Analysis
Insecurity: Defence, Development, and Duty, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
Insecurity: Defence, Development, and Duty, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
Last week, this column examined the need for Nigeria to go beyond the symbolic appointment of a Defence Minister and to embrace a more strategic, coherent and results‑oriented national security policy. With the Honourable Minister of Defence, General Christopher Gabwin Musa (rtd) now sworn in and formally at his desk, the expectations of Nigerians have understandably risen. Citizens are no longer satisfied with promises that go unfulfilled, rhetoric without measurable results, or military engagements that deliver ephemeral victories without sustainable impact. The scale of the challenge is immense, and to effectively confront insecurity in all its dimensions requires a realistic blueprint that is rooted in global experience but fully adapted to our domestic realities.
The current insecurity landscape in Nigeria is not confined to a single theatre of operation. It encompasses violent extremism in the Northeast involving Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) factions; widespread banditry and cattle rustling across the Northwest; mass kidnappings for ransom that have spread into Central and Southern states; maritime piracy and sea robbery; farmers‑herders clashes in the Middle Belt; and criminal syndicates operating along transport corridors. These threats are not isolated, and they share common vectors that exploit governance gaps, economic deprivation, porous borders, and community distrust of state institutions. The sheer breadth of this insecurity crisis has made it clear that conventional, ad hoc responses will not suffice. What Nigeria requires now is a comprehensive, intelligence‑driven approach that integrates defence, internal security, economic development, and community empowerment.
The experience of other countries that have confronted similar threats offers instructive lessons. Nations that have made progress in countering terrorism and organised crime have done so by strengthening intelligence structures, integrating technology into security operations, building trust with local communities, and coordinating interagency responses. The United Kingdom’s counter‑terrorism framework, known as CONTEST, was first developed in 2003 by Sir David Omand at the Home Office in response to the 2001 9/11 attacks. It has been revised in 2006, 2009, 2011, 2018, and most recently in July 2023 to address evolving threats. CONTEST’s four pillars — Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare — aim to safeguard UK citizens and infrastructure. Between 2018 and 2023, nine terrorist attacks were declared in the UK, resulting in six deaths and about 20 injuries, while law enforcement agencies disrupted 39 late-stage terrorist plots before they could be executed. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2019, introduced by then Home Secretary Sajid Javid and receiving Royal Assent on 12 February 2019, further strengthened UK powers at ports, borders, and in counter‑terrorism investigations. These measures reiterate the importance of intelligence integration and pre-emptive action, lessons highly relevant to Nigeria’s own security planning.
Spain’s experience with ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) provides another instructive example. ETA was responsible for hundreds of deaths over decades before declaring a definitive cessation of armed activity in 2011 and formally dissolving its structure in May 2018. French and Spanish security cooperation played a decisive role in degrading ETA’s networks throughout the 2000s and 2010s, alongside judicial and intelligence reforms after the 2004 Madrid train bombings. Historical estimates attribute between 830 and 857 killings to ETA, illustrating both the human cost of insurgency and the impact of sustained counter-terrorism measures led by state intelligence agencies. Spain’s Ministry of Interior and Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Centre continues to coordinate post-ETA security strategies, reflecting the necessity of ongoing vigilance even after apparent victories.
Saudi Arabia has also demonstrated the impact of a coordinated, high-level counter-terrorism approach. In 2005, the Kingdom hosted the first International Counter-Terrorism Conference in Riyadh, attended by over 55 countries, resulting in the establishment of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) with Saudi financial support of US$110 million to assist countries in combating terrorism. Further, in February 2014, King Abdullah issued a royal decree reinforcing counter-terrorism measures, stating that participation in extremist or terrorist activities would not be tolerated, reflecting a strong political commitment to national and global security. According to the Global Terrorism Index, Saudi Arabia’s terrorism impact score declined significantly over the past decade, demonstrating the effectiveness of combined intelligence, legislative, and operational measures.
