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Analysis

Beyond A Defence Minister, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

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Beyond A Defence Minister, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

 

When the name of General Christopher Gwabin Musa (rtd) was announced as the new Minister of Defence for Nigeria, many citizens did not cheer — they exhaled. In a country where hope often flickers faster than security, each new appointment carries the burden of history. Nigerians are tired of seeing ministers swap titles, while insecurity deepens, kidnappings proliferate, and communities collapse.

 

To understand the challenge he inherits, one must revisit the history of Nigeria’s Defence Ministry from 1999 onward. The first in the Fourth Republic was retired Lieutenant-General Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma, who assumed office in June 1999 after democracy was restored. Danjuma’s appointment was meant to restore honour and discipline to a military tainted by years of dictatorship. His immediate task was political: reassure Nigerians that the Armed Forces would no longer be politics by another name, and help transition from military rule to civilian governance. He helped steer budgets toward rebuilding and re-equipping, initiating what was then a credible attempt at professionalising Nigeria’s armed forces. But those efforts addressed conventional defence, not the emerging internal threats. Danjuma’s tenure ended in May 2003 with the civilianization of leadership but by then the foundations for internal security challenge management remained shallow.

 

In July 2003, Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso became Defence Minister under President Obasanjo’s second term, and thus inaugurated an era of civilian political stewardship at the Ministry of Defence. His time, stretching to May 2007, coincided with the earliest stirrings of what would become insurgency. Boko Haram was still marginal, largely ignored by national security architecture focused on external defence. Kwankwaso’s strengths lay in politics and governance, but not in shaping a doctrinal shift toward internal security or insurgency response. The defence ministry under him remained oriented toward traditional armed-forces metrics of equipment, formal deployments, diplomacy while Nigeria lurched toward a reality that required intelligence-driven, community-rooted internal security frameworks.

 

When Mahmud Yayale Ahmed took over in July 2007 and served until September 2008, the writing was already on the wall. Boko Haram had begun to emerge visibly, yet the response remained bureaucratic. Yayale Ahmed brought civil-service credentials and an administrative mindset, not military temperament. The ministry managed procurement, sustained the flagging morale of the forces after years of underfunding, but did little to evolve institutional capacity for asymmetric threats.

 

By late 2008 and early 2009, under Shettima Mustapha and subsequently the retired Major-General Godwin Abbe, Nigeria entered what would become its darkest chapter of internal insecurity. In 2009, Boko Haram erupted violently. Abbe, a former soldier turned politician, presided during the crescendo of that crisis. The response was drastic but superficial: raids, crackdowns, mass arrests, but little reckoning with root causes. Communities were ravaged, trust was eroded, animosity deepened between the security forces and civilians. The violence may have been met with force, yet the underlying grievances, intelligence failures and governance vacuums were never addressed. The result was predictable: suppression bred resentment, insurgency morphed and scattered, later to resurge with renewed vigour.

 

When the baton passed to civilian ministers Adetokunbo Kayode (2010–2011), Haliru Mohammed Bello (2011–2012), and Olusola Obada (2012–2013), Nigeria sank deeper into chronic internal instability. Their tenures focused largely on procurement, revitalizing weapon stocks and administrative reshuffles, rather than systemic overhaul. There were no comprehensive reforms of policing, no robust intelligence-sharing across agencies, no serious investment in community-based early-warning or conflict-prevention mechanisms. Some may have tried to manage manpower, restructure departments or buy equipment, but the enemy had changed: asymmetric war, civilian-targeted violence, kidnapping rings, banditry, communal conflicts. The Ministry remained geared for conventional threats. As a result, Nigeria drifted.

