Analysis
Insecurity: Defence, Development, and Duty, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
Insecurity: Defence, Development, and Duty, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
Last week, this column examined the need for Nigeria to go beyond the symbolic appointment of a Defence Minister and to embrace a more strategic, coherent and results‑oriented national security policy. With the Honourable Minister of Defence, General Christopher Gabwin Musa (rtd) now sworn in and formally at his desk, the expectations of Nigerians have understandably risen. Citizens are no longer satisfied with promises that go unfulfilled, rhetoric without measurable results, or military engagements that deliver ephemeral victories without sustainable impact. The scale of the challenge is immense, and to effectively confront insecurity in all its dimensions requires a realistic blueprint that is rooted in global experience but fully adapted to our domestic realities.
The current insecurity landscape in Nigeria is not confined to a single theatre of operation. It encompasses violent extremism in the Northeast involving Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) factions; widespread banditry and cattle rustling across the Northwest; mass kidnappings for ransom that have spread into Central and Southern states; maritime piracy and sea robbery; farmers‑herders clashes in the Middle Belt; and criminal syndicates operating along transport corridors. These threats are not isolated, and they share common vectors that exploit governance gaps, economic deprivation, porous borders, and community distrust of state institutions. The sheer breadth of this insecurity crisis has made it clear that conventional, ad hoc responses will not suffice. What Nigeria requires now is a comprehensive, intelligence‑driven approach that integrates defence, internal security, economic development, and community empowerment.
The experience of other countries that have confronted similar threats offers instructive lessons. Nations that have made progress in countering terrorism and organised crime have done so by strengthening intelligence structures, integrating technology into security operations, building trust with local communities, and coordinating interagency responses. The United Kingdom’s counter‑terrorism framework, known as CONTEST, was first developed in 2003 by Sir David Omand at the Home Office in response to the 2001 9/11 attacks. It has been revised in 2006, 2009, 2011, 2018, and most recently in July 2023 to address evolving threats. CONTEST’s four pillars — Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare — aim to safeguard UK citizens and infrastructure. Between 2018 and 2023, nine terrorist attacks were declared in the UK, resulting in six deaths and about 20 injuries, while law enforcement agencies disrupted 39 late-stage terrorist plots before they could be executed. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2019, introduced by then Home Secretary Sajid Javid and receiving Royal Assent on 12 February 2019, further strengthened UK powers at ports, borders, and in counter‑terrorism investigations. These measures reiterate the importance of intelligence integration and pre-emptive action, lessons highly relevant to Nigeria’s own security planning.
Spain’s experience with ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) provides another instructive example. ETA was responsible for hundreds of deaths over decades before declaring a definitive cessation of armed activity in 2011 and formally dissolving its structure in May 2018. French and Spanish security cooperation played a decisive role in degrading ETA’s networks throughout the 2000s and 2010s, alongside judicial and intelligence reforms after the 2004 Madrid train bombings. Historical estimates attribute between 830 and 857 killings to ETA, illustrating both the human cost of insurgency and the impact of sustained counter-terrorism measures led by state intelligence agencies. Spain’s Ministry of Interior and Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Centre continues to coordinate post-ETA security strategies, reflecting the necessity of ongoing vigilance even after apparent victories.
Saudi Arabia has also demonstrated the impact of a coordinated, high-level counter-terrorism approach. In 2005, the Kingdom hosted the first International Counter-Terrorism Conference in Riyadh, attended by over 55 countries, resulting in the establishment of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) with Saudi financial support of US$110 million to assist countries in combating terrorism. Further, in February 2014, King Abdullah issued a royal decree reinforcing counter-terrorism measures, stating that participation in extremist or terrorist activities would not be tolerated, reflecting a strong political commitment to national and global security. According to the Global Terrorism Index, Saudi Arabia’s terrorism impact score declined significantly over the past decade, demonstrating the effectiveness of combined intelligence, legislative, and operational measures.
