U.S. Yields to Pressure, Drops Mali from Visa Bond List

The United States has quietly withdrawn Mali from its controversial Visa Bond Pilot Programme, ending weeks of diplomatic tension with the West African nation just days before the policy was due to take effect.

In an update released on October 23, 2025, the U.S. Department of State confirmed that only six African countries — Mauritania, São Tomé and Príncipe, Tanzania, The Gambia, Malawi, and Zambia, remain subject to the visa-bond requirement, with implementation dates ranging from August to October 2025.

Mali, which was initially included in the October 8 listing, was noticeably omitted from the revised roster, a move interpreted by observers as a diplomatic backtrack following Bamako’s strong response.

According to the State Department, the initiative is backed by Section 221(g)(3) of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Temporary Final Rule governing the pilot scheme.

It said the decision was informed by data from the Department of Homeland Security on B-1/B-2 visa overstay rates among nationals of selected countries.

The visa-bond policy, which empowers U.S. consular officers to demand a refundable bond of up to $15,000 from certain visa applicants to guarantee their return, had sparked immediate outrage in Bamako.

Malian authorities denounced the measure as unfair and discriminatory, arguing that it singled out their citizens without justifiable cause.

In a rare show of diplomatic defiance, the Malian government responded by introducing a reciprocal visa-bond rule targeting U.S. travellers.

That tit-for-tat decision appeared to have forced Washington’s hand. With the potential for a full-blown diplomatic rift looming, the U.S. eventually removed Mali from the list, easing tensions between the two countries.

Analysts say the U.S. retreat underscores Washington’s desire to avoid deepening hostilities with Mali, which in recent years has redefined its foreign alliances and taken a more assertive stance in global diplomacy.

Bamako’s firm response, they argue, signalled its readiness to confront what it perceives as unilateral or prejudicial policy moves.

By stepping back, the U.S. has effectively prevented a visa-related dispute from escalating into a broader diplomatic impasse, even as other African countries remain under the visa-bond scheme.

Tinubu’s Policy Somersaults and the Search for Economic Direction

By Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman

When President Bola Ahmed Tinubu declared “subsidy is gone” on May 29, 2023, he triggered not just applause but also anxiety. The bold announcement, made even before he settled into office, set off a chain reaction that would define his presidency. Nearly 17 months later, what stands out is not just the courage of his decisions but the inconsistency of their execution, a troubling pattern of policy somersaults that have left Nigeria’s economy oscillating between reform and relapse.

The Tinubu administration came into power on the promise of bold economic transformation. It pledged to end wasteful subsidies, unify the exchange rate, overhaul the tax system, and attract investment. Yet, the implementation of these policies has often been marked by haste, reversals, and contradictions, leaving citizens to bear the brunt of experimentation without a clear safety net.

Few policies have shaped the Tinubu era like the removal of fuel subsidy. The logic was sound: the Nigerian government spent over ₦4.7 trillion on subsidies in 2022 alone, according to the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), making it more than the federal budgets for health and education combined. Eliminating it, Tinubu argued, would free up funds for infrastructure and development.

However, the rollout was chaotic. Within weeks, the average petrol price jumped from below ₦200 per litre to ₦617 at major Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL) stations by July 2023. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) later confirmed that the average national retail price surged from ₦238.11 per litre in May 2023 to ₦626.21 by September 2023 — a 226 percent increase in just four months.

By May 2024, NBS data showed another spike, with petrol averaging ₦769.62 per litre nationwide, and even higher in states like Taraba and Rivers. In some private stations in Lagos and Ibadan, prices exceeded ₦850 per litre by late 2024.

The economic consequences were immediate. Transport costs tripled, food inflation soared, and small businesses struggled to survive. What made matters worse was the creeping suspicion that the government had quietly reintroduced a “hidden subsidy.” Independent data from industry analysts revealed that as of mid-2024, the landing cost of petrol was about ₦1,200 per litre, yet it sold for roughly ₦700, suggesting that the federal government was once again absorbing part of the cost.

This backdoor return of subsidy, after its public burial, unapologetically exposed a policy contradiction. The administration that prided itself on fiscal discipline was once again subsidizing consumption, this time without transparency.

Again, Tinubu’s decision to unify the exchange rate and allow the naira to float was meant to end years of distortion in Nigeria’s foreign exchange market. In June 2023, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) merged multiple exchange windows, and the naira initially traded at around ₦750 per dollar.

But the reform quickly turned into a free fall. By September 2024, the naira had tumbled to over ₦1,600 per dollar in the parallel market. In October 2025, Reuters reported it hovering between ₦1,455 and ₦1,475 at the official Investors and Exporters window, a sign that despite the “float,” the CBN had resumed active interventions.

The result was predictable: imported goods became unaffordable, inflation climbed above 30 percent, and investor confidence weakened. Nigeria’s inflation officially stood at 24.23 percent in March 2025, according to the NBS, but food inflation was far higher, eroding household purchasing power.

The policy’s intent to attract foreign inflows was lost amid uncertainty. Businesses couldn’t plan; manufacturers couldn’t price goods; and citizens, already hit by petrol costs, faced a depreciating currency that made survival harder by the month.

Also, in a bid to expand revenue, the Tinubu government launched an ambitious tax reform agenda, establishing the Presidential Committee on Fiscal Policy and Tax Reforms led by Taiwo Oyedele. The committee’s work was well-received, projecting an effort to simplify Nigeria’s complex tax regime and improve collection efficiency.

