 

Curiously, Tinubu himself made this case in the same statement. He said that since assuming office in May 2023, he had consistently maintained that anti-corruption and law-enforcement agencies should perform their statutory responsibilities independently and professionally, “without fear or favour, or political interference.” He added that he had deliberately refrained from directing or interfering in EFCC operations. That is why the Osun intervention becomes more concerning.

 

If a President can intervene in an operational decision because its timing might create an appearance of political interference, then the President has necessarily exercised influence over an operational decision. That does not automatically make the intervention unlawful. But it creates a precedent that future administrations may exploit.

 

Tinubu may genuinely believe the EFCC action could have been interpreted as an attempt to influence the Osun election. Another President could make the same argument about an investigation involving a governor, a minister, a major campaign financier or a politically influential contractor. If the principle becomes that the Presidency can intervene whenever enforcement action creates political controversy, the exception could eventually swallow the rule.

 

Nigeria’s history with the EFCC offers enough warnings. The commission was established in 2002 and began operations under President Olusegun Obasanjo, with Nuhu Ribadu becoming its pioneer chairman in 2003. Ribadu’s aggressive pursuit of governors, ministers, bankers and other powerful Nigerians gave the EFCC international prominence. But his controversial removal in 2007 also generated questions about the vulnerability of the commission to presidential and political interests.

 

Farida Waziri’s tenure produced another controversy. Appointed by President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua in 2008, she was removed by President Goodluck Jonathan on November 23, 2011. Years later, Waziri alleged that Jonathan’s administration had interfered with investigations and that her refusal to back down from a probe contributed to her removal. Though Jonathan rejected the allegation and challenged her to identify whom he had allegedly ordered her not to investigate.

 

The significance of those disputes is not simply who was right. It is that Nigerians repeatedly witnessed a situation in which the political leadership had enormous influence over the institution expected to investigate politically powerful people.

 

The Muhammadu Buhari administration provided another example. Buhari appointed Ibrahim Magu as acting EFCC chairman in 2015, despite the controversy that followed the Senate’s rejection of his nomination for substantive confirmation. On July 10, 2020, Buhari approved Magu’s suspension to allow a presidential panel to investigate allegations against him.

 

Again, the larger issue was institutional. The leadership of the EFCC remained heavily dependent on the Presidency, even though the commission’s work could directly affect members and allies of the governing political establishment. That is the weakness Nigeria has failed to resolve.

 

The President appoints the EFCC chairman. The commission investigates people who may have enormous political connections. The chairman therefore operates within an institutional structure in which the most powerful political office in the country has significant influence over the leadership of the agency.

 

This is why the Osun matter cannot be reduced to whether Tinubu had the right to be concerned about the election. Of course, he did. Elections must be protected from intimidation, manipulation and the misuse of state institutions. The harder question is whether that legitimate concern should be exercised through a presidential direction concerning a live EFCC enforcement matter.

 

There is also an important constitutional distinction regarding Adeleke. Section 308 of the 1999 Constitution grants a sitting governor immunity from civil or criminal proceedings in specified circumstances. But immunity is not exoneration. It does not mean a governor cannot be investigated, that evidence cannot be gathered or that public funds associated with a state government are beyond investigation.

 

If the EFCC had credible evidence of suspicious transfers, Adeleke’s candidacy should not automatically extinguish the commission’s investigative responsibility. Conversely, the approaching election should not give the EFCC licence to turn an investigation into a political weapon. The law must be stronger than both impulses.

 

That is why the better solution should have been procedural rather than presidential. If the EFCC had obtained a freezing order from a court and concerns subsequently arose about its timing or effect on essential state services, those concerns could have been presented before the court. If salaries needed to be paid, the government could have sought appropriate judicial relief.

 

Adeleke, too, must allow due process to take its course. If the EFCC acted unlawfully, the courts provide the remedy. If the allegations are false, evidence and due process should establish that fact.

