Analysis
Savannah Shield and the Security Recalibration of Kwara State
Savannah Shield and the Security Recalibration of Kwara State
By Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
On Thursday, 19 February 2026, at the historic Sobi Barracks in Ilorin, Kwara State did more than launch a security operation. It signalled a recalibration. The formal flag-off of Operation Savannah Shield by Governor AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq alongside the Chief of Defence Staff, General Olufemi Oluyede, the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Waidi Shaibu, senior Nigerian Army commanders and heads of security agencies represented a strategic adjustment to a changing threat landscape.
Having covered Nigeria’s major military theatres for nearly a decade — from Operation Sharan Daji to Operation Accord and to Operation Sahel Sanity and now Hadarin Daji in the North-West to Operation Delta Safe in the South-South and Operation Safe Haven and Operation Whirl Stroke in the North-Central — I have come to understand that recalibration, not reaction, defines sustainable security. Savannah Shield is best understood within that framework: a preventive correction designed to interrupt an emerging trajectory before it hardens into crisis.
Kwara’s security story over the past two years has been one of gradual but undeniable pressure. Between 2024 and 2025, reported kidnapping incidents along the Ilorin–Jebba–Mokwa corridor and rural incursions in parts of Kaiama and Baruten Local Government Areas raised alarm within security circles. National crime tracking datasets and internal security briefings presented in Abuja in late 2025 reflected a broader pattern: North-Central Nigeria recorded an increase in abduction cases year-on-year, mirroring spillover effects from the North-West’s entrenched banditry networks.
Kwara was not yet a frontline theatre. But it was no longer peripheral. Geography partly explains the vulnerability. The state shares strategic boundaries with Niger State to the north and Kogi to the east, while expansive savannah woodland and forest belts — particularly near Kainji Lake — provide concealment corridors. In conflict reporting, terrain is destiny. In Zamfara, forests became staging grounds for bandits. In Kaduna, forest belts enabled mobile kidnapping cells. Kwara’s terrain, if left insufficiently policed, risked similar exploitation.
It is important to distinguish threat types accurately. Kwara is not contending with a large-scale ideological insurgency akin to Boko Haram’s campaign in Borno. The dominant security pattern has been criminal banditry — kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling and sporadic attacks targeting vulnerable communities. Yet the distinction offers little comfort if criminal enclaves begin to entrench themselves. Across Nigeria, the line between economic criminality and violent extremism has proven porous when safe havens emerge.
Operation Savannah Shield therefore represents an anticipatory defence. Its structure reflects lessons from other theatres. Rather than a fragmented deployment, it integrates the Nigerian Army, Nigeria Police Force, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps and intelligence services under coordinated planning. Area domination patrols, forest clearance missions and rapid-response operations are being conducted simultaneously with intelligence gathering and surveillance.
The February 19 launch was not ceremonial theatre. It followed months of consultation between the Kwara State Government and federal authorities. Governor AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq’s engagement with the Presidency and defence leadership secured additional military reinforcement. The visible presence of the Chief of Defence Staff at the launch conveyed federal seriousness — a signal that Kwara’s recalibration had national backing.
From a factual standpoint, the state government has not limited itself to rhetoric. In the 2025 fiscal cycle, budgetary allocations supporting security logistics were increased. Confirmed procurement of patrol vehicles and communication equipment enhanced operational mobility. Community policing initiatives were expanded, and liaison structures strengthened between security agencies and traditional institutions.
Mobility and intelligence are operational currencies. In Kaduna between 2021 and 2023, the integration of aerial surveillance and ground coordination under Operation Thunder Strike reduced high-profile highway kidnappings along key corridors. In Zamfara, initial fragmentation under Operation Hadarin Daji slowed results until unified command structures were enforced. Kwara appears to have internalised those lessons from inception.
Since the launch of Operation Savannah Shield, early field reports suggest measurable improvements in patrol visibility along previously vulnerable routes. Residents in parts of Kwara North have reported increased security presence compared with late 2025. Security officials privately confirm that sustained patrol cycles have disrupted criminal mobility patterns. While comprehensive operational statistics remain confidential for tactical reasons, the qualitative indicators point to stabilisation momentum.