The Global Terrorism Index (GTI), published annually by the Institute for Economics and Peace, provides a reliable benchmark for assessing global terrorism trends. The 2025 GTI reported that 66 countries recorded terrorist attacks in 2024, up from 58 the previous year, indicating the persistent and shifting nature of the threat. The Sahel region accounted for more than half of global terrorism-related deaths, while lone-wolf and extremist-inspired attacks increased in Western countries. These data underline that counter-terrorism outcomes depend on sustained political will, integrated agency action, and community engagement, lessons, again, that are directly applicable to Nigeria.
In Nigeria, security responses have frequently been reactive. Major operations are mounted after attacks have occurred, rather than through proactive disruption of networks and early interdiction of planned activities. To shift this paradigm, the Defence Ministry under General Christopher Gabwin Musa must prioritise the establishment of a National Intelligence Fusion Centre. Such a centre would integrate data from the military, police, Department of State Services, National Security Adviser’s office, customs, immigration, and digital surveillance units into a single analytic platform. This would enable real-time situational awareness, more accurate threat forecasting, and faster decision-making. A national counter-terrorism database accessible to all relevant agencies, with robust legal protections for privacy and civil liberties, would serve as the cornerstone of this integrated architecture.
Border security is another area where strategic emphasis must be placed. Many militant and criminal groups operating in Nigeria exploit porous borders with neighbouring countries. These transnational linkages facilitate the movement of fighters, weapons, contraband, and illicit funds. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has recognised this regional dynamic and proposed a 5,000-member standby force to respond rapidly to insecurity across member states at an estimated first-year cost of $2.61 billion. Nigeria must not only support and participate in regional frameworks but must also strengthen its own border control mechanisms. Smart border technologies such as biometric identification systems, integrated customs and immigration databases, and joint patrols with neighbouring states would make significant inroads into restricting unauthorised movements. Additionally, aerial and satellite surveillance over key migratory and smuggling corridors would enhance the country’s ability to detect and intercept threats before they materialise. Stronger border security disrupts the flow of armed groups, weapons, and contraband while protecting economic zones and encouraging lawful trade.
A critical deficiency in Nigeria’s current security approach has been the disconnect between national forces and local communities. In areas affected by violent extremism and banditry, many communities feel abandoned or marginalised. This creates fertile ground for violent actors to gain influence by positioning themselves as protectors or providers of services. The rise of community security networks such as the Civilian Joint Task Force in the Northeast and Amotekun in the Southwest offers a promising model for localised engagement. These groups have provided valuable situational insights, early warning reporting, and rapid response capabilities. But their informal status limits their effectiveness. What is needed is a nationally coordinated framework that formally integrates community security structures into the broader security architecture, with clear legal status, standardised training, dedicated resources, and oversight mechanisms that ensure accountability and respect for human rights. Empowered, community-embedded security actors can act as force multipliers, strengthening the reach of formal security agencies and building trust between citizens and the state.
Technology must be at the heart of Nigeria’s future security efforts. Modern conflicts are increasingly shaped by information, surveillance, and real-time connectivity. Drones, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, secure communication networks, and artificial intelligence tools for pattern detection can transform the operational footprint of security agencies. For a country with vast territories that are difficult to monitor through ground forces alone, investing in long-endurance drones and satellite imagery agreements would provide crucial surveillance coverage. Integrating AI-enabled systems to analyse movement patterns, social media signals, and financial flows linked to criminal networks can alert authorities to emerging threats before they materialise into attacks. These investments should be accompanied by specialised training for personnel to interpret and act on the data generated by these systems. In this way, technology amplifies human capacity and creates a more agile, responsive defence posture.
Civil-military relations also demand urgent attention like never before. The pattern of military engagements that yield high collateral damage or disregard human rights has undermined public confidence. Nigeria’s military must adopt what is often referred to in strategic circles as a “hearts and minds” approach. This means that operations should be conducted with strict adherence to the rule of law, with proactive measures to minimise harm to civilians, and with structured engagement mechanisms that involve traditional leaders, local influencers, and civil society organisations.