 

For Olukoyede, the lesson is equally clear. The EFCC’s greatest asset is not proximity to the President but distance from political instruction. The commission must be prepared to investigate opposition politicians and members of the ruling party, governors and former governors, ministers and political financiers according to the same evidentiary standard.

 

Tinubu’s intervention, even if motivated by a legitimate desire to protect the integrity of the Osun election, should concern Nigerians. Institutions survive governments. Presidents come and go. Political parties win and lose elections.

 

If Tinubu truly wants Nigerians to believe that the EFCC is independent, the next step is obvious. He should help build an institutional framework in which no future President will need to intervene to prove that the EFCC is not being used politically. That is the real test of leadership. And that is the difference between fighting corruption under a President and building a country where the fight against corruption does not depend on the President.

 

Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com

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Analysis

Jingir’s Words and the Challenge of Religious Tolerance, by Boniface Ihiasota 

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Jingir’s Words and the Challenge of Religious Tolerance, by Boniface Ihiasota 

 

Nigeria’s greatest strength has always been its diversity. Muslims, Christians, traditional worshippers and citizens of other beliefs have lived, worked, traded and built families across the country’s complicated social landscape. That is why recent utterances attributed to Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jingir deserve more than partisan applause or condemnation. They demand reflection.

 

At an event attended by, among others, Kano State Governor Abba Yusuf and Jigawa State Governor Umar Namadi, Sheikh Jingir renewed his support for a Muslim-Muslim presidential ticket ahead of the 2027 elections. He argued that Muslims should mobilise behind such a ticket and urged his audience to obtain their Permanent Voter Cards. He also referred to those opposed to his position as “infidels” and said Muslims should “show the infidels their limit.”

 

There is, of course, nothing inherently undemocratic about a Muslim advocating for Muslim candidates. Democracy gives every citizen the right to support candidates according to personal convictions, including religious convictions. The problem begins when political competition is framed as a contest between religious communities, particularly in a country where religious identity has historically been capable of provoking suspicion, fear and violence.

 

From the perspective of many Nigerians in the diaspora, this language is especially troubling. Those of us watching Nigeria from abroad understand that the country’s image is not determined only by government policies or economic statistics. It is also shaped by how Nigerians treat one another. When influential religious voices appear to portray fellow citizens as outsiders or enemies because of their faith, the damage extends beyond politics.

 

Nigeria is constitutionally a secular state, and Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution prohibits discrimination against citizens on grounds including religion. The implication is important: political participation is a citizenship right, not a privilege reserved for members of the religious majority.

 

This is where religious leadership carries an enormous responsibility. A Sheikh, pastor or traditional religious leader does not speak only to those seated before him. His words travel through social media, enter homes, influence young people and can be repeated long after the original gathering has ended.

 

Femi Fani-Kayode, Nigeria’s ambassador-designate to South Africa, made precisely this point in his reaction to Jingir’s comments, describing the rhetoric as provocative and warning that Nigeria is neither a Muslim nor a Christian country but a secular, multi-religious state. Human-rights lawyer Deji Adeyanju similarly warned on August 10, 2026, that religious rhetoric capable of deepening divisions between Christians and Muslims threatens national cohesion.

 

The lesson should not be that religious people must abandon their convictions. Quite the opposite. Strong faith should make Nigerians more committed to justice, dignity, compassion and peaceful coexistence. Nigeria does not need religious leaders who pretend that differences do not exist. It needs leaders mature enough to acknowledge those differences without turning them into political weapons.

 

The 2027 elections will come and go. Presidents will change, parties will win and lose, and politicians will eventually leave office. But Nigeria will remain. Muslims will continue living beside Christians; Christians will continue doing business with Muslims; and millions of families will continue to transcend religious boundaries. That enduring relationship is more important than any political ticket.