 

A temporary caretaker period under Labaran Maku (2013–2014) barely registered any shift. Then came a moment of cautious optimism. Aliyu Mohammed Gusau, whose career spanned multiple security and intelligence roles, was appointed Defence Minister in March 2014. His background and reputation suggested a possible turning point: here was a man who understood threats beyond the battlefield. He attempted, in the brief span he held office, to emphasise intelligence coordination, inter-agency cooperation, and reform of structural leakages. But insurgency had already scaled across regions; Boko Haram had splintered, and the patience and capacity were thin. Gusau’s efforts lacked political depth and time. When his tenure ended in May 2015, so too did the hopes of seeing a decisive shift from reactive force to preventive security architecture.

 

Under subsequent ministers Mansur Mohammed Dan-Ali (2015–2019) and retired Major-General Bashir Salihi Magashi (2019–2023), the tendency again was toward kinetics, procurement, routine operations — heavy-handed responses to terror strikes, bandit raids, kidnappings. The Armed Forces regained some currency; there were operations, there were “victories,” and sometimes media reports of dislodged cells or rescued hostages. But the casualty was strategic consistency. The underlying problems: weak policing institutions, uncoordinated intelligence between state and federal agencies, porous borders, and a civilian security vacuum. Without credible law enforcement reforms, social rehabilitation and community engagement, cleared zones relapsed. Violence remained endemic.

 

When President Bola Ahmed Tinubu picked Mohammed Badaru Abubakar, a former two-term governor as Defence Minister in August 2023, many hoped that his executive political experience would at last shapeshift national security policy. But reality proved more unforgiving than expectation. By November 2025, Nigeria had witnessed mass kidnappings, schoolchildren abducted en masse, rural communities under siege, and public confidence crumbling. On November 26, President Tinubu declared a nationwide security emergency, ordering mass recruitment into police and army ranks and authorizing new deployments of forest guards to flush out terrorists and bandits from remote hideouts. The aim was to inject manpower; but as many analysts warned, manpower without structural reform is like pouring water into a leaking pot. On December 1, 2025, Badaru resigned reportedly on health grounds.

 

The very next day, on December 2, President Tinubu nominated retired General Christopher Gwabin Musa as Minister of Defence. Musa had served as Chief of Defence Staff from 2023 until October 2025, when he was relieved in a wide-ranging military shake-up. His record is impeccable: commissioned as Second Lieutenant in 1991 after graduating from the Nigerian Defence Academy, Musa rose steadily through command ranks, served in key operational theatres, including as Theatre Commander in counter-insurgency campaigns and won the Colin Powell Award for Soldiering in 2012.

 

This appointment represents more than a change of guard; it presents a crossroads. For generations, Nigeria’s Defence Ministry oscillated between procurement-focused bureaucracy and reactive operations. The missing link was always a coherent, nationwide internal security doctrine, one that recognises terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, communal wars and urban criminality as equal or greater threats than cross-border war. Musa may be the man with the credentials; but credentials do not automatically translate to success. For that, he will need more than a uniform, he will need vision, political courage, and structural reengineering.

 

First, intelligence in Nigeria has long been a patchwork of agencies: military intelligence, police Special Branch, state-level vigilante networks, local community informants, and often unofficial actors. Every Defence Minister since 1999 has inherited this fragmentation. Even when ministers like Aliyu Gusau explicitly prioritized intelligence reform, they lacked either the time, political backing, or institutional leverage to bind these threads into a functional national network. Under Musa, Nigeria must build a real Intelligence Fusion Centre, statutory in law, resourced, and empowered to gather, analyse, and share data across all security agencies. It should not be another office with flowery titles; it must be the beating heart of Nigeria’s security architecture.

 

Second, Nigeria’s policing and internal security apparatus remain dangerously under-developed. The police are overstretched or mis-deployed; conventional policing capacities are weak; law enforcement is uneven across states or non-existent in many rural areas. In effect, the military ends up policing civilians, a recipe for human rights violations, community alienation, and cycles of violence. Musa must use his credibility both as military man and now Defence Minister to push for statutory police reform, to support state-level policing initiatives, and to redefine roles: the military defends the country externally and responds to exceptional internal crises; the police and civil security agencies maintain daily law enforcement and community protection. That might require political negotiation with governors and lawmakers.