Socio-economic development must be integrated into the security agenda. One of the principal drivers of recruitment into violent groups is the lack of opportunity for youth. Unemployment remains high, especially in regions most affected by insecurity. If young people have little access to quality education, job opportunities, or even a sense of hope for the future, the appeal of violent groups offering financial incentives and a sense of belonging increases. Therefore, national security policy must be coordinated with economic planning. Ministries of Defence, Interior, Youth Development, Finance, and regional development agencies must work with the private sector to design vocational training programmes, micro-enterprise support schemes, agricultural revitalisation initiatives, and infrastructure projects that create sustainable livelihoods in vulnerable communities. Security will not be sustainable where economic despair persists.
Transparency and accountability in the security sector are also essential. Nigerians are weary of high defence budgets that appear disconnected from tangible results. Defence spending must be accompanied by transparent reporting, independent oversight, and measurable performance outcomes. The creation of parliamentary defence committees with access to classified expenditure details has precedent in mature democracies and can be adapted to Nigeria’s context. Civil society organisations, human rights bodies, and the media must be permitted, within legal frameworks, to scrutinise defence policies and operations. When citizens see that resources are managed responsibly and that abuses are addressed decisively, trust in the security apparatus increases, and cooperation improves.
Nigeria’s role in regional security cooperation cannot be overstated. The threats that afflict the country are not confined to its borders. Maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, cross-border banditry, extremist networks with regional affiliates, and smuggling syndicates operate across national frontiers. Nigeria must lead, not only in rhetoric but in structured collaborative action through regional bodies such as ECOWAS and the African Union. Joint training programmes, intelligence sharing agreements, coordinated patrols, and unified response protocols can dramatically improve collective capacity to deal with transnational threats. However, such cooperation must be accompanied by clear understanding of command responsibilities, funding mechanisms, and the primacy of human rights in operational engagements.
Within the next twelve to twenty-four months, a well-executed security blueprint based on the principles outlined can deliver measurable improvements. Reduced terror-related fatalities, fewer mass kidnappings, restored confidence in security forces, and renewed economic activity in previously conflict-impacted areas would serve as tangible indicators of progress. Most importantly, strengthened cooperation between federal and state security agencies and enhanced trust with communities will lay the foundation for longer-term stability.
Nigeria stands at a crossroads. The Defence Ministry now has the opportunity to transform the nation’s security architecture, not through isolated campaigns or fleeting headlines, but through a sustained, integrated, people-centred strategy. Ending insecurity in Nigeria is not merely a Defence Ministry task. It is a national imperative that demands political will, inter-governmental coordination, community partnership, and structural reform. The people of this country deserve not merely promises but results. It is time for leadership that does more than respond to insecurity; it is time for leadership that contains, mitigates, and ultimately overcomes it. Nigeria’s future depends on it.
Analysis
Let the Bishop’s Visit Heal Us — A Call for Peace Among Mbaise Sons and Daughters in the Diaspora
Let the Bishop’s Visit Heal Us — A Call for Peace Among Mbaise Sons and Daughters in the Diaspora
By Boniface Ihiasota
Publisher/Correspondent, Foreign Press Center, Washington D.C.
Excel Global Media Group Inc, USA
The first episcopal visit of His Lordship, Rt. Rev. Simeon Okezuo Nwobi, Catholic Bishop of Ahiara Diocese, to the DMV is more than a Mass. More than a reception. More than protocol.
It is a divine appointment.
On Sunday, July 12, 2026, at 3:00 PM, the people of Mbaise in DC, Maryland, Virginia, and neighboring states will gather at St. Matthias Catholic Church, Lanham, to welcome our Bishop. Friendship Hall will open its doors. But the real question is: Will we open our hearts?
At a time when our Mbaise diaspora community is blessed with numbers, talent, and resources, we are also burdened by something far less holy — division. The whispers have grown louder than our prayers. Gossip travels faster than goodwill. Clans compete where they should collaborate. Brothers ignore brothers. Sisters wound sisters with words. We are building houses side by side in Maryland, Virginia, and D.C., yet building walls between our hearts.
This cannot be our story in a foreign land.
I appeal to His Lordship: Let this visit be a moment of soul searching for all of us. Use your shepherd’s staff not only to bless an altar, but to gather a scattered flock. Preach to us again the Gospel we know but too often forget — _“Love one another as I have loved you.”_ John 13:34 did not come with exceptions for village meetings, title disputes, or WhatsApp arguments.