But recalibration demands depth, not just deployment. The sustainability question looms large. Military offensives can suppress activity; lasting stability depends on institutional reinforcement. The Nigeria Police Force in Kwara must build intelligence capacity and data-driven crime mapping systems to assume long-term stabilisation roles once immediate military pressure reduces threat intensity.
In every theatre I have covered, gains proved fragile when civilian policing capacity lagged behind military success.
Judicial coordination is equally critical. Arrested suspects must face timely prosecution. Kaduna’s experience in strengthening prosecution processes between 2022 and 2023 offers a useful blueprint. Deterrence is anchored not merely in arrest numbers but in the certainty of consequence. Kwara’s Ministry of Justice must align operational tempo with judicial throughput.
Security recalibration also intersects with economic policy. Kwara’s northern agricultural belt contributes significantly to food production. When insecurity disrupts planting and harvesting cycles, economic ripple effects follow — affecting markets, employment and food inflation. By stabilising rural communities, Savannah Shield safeguards both livelihoods and macroeconomic resilience.
Inter-state coordination will determine whether recalibration endures. Criminal networks relocate under pressure. I observed this dynamic in the North-West, where offensives in one state displaced bandits into neighbouring territories. Kwara must institutionalise intelligence-sharing protocols with Niger, Kogi, Oyo and Osun to prevent displacement cycles. A shield is only as strong as its perimeter.
Public communication deserves commendation. Transparent advisories and engagement with community leaders have sustained trust. In conflict zones, misinformation amplifies fear and undermines operations. Kwara’s measured communication approach counters panic while reinforcing cooperation.
Of course, realism tempers optimism. Security operations demand sustained funding. Logistics, fuel, maintenance and personnel welfare cannot be episodic. If Savannah Shield is to remain effective beyond its launch phase, fiscal consistency must accompany strategic clarity.
Yet what distinguishes Savannah Shield is not perfection but intent backed by structure. The recalibration is evident in three dimensions: anticipatory deployment before escalation, integrated command rather than siloed action, and alignment between security and development policy.
From a regional lens, the significance is broader. North-Central Nigeria is a strategic hinge between insurgency-prone North-East and bandit-dominated North-West. Preventing entrenchment in relatively stable states like Kwara strengthens national security coherence. Savannah Shield contributes to that containment logic.
After nearly a decade reporting from Nigeria’s security corridors, I have learned that the most meaningful victories are incremental. They manifest in reopened schools, functioning markets and uninterrupted farming seasons. They are measured in the quiet return of routine.
Kwara’s recalibration signals an understanding that waiting invites escalation. Acting early reduces long-term cost — human and economic. The February 19 launch was therefore less about spectacle and more about strategic timing.
Savannah Shield is not a silver bullet. No operation is. But it is a structured assertion that Kwara will not surrender its harmony to creeping insecurity. It is a commitment that governance will adapt to emerging threats rather than deny them.
In a national landscape often fatigued by crisis headlines, Kwara’s approach offers a measured alternative: acknowledge vulnerability, mobilise partnership, invest in logistics, align institutions and communicate transparently.
Security recalibration is not merely about raising a shield. It is about strengthening the arm that holds it and reinforcing the society it protects. If sustained with discipline, institutional learning and inter-state cooperation, Savannah Shield can become more than an operation. It can become a model of preventive governance in North-Central Nigeria and beyond.
Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com
Analysis
Will Africa Follow Niger Republic? By Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
Will Africa Follow Niger Republic? By Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
Africa’s greatest economic contradiction is buried beneath its own soil. Across the continent lie enormous deposits of oil, gas, uranium, gold, lithium, cobalt, copper, diamonds and other strategic minerals, yet many of the countries sitting on these resources continue to struggle with poverty, unemployment, weak industrialisation and the steady movement of their young people towards Europe, North America and other destinations in search of better opportunities.
For decades, much of Africa’s natural wealth has travelled outward as raw material, while the greater economic value created through processing, refining, manufacturing and technology has accumulated elsewhere. Africa has supplied the resources that feed global industries, but has too often remained at the lower end of the economic chain, buying back finished products at prices far removed from what it earned when those raw materials left its soil.