 

Third, Nigeria must stop treating security as a matter of fire-power and weapons. As urban kidnappings show, and as rural banditry and communal conflicts prove, contemporary insecurity thrives on mobility, networks, subversion, infiltration, and terror. The new minister should prioritise modern security tools: drones for surveillance, communication-intercept (COMINT and SIGINT) capacity, special forces trained in counter-terror, local informant networks, rapid reaction units — small, mobile, intelligence-driven. Big tank brigades and conventional formations have their place; but they are blunt instruments in a country where threats can strike schools at night and vanish into forests by dawn.

 

Even military brilliance alone will fail if it remains disconnected from society. Nigeria’s security problems are deeply structural: poverty, social dislocation, youth unemployment, weak institutions, poor governance, inter-communal crises, land conflicts, ethnic and religious fractures. Every military advance that does not come with social stabilization — resettlement of displaced persons, rebuilding of schools, reviving of farms and markets, psychosocial support, community reconciliation — simply displaces the problem. The new Defence Minister must insist that security operations be paired with civil-affairs initiatives: resettlement, restoration, rebuilding.

 

Finally, the Ministry must embrace transparency and result-oriented reporting. For too long, Nigerians have depended on headlines: “Bandits killed,” “Scores of terrorists neutralised,” “Villages liberated.” But those headlines rarely translate into lasting security. The public needs measurable outcomes: fewer kidnappings, fewer mass attacks, safer roads, resettled communities, functioning markets, schools reopened, return of displaced people.

 

General Musa steps into office at a critical moment: the presidency has just declared a nationwide security emergency; recruitment into police and army forces has been ordered; forest guards are to be deployed, and VIP-protection officers are to be redeployed to frontier duties. These are signals that the government finally acknowledges the scale of the crisis, but manpower without structure is no answer.

 

If Musa gets it right, this appointment could mark the beginning of a long overdue transformation. If he fails, the nation risks descending deeper into despair: more missing schoolchildren, more displaced families, more ghost towns.

 

Nigeria does not need another Defence Minister. What Nigeria needs is a Defence Minister who is also an architect of a new national security system: one that integrates intelligence, law enforcement, civil protection, social support, governance and accountability. The war to reclaim Nigeria’s peace is no longer just on the battlefield but in institutions, in policies, in communities, and in hearts.

 

Gen. Christopher Gwabin Musa (rtd) now carries the weight of that history. If he can convert his military credentials into strategic reforms, if he can lead with vision, then he may offer Nigeria more than hope: a path to security; a chance at peace.

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Analysis

Understanding South Africa’s Xenophobic Violence, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

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Understanding South Africa’s Xenophobic Violence, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

 

There is a tendency to explain xenophobic violence in South Africa as a spontaneous eruption of anger by frustrated citizens. That explanation is convenient, but it is incomplete. What has unfolded repeatedly across Johannesburg, Durban, Pretoria and other urban centres over the past three decades is not random. It is patterned, predictable, and rooted in deeper structural contradictions within South Africa’s post-apartheid society. To understand it fully is to confront an uncomfortable reality: xenophobia in South Africa is as much about internal failure as it is about external scapegoating, and as much about forgotten history.

 

Since the formal end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa has occupied a paradoxical position on the continent. It is Africa’s most industrialised economy, yet one of its most unequal societies. It is a democracy born out of global solidarity, yet one that has struggled to extend that same spirit to fellow Africans. These contradictions form the backdrop against which xenophobic violence has evolved.

 

The early years of democracy created powerful expectations. South Africa was imagined as a land of opportunity, and for many Africans, it became exactly that. Migrants from Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Somalia, Ethiopia and beyond moved into the country in search of economic advancement and stability. Nigerians, in particular, established themselves in commerce, education, entertainment and professional services, becoming one of the most visible African communities in the country.

 

South Africa’s structural inequality remained largely intact after apartheid. By the late 1990s, unemployment had become entrenched, especially among the youth. Informal settlements expanded, service delivery lagged, and frustration grew. In this environment, the presence of foreign nationals—many of whom operated small businesses in townships and informal markets—became a focal point for resentment.