Mbaise people are known for faith, resilience, and intellect. We produced bishops, professors, doctors, builders. But what does it profit us to gain the whole DMV and lose our brotherhood? Our children are watching. They are learning how to be Igbo in America from us. Are we teaching them unity or enmity?
Let St. Matthias on July 12 be remembered not just as the place we welcomed our Bishop, but as the ground where healing began. Let every son and daughter of Mbaise who enters Friendship Hall that day become a witness to a new covenant: That from this day, we will eschew hate. We will kill gossip before it kills our community. We will disagree without destroying.
Division is easy. Anybody can pull down. Peace is the hard, holy work of builders. And we are _Ndi Mbaise_ — we are builders.
Bishop Nwobi, you carry the moral authority of Ahiara Diocese. We, your children abroad, carry the weight of survival in a foreign land. Neither is easy. But together, we can make this diaspora a cathedral of love, not a courtyard of conflict.
I call on every Mbaise union, every age grade, every family, every individual: Come to the drawing board. The Bishop is coming. The Church doors are open. The moment is now.
Let us leave Friendship Hall as brothers and sisters, not just by blood, but by bond. Let us pursue our good, and the good of the community at large. For in the end, _“Umunna bu ike”_ — but only when _Umunna_ is at peace.
May this visit not just welcome a Bishop. May it restore a people.
I come in peace.
Analysis
Understanding Kwara’s New Security Landscape, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
Understanding Kwara’s New Security Landscape, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
There are journeys that leave you with more questions than answers. There are also journeys that challenge the assumptions carefully built from social media commentaries, political arguments and sensational headlines. Kwara’s security story belongs in that category.
For months, the dominant narrative has oscillated between two extremes. On one side are those who insist that the state has become a model of coordinated security response under Governor AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq. On the other are critics who argue that nothing has changed because kidnappings still occur, farmers are occasionally attacked and some communities continue to live under the shadow of fear. The truth, as is often the case, lies somewhere in between.
Security is perhaps the most difficult sector to evaluate because its greatest achievements are rarely visible. A school can be commissioned. A road can be measured in kilometres. A hospital can be counted in beds. But how does one measure an attack that never happened because intelligence intercepted the perpetrators? How does one quantify the confidence of a farmer who returns to his farmland after months of uncertainty? How do you calculate the value of a market that gradually comes alive again because armed patrols now dominate routes that were once deserted?
These questions came to mind while reflecting on the evolving security landscape across Kwara North and parts of Kwara South during my tour in the days leading to this year’s Eid-el-Adha (Big Sallah) celebration.
What became obvious is that the conversation should no longer be about whether insecurity exists. It does. The more useful debate is whether Kwara today is better prepared to confront it than it was a few years ago. That distinction matters.
The events of February 3 and 4, 2026, remain one of the darkest moments in the state’s contemporary history. Terrorists descended on Woro and Nuku Communities in Kaiama Local Government Area, killing scores of residents, burning homes, destroying livelihoods and abducting others after months of reported threats to the communities. The attacks left entire families shattered and forced many survivors into displacement. Estimates of the death toll varied, but humanitarian agencies and international media reported that well over 160 people were killed, making it one of the deadliest attacks in Nigeria this year.
The attack fundamentally altered Kwara’s security conversation. It was no longer about isolated kidnappings or criminal gangs seeking ransom. It exposed the growing danger of extremist elements exploiting the vast forests around Kaiama, Baruten and neighbouring parts of Niger State.
The immediate aftermath painted a heartbreaking picture. Reports showed that Woro, once a thriving agrarian community, became largely deserted as survivors fled in search of safety. Only a fraction of the population remained behind to bury the dead and protect what little was left. Shops were shut. Schools stopped functioning. Farming activities halted almost completely. A community that had once depended on agriculture suddenly found itself battling for survival.
It was against this backdrop that the Governor AbdulRazaq administration faced perhaps its greatest security test.