But at the same time, the government and its agencies imposed new taxes and levies that contradicted the reform spirit. Excise duties on beverages increased, Customs raised import tariffs, and several states introduced new consumption taxes. Manufacturers, already reeling from exchange-rate pressures and high energy costs, began to shut down or relocate.

The Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) warned in mid-2024 that over 30 percent of its members were operating below capacity, citing rising input costs and multiple taxation. The government’s short-term revenue drive, critics argue, is strangling the very industries that could generate sustainable growth.

Furthermore, in April 2024, the government approved an electricity tariff hike for “Band A” customers, from ₦68 to ₦225 per kilowatt hour, claiming it affected only those receiving at least 20 hours of power daily. But within weeks, public outcry forced a partial reversal. The Minister of Power, Adebayo Adelabu, and the regulatory commission issued conflicting statements, leaving investors uncertain and consumers angry.

The pattern was similar in labour relations. After months of delay, negotiations for a new minimum wage ended in confusion. A proposed ₦70,000 wage was announced, withdrawn, and then reintroduced and yet to be fully implemented across. Each cycle of promise and reversal erodes credibility and deepens public frustration.

To cushion the subsidy shock, the federal government announced a ₦500 billion palliative package, including cash transfers and food distribution. But implementation was chaotic. Governors disagreed on sharing formulas, distribution was politicized, and many citizens reported being left out.

Similarly, the much-publicized student loan scheme, initially announced for September 2023 was delayed for nearly a year, suspended, then relaunched in mid-2024. The repeated stop-start pattern has become emblematic of Tinubu’s governance style: bold announcements followed by administrative bottlenecks.

Tinubu’s reform instinct is not the problem; his reform management is. The administration must move from ad hoc responses to structured execution. Nigeria cannot afford further policy confusion; stability and clarity must now define governance.

First, the President should rebuild coordination within his economic team. The CBN, Ministry of Finance, and Budget Office must speak with one voice. Economic policy cannot thrive when officials contradict one another.

Second, transparency must replace opacity. Nigerians deserve to know how much is spent on fuel subsidy, how forex is allocated, and how palliatives are distributed. Publishing monthly reports on fiscal and monetary interventions would restore trust.

Third, government must prioritize production over taxation. Incentivize manufacturing, reduce energy bottlenecks, and support SMEs through credit facilities. Expanding the economy’s productive base will yield more revenue than squeezing existing taxpayers.

Fourth, social protection needs reengineering. Palliatives should be digital, data-driven, and corruption-proof. The student loan scheme must be managed transparently, not politicized. The poor cannot remain collateral damage in every policy transition.

Finally, President Tinubu must embrace patience. Sustainable reform is not achieved through shock therapy but through gradual, sequenced policies backed by strong institutions. The temptation to reverse decisions under pressure should give way to evidence-based adjustments.

Alabidun is the Editor of Diaspora Watch Newspapers and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com

Russia Calls for Calm as Deadly Pakistan–Afghanistan Border Clashes Escalate

Russia has appealed for restraint following two days of heavy fighting between Pakistani and Taliban forces along their shared border, which has left dozens dead and severely disrupted trade activities in the region.

In a statement issued on Monday, the Russian Foreign Ministry said it was “closely monitoring the situation” and noted that tensions appeared to be “stabilising.” The Kremlin added that it “welcomes this process,” joining China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar in calling for an immediate de-escalation.

Hostilities broke out late last week after the Taliban accused Pakistan of masterminding a series of explosions in Kabul and the eastern province of Paktika on Thursday.

By Saturday night, Taliban fighters reportedly launched coordinated attacks on several Pakistani military positions, triggering fierce retaliatory strikes. Both sides exchanged artillery fire, drone attacks, and gunfire through Sunday morning, with sporadic clashes continuing into the new week.

The two countries have released sharply conflicting casualty figures.

Pakistan’s military reported 23 soldiers killed while claiming to have neutralised more than 200 Taliban and allied fighters. However, Afghan officials countered that 58 Pakistani troops were killed in the exchanges.

By Monday, Pakistani troops were said to be on high alert along the Spin Boldak–Chaman crossing, where hundreds of civilians and commercial trucks remained stranded following the border closure.

Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry in a statement said the country “greatly values dialogue and diplomacy,” but warned that “any further provocations would be met with an unwavering and befitting response.”

Relations between Islamabad and Kabul have steadily worsened since the Taliban returned to power in 2021.

Pakistan has consistently accused Afghanistan of harbouring the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — an armed group responsible for multiple attacks on Pakistani soil. The Taliban government has repeatedly denied the claim, insisting it does not support cross-border militancy.

Russia, which has sought to expand its influence in post-U.S. Afghanistan, has emerged as a key diplomatic player in the evolving South Asian security landscape.

In both 2022 and 2024, Taliban representatives attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, marking a gradual thaw in Moscow–Kabul relations.

Last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin described the Taliban as “allies in the fight against terrorism,” particularly against ISIS-K (Islamic State Khorasan Province) — the regional affiliate of ISIL that has staged deadly attacks in Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan.

In July 2025, Russia became the first country to formally recognise the Taliban government — a decision the Kremlin said was intended to “boost productive bilateral cooperation across multiple sectors.”

Analysts say Moscow’s latest intervention reflects its growing stake in maintaining regional stability, especially as new power alignments emerge across Central and South Asia.

The Russian Foreign Ministry’s call for restraint, they note, underscores Moscow’s intent to position itself as a mediator and stabiliser amid shifting alliances and old rivalries in the region.

“Russia’s involvement is no longer symbolic,” said a senior Central Asian affairs analyst in Moscow. “It is actively trying to shape outcomes that prevent instability from spilling over into its southern borders.”