 

The first major signal that this resentment could turn violent came in May 2008. What began as localised misunderstandings in Alexandra township near Johannesburg quickly escalated into nationwide attacks. Over the course of weeks, violence spread to multiple provinces, leaving at least 60 people dead and displacing tens of thousands. Shops owned by foreign nationals were looted, homes were destroyed, and entire communities were forced to flee. The victims were overwhelmingly African migrants, reflecting that the violence was not about race in the traditional South African sense, but about nationality and belonging.

 

The 2008 attacks were widely condemned, both domestically and internationally. The government responded with security deployments and humanitarian assistance, but the underlying causes were not resolved. Instead, the violence established a template that would be repeated in subsequent years.

 

In April 2015, xenophobic attacks erupted again, beginning in Durban and spreading to other parts of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng provinces. At least seven people were killed, and thousands were displaced. The violence followed controversial remarks attributed to Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini, who was reported to have suggested that foreigners should leave South Africa. Regardless of the intended meaning, the statement resonated with existing anti-immigrant sentiment and contributed to the escalation.

 

By 2017, the pattern had become more targeted. Nigerian-owned businesses in Pretoria and Johannesburg were attacked, with shops looted and properties destroyed. Nigerians, already burdened by negative stereotypes linking them to crime, found themselves increasingly singled out. These stereotypes, often amplified by social media and sensational reporting, created a climate in which collective punishment was normalised.

 

The 2019 wave of violence marked another turning point. Attacks in Johannesburg and surrounding areas led to deaths, widespread looting, and renewed diplomatic rifts. The scale and intensity of the violence prompted strong reactions from affected countries, particularly Nigeria. The Nigerian government recalled its High Commissioner from Pretoria and boycotted the World Economic Forum on Africa in Cape Town. There were also retaliatory incidents in Nigeria, where South African-owned businesses were targeted by angry youths.

 

Behind these episodic eruptions lies a consistent pattern of human and economic loss. Over the years, hundreds of people have been killed, thousands displaced, and billions of naira worth of property destroyed. Nigerian victims alone have suffered disproportionately, with over a hundred deaths recorded within a short span between 2016 and 2018. These figures are not merely statistics; they represent lives disrupted, families broken, and dreams deferred.

 

Yet, to focus solely on the violence without examining its historical context is to miss a critical dimension of the story. South Africa’s liberation from apartheid was not achieved in isolation. It was the product of sustained international and continental support, in which Nigeria played a leading role.

 

From the 1960s through the early 1990s, Nigeria positioned itself as a central actor in the anti-apartheid struggle. It provided financial assistance to liberation movements such as the African National Congress, hosted South African exiles, and funded scholarships for thousands of students who could not pursue education at home due to apartheid restrictions. These efforts were not incidental; they were embedded in Nigeria’s foreign policy, which prioritised African liberation and unity.

 

The country’s commitment extended beyond financial support. In 1976, following the Soweto uprising, Nigeria intensified its diplomatic campaign against apartheid. By 1979, it had nationalised British Petroleum assets in protest against Western engagement with the apartheid regime. Nigeria also played a significant role at the United Nations, advocating for sanctions and contributing to the global isolation that eventually forced the apartheid government to negotiate.

 

These actions came at a cost. Nigeria sacrificed economic opportunities and diplomatic relationships in pursuit of a broader African cause. The expectation was not repayment, but recognition of a shared destiny. When Nelson Mandela was released in 1990 and later elected president in 1994, that expectation seemed justified.

 

However, the post-apartheid reality has complicated that narrative. Xenophobic violence has raised difficult questions about the durability of African solidarity. It has exposed the limits of historical memory in shaping contemporary behaviour.