To be fair, no state government possesses constitutional control over the military, police or intelligence agencies. Governors are called chief security officers largely by convention rather than operational authority. Yet citizens naturally hold them accountable whenever insecurity escalates. Rather than retreat into constitutional excuses, the administration adopted a multi-layered response.
As was relayed by both Traditional Rulers of Woro and Babanla, Alhaji Saliu Bio Umar and Oba Aliyu Alabi Yusuf (Arojojoye II) during my tour to their respective domain said Governor AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq visited the affected communities shortly after the attacks, describing the killings as a deliberate massacre and assuring residents that the government would not abandon them.
He subsequently engaged President Bola Tinubu and federal security authorities, pushing for stronger military intervention in the affected axis. That engagement resulted in the approval and eventual launch of Operation Savannah Shield, a joint military operation involving the Nigerian Army, Navy and Air Force to secure Kwara and adjoining parts of Niger State.
Operation Savannah Shield did not emerge in isolation. It came after months of increasing concern over terrorist infiltration into the forests stretching across Kaiama, Baruten and Edu Local Government Areas. The operation introduced additional troops, armoured assets, aerial surveillance, intelligence-driven operations and coordinated patrols aimed at dismantling criminal enclaves around the Kainji axis.
The operation was also consistent with the Federal Government’s broader security strategy for the first half of 2026, during which Kwara featured prominently among the country’s operational flashpoints alongside Borno, Yobe, Taraba, Katsina, Zamfara, Sokoto, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Oyo and Kaduna.
According to the Joint Security Press Briefing by the Defence Headquarters and other national security agencies on Thursday, 2nd of July, 2026, troops conducted 14,221 coordinated security operations nationwide between January and June 2026. These operations resulted in the neutralisation of 1,597 terrorists and insurgents, the rescue of 1,516 kidnapped victims, the recovery of 451 firearms, 16,726 rounds of ammunition, and 161 explosives and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Intelligence-driven raids, clearance missions and rescue operations specifically covered flashpoints that included Kwara, demonstrating the state’s strategic importance in the national counter-insurgency effort.
But military deployments alone do not tell the whole story. Secretary to the State Government, Professor Mamman Saba Jibril, during an interview with some Defence Editors in Ilorin in May said “Long before the Woro tragedy, the Kwara State Government had consistently invested in strengthening security logistics. Through Operation Harmony, the administration procured patrol vehicles, distributed motorcycles to all sixteen local government areas, supported communication equipment, provided operational logistics and sustained collaboration with the Nigeria Police Force, the Nigerian Army, the Department of State Services, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, the Nigeria Immigration Service and local vigilante groups. These interventions were designed to improve mobility, intelligence gathering and rapid response across vulnerable communities.”
Those investments complemented rather than replaced federal security operations. The administration’s sustained logistical support enabled security agencies to improve operational mobility across the difficult terrain stretching from Kaiama through Baruten to Edu. Equally important was the growing integration of local vigilantes, hunters and community intelligence networks with conventional security agencies, recognising that defeating armed groups operating inside forests requires both military capability and local knowledge.
Critics are quick to ask an understandable question: if all these interventions exist, why do kidnappings still occur? It is a fair question. Yet it also reflects the temptation to judge security by isolated incidents rather than broader trajectories.
No serious security analyst measures success by expecting absolute zero crime. Even countries with the world’s most sophisticated policing systems continue to confront organised criminality. The relevant question is whether institutions are becoming stronger, whether response times are improving, whether intelligence networks are expanding and whether communities are regaining confidence.
In Kwara, evidence suggests cautious but measurable progress. Beyond the increased visibility of troops and security patrols, law enforcement agencies have recorded concrete operational successes. During the first half of 2026, the Nigeria Police Force dismantled a 33-member criminal network involved in terrorism, cattle rustling and violent attacks in Kwara State. Intelligence-led policing also intensified across the forest corridors linking Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Ekiti, Kwara and Kogi States—routes long exploited by kidnappers, terrorists and armed gangs. In another major breakthrough, police dismantled a railway vandalism syndicate operating across Nasarawa, Bauchi and Kwara States, recovering approximately 60 tonnes of vandalised railway materials valued at about ₦400 million, thereby disrupting another organised criminal network.