 

From the diaspora, therefore, the message is simple: Nigerians may disagree passionately about candidates, parties and policies, but we must never allow political competition to convince us that our fellow citizens are less Nigerian because they worship differently. Religious freedom means the freedom to believe. Religious tolerance means allowing another citizen to believe differently without treating that difference as a threat. Nigeria needs both.

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Analysis

Lessons from the Catholic Bishops’ Visit to Tinubu, by Boniface Ihiasota 

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Lessons from the Catholic Bishops’ Visit to Tinubu, by Boniface Ihiasota 

 

The recent visit of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria to President Bola Ahmed Tinubu at the Presidential Villa was more than a ceremonial engagement. It became one of the clearest illustrations yet of the widening gap between official optimism and the daily realities confronting millions of Nigerians. The discussions that followed—and the public reactions they generated—have once again underscored the indispensable role of religious institutions in shaping national conversations on governance, accountability and social justice.

 

Led by the President of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria, Archbishop Matthew Man-Oso Ndagoso, the bishops used the opportunity to raise concerns over insecurity, economic hardship, unemployment and the general welfare of Nigerians. They also urged President Tinubu to formally invite Pope Leo XIV to Nigeria, arguing that such a visit would strengthen peace, unity and national reconciliation.

 

President Tinubu, on his part, defended his administration’s reforms, insisting that the difficult decisions taken since assuming office were necessary to rescue the economy from years of structural distortions. He maintained that security architecture was being repositioned and that prosperity would eventually follow the current sacrifices.

 

Ordinarily, such exchanges between government and faith leaders are healthy in every democracy. However, the conversation assumed greater significance after Cardinal John Onaiyekan publicly disclosed that the President disagreed with many of the bishops’ assessments. According to the Cardinal, the bishops told Tinubu that “the economy is not helping our poor people,” while the President maintained that the economy was improving. The revelation immediately triggered widespread debate across political and religious circles because it exposed two sharply contrasting narratives about the state of the nation.

 

Yet, facts remain stubborn. Nigeria continues to face severe economic challenges. Inflation has remained elevated over the past two years, food prices have climbed dramatically, and millions of households continue to struggle with declining purchasing power. The World Bank has repeatedly warned that while reforms such as fuel subsidy removal and exchange-rate liberalisation may improve long-term fiscal sustainability, they also impose painful short-term costs on vulnerable citizens unless accompanied by robust social protection measures.

 

This explains why the bishops’ intervention resonated beyond the Catholic faithful. Religious leaders occupy a unique position in Nigerian society. They interact daily with ordinary citizens who seek assistance through churches, mosques and community organisations. Consequently, their assessment of public suffering often reflects grassroots realities that official statistics may not immediately capture.

 

The reactions also revealed an important democratic principle. Criticism of government should not automatically be interpreted as political opposition. Throughout Nigeria’s democratic history, both Christian and Muslim leaders have consistently spoken against corruption, insecurity, injustice and poverty irrespective of which party occupies Aso Rock. Their constitutional freedom to speak truth to power remains essential to democratic accountability.

 

At the same time, government officials equally have the responsibility to explain policies and defend their decisions. Democracy thrives not when everyone agrees but when disagreements are managed through dialogue rather than hostility. The exchange between Tinubu and the bishops should therefore be viewed as evidence that democratic engagement remains alive, provided both sides continue to listen respectfully.

 

The larger lesson is that perception matters almost as much as policy. Economic indicators may improve on paper, but if ordinary Nigerians cannot afford food, healthcare, education or transportation, public confidence will remain elusive. Governments ultimately earn legitimacy not through optimistic speeches but through measurable improvements in people’s quality of life.

 

As Nigeria journeys toward the 2027 elections, the meeting between the Catholic bishops and President Tinubu should remind both leaders and citizens that governance is not merely about defending statistics or winning arguments. It is about restoring hope. That hope will be strengthened only when policy outcomes begin to match the lived experiences of the millions whose voices the bishops sought to amplify.

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