The Global Terrorism Index (GTI), published annually by the Institute for Economics and Peace, provides a reliable benchmark for assessing global terrorism trends. The 2025 GTI reported that 66 countries recorded terrorist attacks in 2024, up from 58 the previous year, indicating the persistent and shifting nature of the threat. The Sahel region accounted for more than half of global terrorism-related deaths, while lone-wolf and extremist-inspired attacks increased in Western countries. These data underline that counter-terrorism outcomes depend on sustained political will, integrated agency action, and community engagement, lessons, again, that are directly applicable to Nigeria.
In Nigeria, security responses have frequently been reactive. Major operations are mounted after attacks have occurred, rather than through proactive disruption of networks and early interdiction of planned activities. To shift this paradigm, the Defence Ministry under General Christopher Gabwin Musa must prioritise the establishment of a National Intelligence Fusion Centre. Such a centre would integrate data from the military, police, Department of State Services, National Security Adviser’s office, customs, immigration, and digital surveillance units into a single analytic platform. This would enable real-time situational awareness, more accurate threat forecasting, and faster decision-making. A national counter-terrorism database accessible to all relevant agencies, with robust legal protections for privacy and civil liberties, would serve as the cornerstone of this integrated architecture.
Border security is another area where strategic emphasis must be placed. Many militant and criminal groups operating in Nigeria exploit porous borders with neighbouring countries. These transnational linkages facilitate the movement of fighters, weapons, contraband, and illicit funds. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has recognised this regional dynamic and proposed a 5,000-member standby force to respond rapidly to insecurity across member states at an estimated first-year cost of $2.61 billion. Nigeria must not only support and participate in regional frameworks but must also strengthen its own border control mechanisms. Smart border technologies such as biometric identification systems, integrated customs and immigration databases, and joint patrols with neighbouring states would make significant inroads into restricting unauthorised movements. Additionally, aerial and satellite surveillance over key migratory and smuggling corridors would enhance the country’s ability to detect and intercept threats before they materialise. Stronger border security disrupts the flow of armed groups, weapons, and contraband while protecting economic zones and encouraging lawful trade.
A critical deficiency in Nigeria’s current security approach has been the disconnect between national forces and local communities. In areas affected by violent extremism and banditry, many communities feel abandoned or marginalised. This creates fertile ground for violent actors to gain influence by positioning themselves as protectors or providers of services. The rise of community security networks such as the Civilian Joint Task Force in the Northeast and Amotekun in the Southwest offers a promising model for localised engagement. These groups have provided valuable situational insights, early warning reporting, and rapid response capabilities. But their informal status limits their effectiveness. What is needed is a nationally coordinated framework that formally integrates community security structures into the broader security architecture, with clear legal status, standardised training, dedicated resources, and oversight mechanisms that ensure accountability and respect for human rights. Empowered, community-embedded security actors can act as force multipliers, strengthening the reach of formal security agencies and building trust between citizens and the state.
Technology must be at the heart of Nigeria’s future security efforts. Modern conflicts are increasingly shaped by information, surveillance, and real-time connectivity. Drones, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, secure communication networks, and artificial intelligence tools for pattern detection can transform the operational footprint of security agencies. For a country with vast territories that are difficult to monitor through ground forces alone, investing in long-endurance drones and satellite imagery agreements would provide crucial surveillance coverage. Integrating AI-enabled systems to analyse movement patterns, social media signals, and financial flows linked to criminal networks can alert authorities to emerging threats before they materialise into attacks. These investments should be accompanied by specialised training for personnel to interpret and act on the data generated by these systems. In this way, technology amplifies human capacity and creates a more agile, responsive defence posture.
Civil-military relations also demand urgent attention like never before. The pattern of military engagements that yield high collateral damage or disregard human rights has undermined public confidence. Nigeria’s military must adopt what is often referred to in strategic circles as a “hearts and minds” approach. This means that operations should be conducted with strict adherence to the rule of law, with proactive measures to minimise harm to civilians, and with structured engagement mechanisms that involve traditional leaders, local influencers, and civil society organisations.