That contradiction is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore because of what is happening in Niger Republic. Since General Abdourahamane Tiani came to power following the July 26, 2023 coup, his government has increasingly pursued greater control over Niger’s natural resources. What initially appeared to be part of the broader political rupture between Niamey and its former colonial power, France, has gradually developed into a wider policy of resource nationalism.
On June 19, 2025, Niger’s Council of Ministers approved the nationalisation of Société des Mines de l’Aïr, SOMAÏR, the uranium company operating at Arlit in the Agadez region. SOMAÏR was established in 1968 and began uranium production in 1971. Before nationalisation, French nuclear company Orano held 63.4 per cent, while Niger’s state mining company, SOPAMIN, held 36.6 per cent.
Between 1971 and 2024, SOMAÏR produced 81,861 tonnes of uranium, of which 80,518 tonnes were commercialised. Figures presented by the Nigerien government showed that Orano had taken 86.3 per cent of the commercialised production, while SOPAMIN accounted for 9.2 per cent.
In August 2026, the government took another step. It awarded the In Azaoua large-scale uranium mining permit in Arlit to Teloua Safeguarding Uranium Mining Company, TSUMCO, the state company created to replace SOMAÏR and continue operations over the former SOMAÏR perimeter. At its August 21 meeting, the Council of Ministers also approved the reassignment of another uranium permit, Madaouela I, to the state-linked Madaouela Mining Company.
The government has adopted a similar approach in the petroleum sector. On June 12, 2026, Niger’s Petroleum Minister, Hamadou Tini, announced that the government was reviewing the hydrocarbons code and preparing a new production-sharing contract model. He said the reforms were intended to strengthen the state’s negotiating capacity and increase the economic benefits accruing to Niger. He also disclosed plans to review provisions relating to cost recovery by petroleum operators and stressed the importance of training Nigerien professionals capable of negotiating more effectively with international companies.
Niger has also established MAZOUMAWA National Gold Company as part of its attempt to strengthen national control over gold resources and the country’s gold value chain. In January 2026, its Director-General, Abdou Ousseini, said the company intended to contribute to gold exploitation while controlling the valorisation and value chains of gold in Niger. The company had two exploration permits in the Dan Issa area and had collected more than 6,000 samples for analysis.
There is, therefore, something much bigger than the Niger-France dispute at stake. It is the ownership of Africa’s economic future.
For generations, the structure has remained remarkably familiar. Africa digs, pumps, cuts and exports. Someone elsewhere processes, refines, manufactures, finances and markets. The finished product eventually returns to African consumers at a considerably higher price.
That arrangement is not entirely without benefits. Foreign companies bring capital, technology, technical expertise, international markets and, in some cases, infrastructure that many African countries would struggle to provide on their own. The problem begins when that relationship becomes permanent, when Africa remains trapped at the extraction end of the value chain while the greater economic benefits of its resources accumulate elsewhere.
The African Union has recognised this problem for years through initiatives such as the African Mining Vision and its commodities strategy. The objective is for Africa to move from being primarily a supplier of raw materials towards greater value addition, stronger local content, higher returns from commodities and meaningful participation in global value chains.
The African Development Bank estimates that Africa possesses about 30 per cent of the world’s mineral reserves and could capture more than 10 per cent of the projected $16tn revenues from key green minerals by 2030. Yet the same institution reported that Africa received about $190.7bn in financial inflows in 2022 while losing approximately $587bn through financial leakages.
The implication is clear: Africa does not necessarily need to chase away foreign investors. It needs to become a better negotiator, a more capable participant and, ultimately, a stronger owner of the industries built around its own resources.
Botswana offers an important illustration. Its diamond industry was not built by simply shutting foreign capital out. Debswana, the company at the centre of Botswana’s diamond production, is jointly owned by the Government of Botswana and De Beers, with each holding 50 per cent. The partnership has become a major contributor to Botswana’s GDP, foreign exchange earnings and government revenue and employs about 5,000 staff and 6,000 contractors.
Tanzania has pursued another route by giving the state a minimum 16 per cent non-dilutable free-carried interest in mining companies, alongside taxation, royalties and other government participation mechanisms. Its local-content framework also seeks to ensure that Tanzanian companies participate in supplying goods and services to the mining industry.