Several communities that experienced disruption earlier in the year are gradually witnessing the return of commercial transport, weekly markets and farming activities under increased security presence. Farmers who abandoned portions of their farmlands are slowly returning, though many still do so with understandable caution. Commercial vehicles that once avoided certain routes now operate under the reassurance of military patrols and security checkpoints. Confidence remains fragile, but it is no longer absent.
The emotional scars, however, remain visible. The people of Woro continue to appeal to government at every level not merely to rebuild houses but to rescue those still abducted during the attacks. Families remain hopeful that missing relatives will someday return. Their request is simple: security operations should continue until every criminal network responsible for the tragedy is dismantled and those still in captivity regain their freedom. That appeal reminds everyone that security is ultimately about people rather than statistics.
Another lesson emerging from Kwara’s experience is that security cannot be divorced from economic development. Kaiama, Baruten, Edu and parts of Patigi constitute important agricultural belts. Whenever insecurity keeps farmers away from their fields, the consequences extend far beyond those communities. Food production declines, rural incomes collapse and local markets weaken. It is therefore unsurprising that Governor AbdulRazaq has repeatedly linked security operations with food security, arguing that protecting farming communities is as much an economic imperative as it is a law enforcement responsibility.
There is also a quieter aspect of the administration’s intervention that rarely attracts headlines. Traditional rulers, community leaders, hunters and local vigilante formations have become increasingly integrated into intelligence gathering.
Security agencies understand that the first indication of suspicious movement often comes not from technology but from local residents who know their environment intimately. Nationally, this community-centred approach has become a key pillar of military operations. Between January and June 2026, the Armed Forces conducted 33 peacebuilding initiatives, 13 public sensitisation campaigns and 33 stakeholder engagement meetings involving traditional rulers, religious leaders and community stakeholders. Kwara has increasingly benefited from this collaborative security model.
None of this suggests that government has solved every problem. It has not.
Remote communities still require greater security presence. Forest surveillance must become even more sophisticated. Border management around the Benin Republic axis deserves continued strengthening. More permanent security formations may still be necessary in vulnerable areas. Victims of terrorism require sustained rehabilitation beyond emergency relief. Yet fairness also demands acknowledging what has changed.
Professor Mamman Saba Jibril further noted during the interview that Kwara of today is not confronting insecurity with the same institutional capacity it possessed a few years ago, affirming operational mobility has expanded through improved logistics and state support. “Federal and state collaboration has deepened considerably. Intelligence coordination among the Armed Forces, Nigeria Police Force, Department of State Services, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Nigeria Immigration Service and local security volunteers has become more structured,” Jibril emphasized.
The dismantling of a 33-member criminal network in Kwara, intensified military operations within the Kainji axis and sustained intelligence-led operations across vulnerable communities underscore a more proactive security posture than previously existed. These developments do not erase tragedy, but they significantly improve the state’s capacity to prevent future attacks and respond more effectively when threats emerge.
Ultimately, security is measured not only by the absence of attacks but by the resilience of institutions. Kwara’s experience over the past year illustrates this reality. The February massacre in Woro and Nuku exposed dangerous vulnerabilities, but it also triggered one of the most coordinated security responses the state has witnessed in recent years. Military deployments increased, intelligence sharing improved, criminal networks were dismantled, and communities previously isolated by fear gradually began reclaiming normal life. While the threat has not disappeared, the institutional response is demonstrably stronger than before. Perhaps that is the real lesson.
Security is not a destination where governments eventually arrive and declare victory. It is a continuous process of adaptation against adversaries who constantly evolve. Every patrol vehicle deployed, every intelligence report acted upon, every community engagement held and every kilometre of forest reclaimed represents another step in that long journey.
Those who insist that nothing has changed ignore these institutional improvements. Those who claim everything is perfect ignore the grief of families still mourning loved ones, the fear of communities rebuilding from trauma and the reality that isolated attacks continue to occur. The wiser position lies between both extremes.