Socio-economic development must be integrated into the security agenda. One of the principal drivers of recruitment into violent groups is the lack of opportunity for youth. Unemployment remains high, especially in regions most affected by insecurity. If young people have little access to quality education, job opportunities, or even a sense of hope for the future, the appeal of violent groups offering financial incentives and a sense of belonging increases. Therefore, national security policy must be coordinated with economic planning. Ministries of Defence, Interior, Youth Development, Finance, and regional development agencies must work with the private sector to design vocational training programmes, micro-enterprise support schemes, agricultural revitalisation initiatives, and infrastructure projects that create sustainable livelihoods in vulnerable communities. Security will not be sustainable where economic despair persists.
Transparency and accountability in the security sector are also essential. Nigerians are weary of high defence budgets that appear disconnected from tangible results. Defence spending must be accompanied by transparent reporting, independent oversight, and measurable performance outcomes. The creation of parliamentary defence committees with access to classified expenditure details has precedent in mature democracies and can be adapted to Nigeria’s context. Civil society organisations, human rights bodies, and the media must be permitted, within legal frameworks, to scrutinise defence policies and operations. When citizens see that resources are managed responsibly and that abuses are addressed decisively, trust in the security apparatus increases, and cooperation improves.
Nigeria’s role in regional security cooperation cannot be overstated. The threats that afflict the country are not confined to its borders. Maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, cross-border banditry, extremist networks with regional affiliates, and smuggling syndicates operate across national frontiers. Nigeria must lead, not only in rhetoric but in structured collaborative action through regional bodies such as ECOWAS and the African Union. Joint training programmes, intelligence sharing agreements, coordinated patrols, and unified response protocols can dramatically improve collective capacity to deal with transnational threats. However, such cooperation must be accompanied by clear understanding of command responsibilities, funding mechanisms, and the primacy of human rights in operational engagements.
Within the next twelve to twenty-four months, a well-executed security blueprint based on the principles outlined can deliver measurable improvements. Reduced terror-related fatalities, fewer mass kidnappings, restored confidence in security forces, and renewed economic activity in previously conflict-impacted areas would serve as tangible indicators of progress. Most importantly, strengthened cooperation between federal and state security agencies and enhanced trust with communities will lay the foundation for longer-term stability.
Nigeria stands at a crossroads. The Defence Ministry now has the opportunity to transform the nation’s security architecture, not through isolated campaigns or fleeting headlines, but through a sustained, integrated, people-centred strategy. Ending insecurity in Nigeria is not merely a Defence Ministry task. It is a national imperative that demands political will, inter-governmental coordination, community partnership, and structural reform. The people of this country deserve not merely promises but results. It is time for leadership that does more than respond to insecurity; it is time for leadership that contains, mitigates, and ultimately overcomes it. Nigeria’s future depends on it.
Analysis
Tinubu, EFCC and the Danger of Political Interference, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
Tinubu, EFCC and the Danger of Political Interference, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
There are moments when the intention behind an official decision may be defensible, yet the decision itself opens a door that ought to concern every citizen. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s intervention in the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission’s freezing of an Osun State Government account is one of those moments.
On August 6, 2026, with the Osun governorship election only nine days away, Tinubu directed the EFCC to return to court, vacate the order freezing an account belonging to the Osun State Government and discontinue the action it had instituted. The President said he was “deeply embarrassed” not by the EFCC’s exercise of its mandate, which he acknowledged was backed by a court order, but by its timing.
His explanation was understandable. Tinubu said actions taken by federal institutions were ordinarily attributed to him as President, whether or not he had prior knowledge of them. Since the election was approaching, he argued, nothing should be done that could create the impression that the EFCC or another Federal Government agency was being used to influence the election.
The argument is “morally” correct. But it also creates a difficult constitutional and institutional question: where does legitimate presidential concern about an election end and operational interference in an anti-corruption agency begin?
The EFCC did not arbitrarily descend on Osun. The commission said it had observed “huge transfers of funds into different corporate entities” from the state account and had acted to halt what it considered suspicious movement of public money. It argued that the approaching election could not become an excuse for an anti-corruption agency to ignore suspected movement of public funds.
Governor Ademola Adeleke, however, said the account was used for workers’ salaries and had been placed on a “Post No Debit” status. He demanded an explanation from EFCC Chairman Ola Olukoyede and described the action as another assault on Osun’s democracy.