Ghana has moved in a different direction. Rather than nationalising its gold mines, it has sought to increase domestic participation through regulation. Its 2025 local-content framework required surface mining operations to be undertaken by wholly Ghanaian-owned contractors, while underground contract mining requires at least 50 per cent Ghanaian ownership.
Zimbabwe’s lithium policy provides perhaps an even clearer example of beneficiation as a development strategy. After banning exports of unprocessed lithium ore in 2022, Zimbabwe announced in June 2025 that it would prohibit the export of lithium concentrates from January 1, 2027. The objective is to encourage greater domestic processing. Zimbabwe is Africa’s leading lithium producer, while Chinese-owned companies have invested more than $1bn in the country’s lithium sector since 2021.
If lithium is increasingly important to batteries and energy storage, Zimbabwe wants more of the economic activity generated by that demand to take place within Zimbabwe rather than elsewhere. That is precisely the direction Africa needs to consider.
The International Energy Agency reported in October 2025 that Africa captures less than one per cent of the value generated from manufacturing clean-energy technologies and their components, despite supplying around 75 per cent of global manganese, 70 per cent of cobalt and nearly 20 per cent of copper. The IEA estimates that moving into beneficiation, processing and manufacturing could raise the market value of minerals produced in Africa to about $120bn by 2040.
This is why the African Union’s Africa Green Minerals Strategy, adopted in March 2025, is significant. The strategy calls for Africa to move beyond raw mineral exports towards value addition at source, regional industrialisation, local beneficiation, job creation and economic diversification. The AU’s African Forum on Mining subsequently called for stronger continental bargaining power and high-level African critical-minerals diplomacy to ensure that mineral agreements prioritise local value addition rather than simply facilitate the export of raw materials.
Niger, therefore, should not be judged simply by whether its nationalisation policy succeeds or fails. Its experiment should be watched for what it reveals about both the possibilities and dangers of greater resource control.
National ownership does not automatically produce efficient management. A government can own a mine and still mismanage it. It can control petroleum and still import refined products. It can take over gold operations while communities around the mines remain poor. It can remove foreign companies and replace foreign inefficiency with domestic corruption.
Niger itself has already encountered some of these complications. Orano has pursued arbitration over the nationalisation of its interest in SOMAÏR. In September 2025, Reuters reported that about 1,500 tonnes of uranium, valued at roughly $270m, remained stockpiled at the former SOMAÏR mine. Orano had begun arbitration proceedings and warned against the material being transferred or sold without authorisation.
A country seeking greater control over its resources needs competent geologists, engineers, lawyers, accountants, negotiators, regulators and financial institutions. It needs reliable electricity, roads, railways and ports. It needs research institutions capable of developing technology. It needs transparent contracts and systems through which citizens can know what governments receive from their natural resources and how those revenues are spent.
Without these foundations, nationalisation can become an expensive political gesture. But Africa should not allow the imperfections of resource nationalism to become an excuse for maintaining a system in which the continent remains primarily an exporter of raw materials.
Nigeria illustrates the urgency. The country has oil, gas, gold, lithium, iron ore, coal and other minerals, but its economic history has repeatedly demonstrated the danger of exporting natural resources without developing sufficient downstream capacity.
The Tinubu administration has increasingly emphasised local processing and value addition in critical minerals. In July 2026, President Bola Tinubu commissioned a $250m lithium mining and processing plant in Nasarawa State with a capacity of 6,000 tonnes of lithium processing per day. It was described as Africa’s largest lithium processing facility.
Nigeria should not stop at processing lithium. It should be thinking about the battery industry, electric vehicles, energy-storage systems, industrial chemicals, research and the skilled workforce required to support those industries.
The same thinking should apply across Africa. A Congolese citizen living beside cobalt deposits should have access to opportunities created by cobalt. A Zambian living around copper mines should benefit from industries built around copper. A Ghanaian should see gold not merely as something extracted and exported, but as an opportunity for refining, jewellery, financial services and manufacturing. A Nigerien should be able to look at uranium and see engineering, science, technology and industrial opportunities. And a Nigerian should be able to look at oil and gas without accepting that the country’s natural destiny is simply to export crude and import refined products.
If Africa can retain more value from its resources, that value can help finance universities, technical schools, electricity, transport infrastructure, healthcare, manufacturing and technology. Those investments can create productive employment. Productive employment can reduce the economic pressure pushing young Africans towards foreign shores.