Kwara’s new security landscape is neither the paradise described by enthusiastic supporters nor the hopeless battlefield portrayed by relentless critics. It is a state confronting an evolving threat with increasing resolve, improved coordination and sustained investment, while recognising that the journey towards lasting peace is still unfinished. Beyond the gunfire and beyond the politics, perhaps that is the story that deserves to be told.
Alabidun is a Journalist and Editor and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com
Analysis
The Politics of Akara and Kuli-Kuli Empowerment, by Boniface Ihiasota
The Politics of Akara and Kuli-Kuli Empowerment, by Boniface Ihiasota
In a country battling one of its worst economic crises in decades, every statement and public programme from those in positions of leadership carries enormous symbolic weight. Nigerians are not only listening to what their leaders say; they are also measuring whether government actions reflect the daily struggles of ordinary citizens. That is why the recent empowerment initiative championed by Nigeria’s First Lady, Senator Oluremi Tinubu, has generated widespread criticism across the country.
The initiative, which encouraged women to embrace small-scale ventures such as akara frying, corn roasting and similar petty businesses, may have been conceived as a grassroots poverty alleviation programme. Across Nigeria, countless women have built respectable livelihoods through food vending and other micro-enterprises. There is dignity in honest labour, and no profession should be ridiculed.
However, the criticism is not directed at these occupations themselves. Rather, it is about the apparent disconnect between the scale of Nigeria’s economic challenges and the kind of empowerment being promoted by the nation’s highest office dedicated to women.
Since President Bola Ahmed Tinubu assumed office on May 29, 2023, his administration has implemented sweeping economic reforms, including the removal of petrol subsidy and the liberalisation of the foreign exchange market. While these policies were presented as necessary for long-term economic recovery, they have also contributed to soaring inflation, rising transportation costs and an unprecedented increase in the prices of food and essential commodities. Millions of Nigerian households have seen their purchasing power eroded.
According to the National Bureau of Statistics, food inflation has consistently remained among the highest components of the country’s inflation figures over the past two years. For many families, survival has become a daily struggle rather than a long-term economic plan.
Against this backdrop, many Nigerians expected empowerment programmes that would focus on access to affordable credit, vocational training in technology and manufacturing, agricultural value chains, digital entrepreneurship and medium-scale business development. Such interventions would not only provide immediate relief but also create pathways for sustainable wealth creation.
Instead, the emphasis on traditional petty trading has been interpreted by many as lowering the aspirations of Nigerian women at a time when countries across Africa are investing heavily in innovation, digital skills and industrial development.
The First Lady’s office occupies a unique position in Nigeria’s governance structure. Although it is not a constitutional office, it has historically been used to champion major social causes. Previous First Ladies have led campaigns on maternal health, education, HIV/AIDS awareness, women’s rights and humanitarian interventions. Consequently, every initiative launched from the office inevitably attracts national scrutiny.
Critics have also pointed to previous public engagements involving the First Lady, including the distribution of vehicles to party women leaders at periods when the country was grappling with serious security concerns, including the abduction of schoolchildren in different parts of northern Nigeria. Whether fair or not, such images reinforce a perception that political elites remain insulated from the hardships confronting ordinary Nigerians.
Perception matters in governance. Leadership is not merely about implementing programmes; it is equally about understanding the emotional pulse of the people. At a time when many women are university graduates, professionals, innovators and entrepreneurs seeking access to finance, markets and modern business opportunities, public messaging should inspire ambition rather than reinforce subsistence.
Constructive criticism should not be mistaken for ethnic or partisan hostility. Democratic accountability requires citizens to question public officials irrespective of tribe, religion or political affiliation. Holding leaders accountable strengthens democracy rather than weakens it.
The challenge before Nigeria is not whether women should sell akara, roast corn or produce local snacks. Many successful businesses have humble beginnings. The real question is whether government should limit its vision of women’s economic empowerment to survival-level enterprises while millions seek opportunities to participate meaningfully in a modern economy.
Nigerian women deserve policies that match their talents, education and aspirations. Empowerment should not simply help citizens survive poverty; it should equip them to escape it permanently. That is the standard by which every government initiative should be measured.
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