The political atmosphere surrounding the matter had also been poisoned long before the account was frozen. In June, the Diaspora Committee of the All Progressives Congress Governorship Campaign Council in Osun asked the EFCC to freeze accounts allegedly connected with a reported N13.7bn annual ghost-workers payroll scandal. The committee claimed the money could be diverted to finance vote-buying ahead of the August 15 election. That background makes the EFCC’s action politically sensitive. But sensitivity is precisely why institutional independence matters.
The EFCC is a creation of statute. Under the EFCC (Establishment) Act, its chairman and members are appointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, while the law also provides for the chairman’s tenure and removal. The Presidency therefore has substantial influence over the commission’s leadership. That, however, does not make the President the operational head of every EFCC investigation.
There is an important distinction between constitutional authority over an institution and operational control of its investigations. A President may appoint the EFCC chairman, exercise statutory powers concerning the office, formulate broad government policy and demand accountability from federal agencies. But an anti-corruption agency must retain sufficient operational independence to determine whom to investigate, what evidence to pursue and what enforcement action to take.
Curiously, Tinubu himself made this case in the same statement. He said that since assuming office in May 2023, he had consistently maintained that anti-corruption and law-enforcement agencies should perform their statutory responsibilities independently and professionally, “without fear or favour, or political interference.” He added that he had deliberately refrained from directing or interfering in EFCC operations. That is why the Osun intervention becomes more concerning.
If a President can intervene in an operational decision because its timing might create an appearance of political interference, then the President has necessarily exercised influence over an operational decision. That does not automatically make the intervention unlawful. But it creates a precedent that future administrations may exploit.
Tinubu may genuinely believe the EFCC action could have been interpreted as an attempt to influence the Osun election. Another President could make the same argument about an investigation involving a governor, a minister, a major campaign financier or a politically influential contractor. If the principle becomes that the Presidency can intervene whenever enforcement action creates political controversy, the exception could eventually swallow the rule.
Nigeria’s history with the EFCC offers enough warnings. The commission was established in 2002 and began operations under President Olusegun Obasanjo, with Nuhu Ribadu becoming its pioneer chairman in 2003. Ribadu’s aggressive pursuit of governors, ministers, bankers and other powerful Nigerians gave the EFCC international prominence. But his controversial removal in 2007 also generated questions about the vulnerability of the commission to presidential and political interests.
Farida Waziri’s tenure produced another controversy. Appointed by President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua in 2008, she was removed by President Goodluck Jonathan on November 23, 2011. Years later, Waziri alleged that Jonathan’s administration had interfered with investigations and that her refusal to back down from a probe contributed to her removal. Though Jonathan rejected the allegation and challenged her to identify whom he had allegedly ordered her not to investigate.
The significance of those disputes is not simply who was right. It is that Nigerians repeatedly witnessed a situation in which the political leadership had enormous influence over the institution expected to investigate politically powerful people.
The Muhammadu Buhari administration provided another example. Buhari appointed Ibrahim Magu as acting EFCC chairman in 2015, despite the controversy that followed the Senate’s rejection of his nomination for substantive confirmation. On July 10, 2020, Buhari approved Magu’s suspension to allow a presidential panel to investigate allegations against him.
Again, the larger issue was institutional. The leadership of the EFCC remained heavily dependent on the Presidency, even though the commission’s work could directly affect members and allies of the governing political establishment. That is the weakness Nigeria has failed to resolve.
The President appoints the EFCC chairman. The commission investigates people who may have enormous political connections. The chairman therefore operates within an institutional structure in which the most powerful political office in the country has significant influence over the leadership of the agency.
This is why the Osun matter cannot be reduced to whether Tinubu had the right to be concerned about the election. Of course, he did. Elections must be protected from intimidation, manipulation and the misuse of state institutions. The harder question is whether that legitimate concern should be exercised through a presidential direction concerning a live EFCC enforcement matter.
There is also an important constitutional distinction regarding Adeleke. Section 308 of the 1999 Constitution grants a sitting governor immunity from civil or criminal proceedings in specified circumstances. But immunity is not exoneration. It does not mean a governor cannot be investigated, that evidence cannot be gathered or that public funds associated with a state government are beyond investigation.