 

To understand why xenophobia persists, one must examine the structural drivers within South Africa. Economic inequality remains central. The country consistently ranks among the most unequal in the world, with a Gini coefficient that reflects deep disparities in wealth and opportunity. Unemployment rates, particularly among young people, remain high. In such conditions, competition for resources becomes intense, and migrants are often perceived as competitors.

 

This perception is reinforced by political rhetoric. In times of economic stress, blaming foreigners can be politically expedient. It shifts attention away from governance failures and redirects public anger toward a vulnerable group. Over time, this narrative becomes entrenched, shaping public attitudes and legitimising hostility.

 

Law enforcement challenges further exacerbate the problem. While the South African government has condemned xenophobic violence and, at times, deployed security forces to restore order, the prosecution of perpetrators has been inconsistent. The result is a cycle of violence followed by temporary calm, without meaningful prosecution. This pattern creates a sense of impunity, encouraging future attacks.

 

There is also a psychological dimension that cannot be ignored. The transition from apartheid to democracy did not automatically resolve issues of identity and belonging. During apartheid, the struggle against a common oppressor created a sense of unity among black South Africans. In the post-apartheid era, that unifying force has dissipated, leaving space for new forms of exclusion.

 

Foreign Africans, despite their shared history, have been positioned as outsiders. The term “makwerekwere,” often used derogatorily to describe African migrants, reflects this sense of otherness. It is a linguistic marker of exclusion, one that reinforces the idea that not all Africans are equal within the African space.

 

For Nigerians, the challenge is compounded by perception. While many Nigerians in South Africa are law-abiding entrepreneurs, professionals and students, a minority involved in criminal activities has shaped public perception disproportionately. This perception has been amplified by media narratives and online discourse, creating a stereotype that is both persistent and damaging.

 

The result is a community that is simultaneously visible and vulnerable. Nigerian businesses are often among the first targets during xenophobic attacks, and Nigerian nationals frequently bear the brunt of violence. This dynamic reiterates the intersection of economic competition, social perception, and political narrative.

 

The implications extend beyond South Africa. Xenophobic violence has strained diplomatic relations, particularly between Nigeria and South Africa. These two countries are not just regional powers; they are central to the continent’s economic and political future. This issue between them have ripple effects across Africa, affecting trade, investment, and regional cooperation.

 

At a broader level, xenophobia challenges the very idea of Pan-Africanism. It raises fundamental questions about the feasibility of continental integration in the face of internal divisions. Initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area depend on the free movement of people, goods, and services. Xenophobic violence undermines these goals, creating barriers where there should be bridges.

 

Addressing this crisis requires more than condemnation. It demands a comprehensive approach that tackles both immediate triggers and underlying causes. Economic reforms must prioritise inclusion, ensuring that growth translates into opportunities for all residents. Political leaders must exercise restraint in their rhetoric, avoiding narratives that scapegoat migrants.

 

Law enforcement must be strengthened to ensure proper prosecution. Without consequences, violence will continue to recur. At the same time, there is a need for sustained public education—an effort to reconnect South Africans with their own history and the role that other African nations played in their liberation.

 

For Nigeria, the response must be measured but firm. Protecting its citizens abroad is a fundamental responsibility, but so is maintaining diplomatic engagement. The relationship between Nigeria and South Africa remains too important to be defined by periodic crises.

 

In the final analysis, understanding South Africa’s xenophobic violence requires a willingness to confront uncomfortable truths. It is not enough to attribute the problem to ignorance or anger. It is a product of structural inequality, political dynamics, and historical amnesia.

 

The tragedy lies not only in the violence itself, but in what it represents: a breakdown of the solidarity that once defined Africa’s struggle for freedom. If that solidarity is to be restored, it will require more than memory. It will require action, leadership, and a renewed commitment to the idea that Africa’s future is shared.

 

Until then, xenophobic violence will remain a recurring wound—one that continues to undermine both South Africa’s promise and Africa’s collective aspiration.