The real lesson from Niger, therefore, is not that every African government should wake up tomorrow and nationalise every foreign-owned mine, oilfield or industrial operation. That would be a simplistic reading of what is happening. The lesson is that the old bargain deserves serious reconsideration.
Africa should welcome investors, but it should negotiate better. It should welcome technology, but build its own capacity. It should welcome international capital, but ensure that African capital also grows. It should permit extraction, but demand value addition. It should collect royalties and taxes, but also build industries around the resources generating them.
Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com
Analysis
The Ondo Air Crash and the Cost of Losing Those Who Protect Nigeria, by Boniface Ihiasota
The Ondo Air Crash and the Cost of Losing Those Who Protect Nigeria, by Boniface Ihiasota
The Nigerian Air Force aircraft crash in Igbokoda, Ondo State, has once again confronted Nigeria with a painful question that goes beyond mourning: how much does the country truly value the lives of the men and women entrusted with protecting it?
The tragedy occurred on Monday, October 5, 2026, when an NAF ATR-42 aircraft, tail number NGR 931, disappeared from radar at about 9:13am while travelling from Benin City, Edo State, to Lagos. The aircraft eventually crashed in a swampy area close to the Naval Base in Igbokoda, headquarters of Ilaje Local Government Area. The Nigerian Air Force confirmed that it was on a routine mission.
It is important to correct one early description of the incident. Initial reports from Igbokoda referred to a helicopter, largely because residents saw a military aircraft go down. The NAF subsequently established that the aircraft was an ATR-42, a twin-engine turboprop platform used by the service for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as other military operations.
The human cost is devastating. There was initially confusion over the number of people aboard. The Minister of Aviation and Aerospace Development, Festus Keyamo, reported 25 passengers and seven crew members, making 32 people. President Bola Tinubu’s statement also referred to 25 passengers and seven crew members. However, the NAF’s subsequent release on October 6 identified 20 passengers and five crew members, 25 people in all, and confirmed that there were no survivors.
That discrepancy itself deserves clarification. In a tragedy involving human lives, figures cannot be treated as mere administrative details. Families deserve certainty about who was aboard, while the public deserves an authoritative account of what happened. The investigation must therefore establish not only the cause of the crash but also the definitive passenger and crew manifest.
President Tinubu has already ordered a thorough investigation, while the NAF has directed a comprehensive inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the accident. The Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau has said the crash, involving a military aircraft, falls outside its statutory mandate unless formally invited by the military.
This is where the tragedy must become more than another funeral and another condolence statement.
Nigeria’s military aviation history contains too many painful reminders of what happens when questions surrounding aircraft serviceability, maintenance, operational pressure, training, procurement and institutional accountability are not subjected to sustained scrutiny. An investigation should therefore not become a bureaucratic exercise whose final report disappears into official archives. It must establish what happened, why it happened and, most importantly, what will change.
The ATR-42 involved also carries an important history. In July 2020, the NAF announced the reactivation of another ATR-42 after it had accumulated 5,000 operational hours. The aircraft underwent major maintenance in Germany, described by the Air Force as its first periodic depot maintenance after 10 years of operation. That history does not establish the cause of the Igbokoda crash, but it demonstrates why aircraft maintenance and serviceability must remain central to any serious investigation.
The 25 people officially confirmed dead were not simply numbers. They were pilots, technicians, military personnel and civilians. The NAF’s published list includes Squadron Leader MI Aburime, the flight captain; Squadron Leader AP Man-Ugwueje and Flight Lieutenant IS Bako, both identified as co-pilots; two aircraft technicians and 20 passengers.
Nigeria has rightly mourned them. President Tinubu also declared three days of national mourning and ordered flags to fly at half-mast. But genuine remembrance should extend beyond ceremonies.
Those who fly into danger to defend Nigeria deserve an aviation system in which their safety is treated as a national security priority. The Igbokoda crash should therefore compel Nigeria to ask uncomfortable questions, demand transparent answers and implement whatever corrective measures the investigation produces.
A nation cannot adequately honour its fallen defenders by mourning them today and forgetting the lessons of their deaths tomorrow.