If the EFCC had credible evidence of suspicious transfers, Adeleke’s candidacy should not automatically extinguish the commission’s investigative responsibility. Conversely, the approaching election should not give the EFCC licence to turn an investigation into a political weapon. The law must be stronger than both impulses.
That is why the better solution should have been procedural rather than presidential. If the EFCC had obtained a freezing order from a court and concerns subsequently arose about its timing or effect on essential state services, those concerns could have been presented before the court. If salaries needed to be paid, the government could have sought appropriate judicial relief.
Adeleke, too, must allow due process to take its course. If the EFCC acted unlawfully, the courts provide the remedy. If the allegations are false, evidence and due process should establish that fact.
For Olukoyede, the lesson is equally clear. The EFCC’s greatest asset is not proximity to the President but distance from political instruction. The commission must be prepared to investigate opposition politicians and members of the ruling party, governors and former governors, ministers and political financiers according to the same evidentiary standard.
Tinubu’s intervention, even if motivated by a legitimate desire to protect the integrity of the Osun election, should concern Nigerians. Institutions survive governments. Presidents come and go. Political parties win and lose elections.
If Tinubu truly wants Nigerians to believe that the EFCC is independent, the next step is obvious. He should help build an institutional framework in which no future President will need to intervene to prove that the EFCC is not being used politically. That is the real test of leadership. And that is the difference between fighting corruption under a President and building a country where the fight against corruption does not depend on the President.
Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com
Analysis
Jingir’s Words and the Challenge of Religious Tolerance, by Boniface Ihiasota
Jingir’s Words and the Challenge of Religious Tolerance, by Boniface Ihiasota
Nigeria’s greatest strength has always been its diversity. Muslims, Christians, traditional worshippers and citizens of other beliefs have lived, worked, traded and built families across the country’s complicated social landscape. That is why recent utterances attributed to Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jingir deserve more than partisan applause or condemnation. They demand reflection.
At an event attended by, among others, Kano State Governor Abba Yusuf and Jigawa State Governor Umar Namadi, Sheikh Jingir renewed his support for a Muslim-Muslim presidential ticket ahead of the 2027 elections. He argued that Muslims should mobilise behind such a ticket and urged his audience to obtain their Permanent Voter Cards. He also referred to those opposed to his position as “infidels” and said Muslims should “show the infidels their limit.”
There is, of course, nothing inherently undemocratic about a Muslim advocating for Muslim candidates. Democracy gives every citizen the right to support candidates according to personal convictions, including religious convictions. The problem begins when political competition is framed as a contest between religious communities, particularly in a country where religious identity has historically been capable of provoking suspicion, fear and violence.
From the perspective of many Nigerians in the diaspora, this language is especially troubling. Those of us watching Nigeria from abroad understand that the country’s image is not determined only by government policies or economic statistics. It is also shaped by how Nigerians treat one another. When influential religious voices appear to portray fellow citizens as outsiders or enemies because of their faith, the damage extends beyond politics.
Nigeria is constitutionally a secular state, and Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution prohibits discrimination against citizens on grounds including religion. The implication is important: political participation is a citizenship right, not a privilege reserved for members of the religious majority.
This is where religious leadership carries an enormous responsibility. A Sheikh, pastor or traditional religious leader does not speak only to those seated before him. His words travel through social media, enter homes, influence young people and can be repeated long after the original gathering has ended.
Femi Fani-Kayode, Nigeria’s ambassador-designate to South Africa, made precisely this point in his reaction to Jingir’s comments, describing the rhetoric as provocative and warning that Nigeria is neither a Muslim nor a Christian country but a secular, multi-religious state. Human-rights lawyer Deji Adeyanju similarly warned on August 10, 2026, that religious rhetoric capable of deepening divisions between Christians and Muslims threatens national cohesion.
The lesson should not be that religious people must abandon their convictions. Quite the opposite. Strong faith should make Nigerians more committed to justice, dignity, compassion and peaceful coexistence. Nigeria does not need religious leaders who pretend that differences do not exist. It needs leaders mature enough to acknowledge those differences without turning them into political weapons.