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Analysis

The War Beneath the War, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

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The War Beneath the War, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

 

When the rivalry involving the United States, Israel and Iran is discussed in newspapers or on television shows, the focus is almost always on dramatic moments—missile launches, air strikes, nuclear negotiations, or the activities of proxy militias in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. Yet these visible episodes tell only a fraction of the story. Beneath them lies a far more consequential contest fought through technology, intelligence systems, covert engineering and cyber operations. It is a war fought not just with weapons, but with code, algorithms, sensors and the manipulation of industrial machinery.

 

Over the past two decades, the confrontation has gradually transformed into what security analysts describe as systems warfare. The aim is not merely to defeat an enemy army on the battlefield but to sabotage the technological foundations on which a modern state depends its infrastructure, communications networks, scientific programmes and financial systems. This quiet technological instance has unfolded largely outside public attention, even though it has shaped the strategic balance in the Middle East.

 

The moment that revealed this hidden battlefield most clearly occurred in June 2010 when cybersecurity researchers identified an unusual computer worm circulating across networks around the world. The malware was later named Stuxnet. At first glance it appeared to be another sophisticated cyber intrusion. But detailed analysis soon revealed something far more alarming. Stuxnet had been designed not merely to steal data or disrupt computers; it was built to destroy physical industrial equipment.

 

The target of the malware was Iran’s uranium enrichment complex at the Natanz Nuclear Facility, located roughly 250 kilometres south of Tehran in Isfahan Province. Natanz housed thousands of centrifuges used to enrich uranium gas for Iran’s nuclear programme. These centrifuges, delicate machines spinning at extremely high speeds were controlled by programmable logic controllers produced by the German engineering company Siemens.

 

Stuxnet infiltrated the facility’s control systems and subtly altered the instructions regulating centrifuge speed. At specific intervals, the malware forced the centrifuges to accelerate far beyond their normal operational limits before abruptly slowing them down again. This repeated stress caused mechanical failure. At the same time, the virus fed false data to monitoring screens so that Iranian technicians would see readings indicating that everything was functioning normally.

 

By the time the attack was discovered, the damage had already been done. Security analysts later estimated that approximately 1,000 centrifuges, roughly one-fifth of Iran’s installed capacity at Natanz in 2009 had been destroyed. Subsequent investigative reporting revealed that the operation was part of a covert cyber programme known as Operation Olympic Games, initiated during the presidency of George W. Bush and later expanded under Barack Obama. Although neither United States nor Israel officially acknowledged responsibility. Although it was later confirmed that the operation was a joint effort by both Countries’ cyber specialists.

 

The importance of Stuxnet cannot be overstated. It represented the first publicly known cyber weapon capable of causing physical destruction to industrial infrastructure. In effect, it proved that lines of computer code could function as strategic weapons. Before Stuxnet, cyber warfare was generally associated with espionage or data theft. After Stuxnet, it became clear that cyber tools could sabotage factories, power plants and transportation systems.

 

This revelation carried profound implications. Modern societies depend on complex networks of industrial control systems which are software platforms that manage electricity grids, water treatment plants, oil pipelines, manufacturing facilities and transportation networks. Many of these systems were designed decades ago with minimal cybersecurity protections. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, technologically advanced countries can potentially disrupt entire sectors of national infrastructure without firing a single missile.

 

Yet cyber sabotage is only one dimension of the technological struggle involving the United States, Israel and Iran. Intelligence gathering has also undergone a profound transformation with the rise of artificial intelligence and advanced data analysis. Modern intelligence agencies collect staggering volumes of information: satellite imagery, intercepted communications, digital transactions, social media activity and geolocation data from billions of mobile devices. Processing such enormous datasets would overwhelm human analysts.

 

To solve this problem, intelligence organisations increasingly rely on machine learning algorithms capable of detecting patterns within massive streams of data. Israel’s signals intelligence division within the Israel Defense Forces, widely known as Unit 8200, has invested heavily in such technologies. These systems help analysts identify suspicious logistical movements, map covert networks and monitor scientific activities linked to Iran’s missile and nuclear programmes.