Analysis
Democracy Not Africa’s Answer, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
Democracy Not Africa’s Answer, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
There is a question Africa has avoided for too long because it is politically uncomfortable and historically sensitive: is democracy, as it is presently practised across much of the continent, actually capable of delivering the Africa that Africans need? The question is not an argument for dictatorship. No! It is not a defence of military coups, one-party states or governments that silence citizens. It is not even an argument that Africans do not deserve the right to choose their leaders. They do.
But after decades of elections, constitutions, political parties and changes of government, it is legitimate to ask whether the political model Africa inherited and subsequently reproduced has become more important to African leaders than the outcomes it is supposed to produce.
The fact remains, Africa’s problem is no longer simply who wins elections. It is what happens after the election. Across the continent, citizens are confronting unemployment, insecurity, failing public services, inflation, weak currencies, poor electricity supply, inadequate healthcare, infrastructure deficits, declining purchasing power and the persistent inability of governments to transform enormous natural wealth into broad prosperity. Meanwhile, political competition is often reduced to the struggle for control of the state and its resources.
The evidence of growing frustration is difficult to dismiss. In its latest survey covering 38 African countries in 2024 and 2025, Afrobarometer found that only 47 per cent of respondents considered their country a democracy and only 38 per cent were satisfied with the way democracy was working. Yet 64 per cent still preferred democracy and majorities rejected one-person rule, one-party rule and military rule. Only 36 per cent qualified as what Afrobarometer called “committed democrats”, meaning respondents who both preferred democracy and rejected all three authoritarian alternatives. The report suggests that Africans are not necessarily tired of democracy. They are increasingly tired of the failure of governments that call themselves democratic.
For years, African political elites have treated elections as the utmost evidence of democratic success. Four or five years pass, citizens vote, results are announced, winners celebrate and losers complain. Then government continues. But democracy cannot be reduced to the mechanics of voting. A ballot paper does not put food on a table. It does not generate electricity. It does not secure a village from armed groups. It does not build a functioning railway, hospital or university. It does not process minerals into finished products or turn unemployed young people into productive workers.
The World Bank’s 2025 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment found that governance remains one of the areas in which Sub-Saharan Africa has improved more slowly than other regions. The Bank reported that poor government effectiveness continues to undermine infrastructure and public-service delivery, while deficiencies in transparency, accountability, budget execution and internal controls remain serious obstacles to development.
Consider Nigeria. The country has crude oil, natural gas, vast agricultural land, a huge population, a large consumer market and substantial human capital. Yet electricity remains unreliable, manufacturing struggles with high operating costs, public infrastructure is inadequate and millions of Nigerians remain trapped in poverty. Governments change, slogans change and development plans change, but the structural problems survive the politicians who supposedly came to solve them.
The Democratic Republic of Congo presents an even more painful contradiction. It possesses some of the world’s most important deposits of cobalt, copper and other minerals essential to the modern economy. Yet enormous mineral wealth has coexisted with poverty, weak infrastructure and instability.
Africa therefore does not merely have a resource problem. It has a state-capacity problem. The continent has resources. What it repeatedly lacks is the institutional machinery to convert resources into sustained prosperity. This should force Africans to reconsider what they mean by democracy. Perhaps the more useful political question is not whether a government was elected, but whether the institutions of that government are strong enough to protect public resources from political capture, whether public officials can be held accountable, whether policies survive changes of administration and whether citizens have meaningful influence between elections.
Disappointingly, the answer will not be found in military government. Africa has travelled that road before. The coups that swept across Africa after independence produced governments that often promised discipline, national renewal and an end to corruption. In many cases, they eventually reproduced the same failures they had condemned. Military rule is not a development strategy. Soldiers can seize power, but they cannot manufacture competent institutions merely by wearing uniforms.
The answer may instead lie in redesigning democratic government itself. Africa should examine a form of government that combines democracy with strong federalism, substantial decentralisation, consensus-building, professional public administration and direct participation by citizens. Switzerland provides perhaps the clearest developed-country example of what such an arrangement can look like.