The 2027 elections will come and go. Presidents will change, parties will win and lose, and politicians will eventually leave office. But Nigeria will remain. Muslims will continue living beside Christians; Christians will continue doing business with Muslims; and millions of families will continue to transcend religious boundaries. That enduring relationship is more important than any political ticket.
From the diaspora, therefore, the message is simple: Nigerians may disagree passionately about candidates, parties and policies, but we must never allow political competition to convince us that our fellow citizens are less Nigerian because they worship differently. Religious freedom means the freedom to believe. Religious tolerance means allowing another citizen to believe differently without treating that difference as a threat. Nigeria needs both.
Analysis
Lessons from the Catholic Bishops’ Visit to Tinubu, by Boniface Ihiasota
Lessons from the Catholic Bishops’ Visit to Tinubu, by Boniface Ihiasota
The recent visit of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria to President Bola Ahmed Tinubu at the Presidential Villa was more than a ceremonial engagement. It became one of the clearest illustrations yet of the widening gap between official optimism and the daily realities confronting millions of Nigerians. The discussions that followed—and the public reactions they generated—have once again underscored the indispensable role of religious institutions in shaping national conversations on governance, accountability and social justice.
Led by the President of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria, Archbishop Matthew Man-Oso Ndagoso, the bishops used the opportunity to raise concerns over insecurity, economic hardship, unemployment and the general welfare of Nigerians. They also urged President Tinubu to formally invite Pope Leo XIV to Nigeria, arguing that such a visit would strengthen peace, unity and national reconciliation.
President Tinubu, on his part, defended his administration’s reforms, insisting that the difficult decisions taken since assuming office were necessary to rescue the economy from years of structural distortions. He maintained that security architecture was being repositioned and that prosperity would eventually follow the current sacrifices.
Ordinarily, such exchanges between government and faith leaders are healthy in every democracy. However, the conversation assumed greater significance after Cardinal John Onaiyekan publicly disclosed that the President disagreed with many of the bishops’ assessments. According to the Cardinal, the bishops told Tinubu that “the economy is not helping our poor people,” while the President maintained that the economy was improving. The revelation immediately triggered widespread debate across political and religious circles because it exposed two sharply contrasting narratives about the state of the nation.
Yet, facts remain stubborn. Nigeria continues to face severe economic challenges. Inflation has remained elevated over the past two years, food prices have climbed dramatically, and millions of households continue to struggle with declining purchasing power. The World Bank has repeatedly warned that while reforms such as fuel subsidy removal and exchange-rate liberalisation may improve long-term fiscal sustainability, they also impose painful short-term costs on vulnerable citizens unless accompanied by robust social protection measures.
This explains why the bishops’ intervention resonated beyond the Catholic faithful. Religious leaders occupy a unique position in Nigerian society. They interact daily with ordinary citizens who seek assistance through churches, mosques and community organisations. Consequently, their assessment of public suffering often reflects grassroots realities that official statistics may not immediately capture.
The reactions also revealed an important democratic principle. Criticism of government should not automatically be interpreted as political opposition. Throughout Nigeria’s democratic history, both Christian and Muslim leaders have consistently spoken against corruption, insecurity, injustice and poverty irrespective of which party occupies Aso Rock. Their constitutional freedom to speak truth to power remains essential to democratic accountability.
At the same time, government officials equally have the responsibility to explain policies and defend their decisions. Democracy thrives not when everyone agrees but when disagreements are managed through dialogue rather than hostility. The exchange between Tinubu and the bishops should therefore be viewed as evidence that democratic engagement remains alive, provided both sides continue to listen respectfully.
The larger lesson is that perception matters almost as much as policy. Economic indicators may improve on paper, but if ordinary Nigerians cannot afford food, healthcare, education or transportation, public confidence will remain elusive. Governments ultimately earn legitimacy not through optimistic speeches but through measurable improvements in people’s quality of life.
As Nigeria journeys toward the 2027 elections, the meeting between the Catholic bishops and President Tinubu should remind both leaders and citizens that governance is not merely about defending statistics or winning arguments. It is about restoring hope. That hope will be strengthened only when policy outcomes begin to match the lived experiences of the millions whose voices the bishops sought to amplify.
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