 

Artificial intelligence has therefore become a powerful tool in identifying individuals and facilities associated with sensitive research. Over the years, several Iranian nuclear scientists have been targeted in covert operations. One of the most dramatic incidents occurred on 27 November 2020 when Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a senior physicist widely regarded as the architect of Iran’s nuclear weapons research, was assassinated near the town of Absard east of Tehran. Iranian officials later claimed that the attack involved a sophisticated remote-controlled machine gun mounted on a vehicle, demonstrating the increasing role of advanced technology in covert operations.

 

Drone technology has also become a critical instrument in the shadow conflict between Israel and Iran. Unmanned aerial vehicles have evolved rapidly over the past two decades, becoming smaller, cheaper and more versatile. Intelligence reports suggest that Israeli operatives have occasionally smuggled drone components into Iran through clandestine networks. Once assembled near strategic installations, these drones can be launched to attack radar systems, missile launchers or ammunition depots.

 

Such operations represent a new form of warfare sometimes described by analysts as “inside-out attacks.” Instead of launching strikes from outside a country’s borders, covert assets positioned within the target state create vulnerabilities that can later be exploited. By disabling air defence radars or surface-to-air missile batteries, these drones can make it easier for conventional aircraft to operate if a broader conflict erupts.

 

Another largely invisible battlefield lies within telecommunications networks. Modern military forces rely on secure communication systems linking field units with central command structures. If those communications are disrupted, even highly capable armed forces can struggle to coordinate operations. Cyber units therefore often attempt to infiltrate telecommunications infrastructure before or during military operations.

 

Such attacks may involve manipulating network routing systems, penetrating data centres or disrupting fibre-optic communication nodes. Although details are rarely disclosed publicly, analysts widely believe that telecommunications systems in the Middle East have periodically been targeted during periods of heightened tension between Israel and Iran. The goal is not necessarily permanent destruction but temporary paralysis—disrupting an adversary’s ability to respond quickly during a crisis.

 

Financial infrastructure has also become a target in this technological contest. Banking systems, electronic payment platforms and cryptocurrency exchanges now form essential parts of modern economies. Disrupting these systems can generate economic instability and public frustration. Cyber operations targeting financial databases or digital payment networks can therefore serve as instruments of strategic pressure.

 

Iran’s economy, already strained by international sanctions, is particularly vulnerable to such disruptions. Government subsidy programmes for fuel and basic commodities rely heavily on digital infrastructure. If cyber attacks interrupt payment systems or corrupt financial records, millions of citizens may suddenly find themselves unable to access essential services. In this way, cyber warfare can exert pressure not only on governments but also on societies.

 

Another rarely discussed aspect of the confrontation involves supply-chain sabotage. Nuclear programmes depend on highly specialised equipment—centrifuge components, electronic sensors, control circuits and advanced materials. Because these components are difficult to manufacture domestically, procurement networks often span multiple countries and intermediaries.

 

Taken together, these various operations reveal how profoundly warfare has changed in the twenty-first century. In earlier eras, military power was measured primarily by the size of armies, the number of tanks or the range of missiles. Today, power increasingly depends on technological expertise—cyber capabilities, data analysis, advanced electronics and intelligence networks capable of penetrating the digital architecture of modern states.

 

The rivalry involving the United States, Israel and Iran therefore provides an early glimpse into the future of conflict. The most decisive battles may not occur on visible battlefields but within the hidden systems that sustain national power: computer networks, industrial machinery, telecommunications infrastructure and financial databases.

 

This reality poses difficult challenges for policymakers. Cyber attacks can be extremely difficult to attribute with certainty, allowing states to conduct covert operations without openly acknowledging responsibility. This ambiguity complicates traditional deterrence strategies. In conventional warfare, identifying an attacker is usually straightforward; in cyberspace, digital footprints can be manipulated or disguised.

 

Moreover, the vulnerabilities exploited in operations like Stuxnet are not unique to Iran. Similar industrial control systems operate in power plants, transportation networks and factories across the world. As cyber capabilities continue to evolve, the possibility of attacks targeting critical infrastructure in other countries—including major global economies—becomes increasingly real.