Since becoming a federal state in 1848, Switzerland has organised political authority across the Confederation, 26 cantons and more than 2,000 communes. The principle is straightforward: government should remain as close to the people as possible, with powers transferred upward only where necessary. Its seven-member Federal Council operates collectively, with decisions based on consensus rather than the political dominance of one president. Swiss citizens also vote directly on particular issues through referendums and popular initiatives. Switzerland is not Africa, and no serious person should suggest copying its constitution wholesale. But the underlying principle deserves attention.
Why should one politician in a nation’s capital control an extraordinary concentration of resources and appointments in a country as geographically and culturally diverse as Nigeria? Why should communities wait for federal intervention to solve problems that can be managed locally? Why should political parties compete primarily for the presidency when development takes place in towns, villages, municipalities and regions?
Decentralisation is ultimate here. It will make government visible. It also makes failure harder to hide. A local government that controls its resources and responsibilities can be judged directly by the people living under it. A state or province can be compared with another. Competition can become a competition over public-service delivery rather than merely over political patronage.
Although decentralisation alone is not enough. Africa also needs a professional state. And this is where Singapore offers another useful lesson. Its political circumstances are very different from those of African countries though.
When Lee Kuan Yew became Singapore’s first Prime Minister in 1959, the country faced severe unemployment, overcrowding and economic uncertainty. Nearly 70 per cent of the population lived in slums, according to Singapore’s historical records, and unemployment was in double digits. After Singapore became independent on August 9, 1965, its leaders faced the additional problem of having virtually no natural resources and no large domestic market. They responded with long-term economic planning, industrialisation, infrastructure development, education and an aggressive drive to attract international investment.
The Economic Development Board, established in 1961, became a central instrument of industrialisation. Singapore developed Jurong as an industrial estate, invested heavily in infrastructure and deliberately positioned itself as an export-oriented economy. By 1970, the country had moved close to full employment.
Even at that, Singapore’s story must not be romanticised. Its political model, civil liberties record and historical circumstances are different from those of African states. But one lesson is difficult to dispute: development requires a state capable of implementing decisions consistently over decades. That is precisely what many African political systems struggle to achieve.
A new administration frequently arrives with a new programme, a new slogan and a new set of political appointees. Long-term projects are abandoned, renamed or redesigned. Institutions become vulnerable to political interference. Public servants learn that political loyalty may matter more than professional competence.
Africa cannot build a century-long future on four-year political calculations. What the continent needs is a democratic system that protects the people’s right to choose but prevents every election from becoming a complete reset of the state.
Imagine an African federation in which elected governments could change, but national development strategies could not be casually abandoned. Imagine independent institutions managing public finances, elections, justice and natural resources without becoming instruments of whoever occupies the executive office. Imagine regions controlling significant resources while remaining constitutionally bound to national standards on education, healthcare, security and human rights. That would still be democracy. But it would be a more institutional democracy. It would also address one of Africa’s most destructive political habits: the obsession with the individual leader.
Too much of African politics revolves around presidents. Their photographs dominate government buildings. Their names appear on projects funded with public money. Their approval is sought for matters that should be handled by institutions. Political succession becomes a national crisis because the system is built around personalities rather than rules.
The continent’s 54 states contain hundreds of ethnic groups, languages, religions, political traditions and historical experiences. A rigid political template imposed uniformly across all of them is unlikely to produce identical outcomes. Nigeria is not Botswana. Ghana is not Ethiopia. Kenya is not Morocco. Senegal is not South Africa. Africa therefore needs a political philosophy rather than a single imported constitutional costume.
Africa’s answer may lie in a democratic order redesigned around its own realities: federal where appropriate, decentralised where practical, participatory where necessary, professional in administration, disciplined in public finance and relentless about long-term development.
The objective should not be to discover a government that looks African. It should be to build governments that work for Africans.
Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com
-
Diplomacy1 week agoWhen Two Powerful Heads Meet …
-
Politics1 week agoLee backs Trump-Kim talks, seeks phased North Korea denuclearisation
-
News1 week agoPIF, CARICOM formalise partnership to advance SIDS priorities
-
Analysis1 week agoOrtom’s 23 Vehicles and the Dangerous Culture of Public Entitlement, by Boniface Ihiasota
-
Politics1 week agoRussia may launch limited NATO attack in months, Danish intelligence warns
-
Politics1 week agoEDITORIAL: African Leaders Must Speak to the World With Sovereign Power