 

Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com

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Analysis

Tinubu in Windsor, Nigeria in Flames, by Boniface Ihiasota 

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Tinubu in Windsor, Nigeria in Flames, by Boniface Ihiasota 

 

President Bola Tinubu’s state visit to the United Kingdom, which commenced on Tuesday, March 17, 2026, was always destined to be symbolically significant. It marks the first full state visit by a Nigerian leader to Britain in decades, with engagements scheduled at Windsor Castle under the auspices of King Charles III. Diplomatically, the visit signals continuity, relevance, and a desire to reposition Nigeria within a rapidly shifting global order shaped by trade realignments and post-Brexit economic recalibrations. Yet, the timing of the visit has cast a long and troubling shadow.

 

Barely twenty-four hours before the president’s departure from Abuja, Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State and long regarded as the epicentre of Nigeria’s insurgency crisis, was rocked by coordinated terrorist attacks on Monday, March 16, 2026. The explosions, which began at approximately 7:02 p.m. local time, struck multiple civilian locations, including the bustling Monday Market, parts of the Kaleri neighbourhood, and medical facilities within the city. By early Tuesday morning, official figures confirmed at least 23 fatalities and more than 100 injured, many of them critically.

 

The scale and coordination of the attacks point to a resurgence of operational capability by insurgent groups, widely believed to include Boko Haram factions and elements linked to the Islamic State West Africa Province. For a city that has endured over a decade of violence but had recently experienced relative calm, the bombings were both a psychological and strategic setback. They exposed vulnerabilities in intelligence gathering, urban security, and rapid response coordination within one of the most militarised zones in the country.

 

Against this backdrop, the president’s departure for London presents a difficult paradox. On one hand, governance demands international engagement. Nigeria’s economic challenges, from foreign exchange instability to infrastructure deficits, require external partnerships and financing arrangements that visits of this nature are designed to secure. Reports indicate that discussions during the visit may include substantial investment frameworks, particularly in port modernisation and trade facilitation.

 

On the other hand, leadership is deeply tied to presence, especially in moments of national distress. The optics of leaving the country within hours of a deadly terrorist attack are inevitably jarring. While it is neither unusual nor inherently wrong for a head of state to proceed with scheduled diplomatic engagements during crises, the immediacy and severity of the Maiduguri attacks elevate the expectation of visible, decisive, and empathetic leadership at home.

 

Members of the president’s entourage reportedly include First Lady Oluremi Tinubu and senior government officials, alongside at least one state governor, Dauda Lawal of Zamfara State. Their presence underscores the importance attached to the visit, but it also amplifies the contrast between the formalities of state banquets abroad and the grief unfolding in northeastern Nigeria.

 

From a diaspora perspective, where Nigeria’s image is constantly interpreted through the lenses of security, governance, and economic viability, this moment reinforces a persistent tension. The country often appears outwardly ambitious yet inwardly constrained by recurring instability. Each incident of mass violence not only claims lives but also erodes confidence among investors, partners, and observers who weigh risk as heavily as opportunity.

 

The Maiduguri attacks are not isolated. Since the insurgency began in 2009, tens of thousands of lives have been lost, and millions displaced. Despite repeated assurances from successive administrations that terrorist capabilities have been degraded, incidents such as the March 16 bombings suggest a more complex reality. Insurgent groups have adapted, shifting tactics and exploiting gaps in surveillance and community-level intelligence.

 

This raises pressing questions about strategy and accountability. How do multiple explosive devices detonate across a city under heavy military watch without prior interception? What systemic weaknesses allow such coordination to occur? And perhaps most importantly, how can the state move beyond reactive responses to build a genuinely preventive security architecture?

 

There is also the matter of communication. In crises, tone matters as much as action. Citizens expect not only policy responses but also reassurance, clarity, and a sense that leadership is fully engaged with their plight. The absence of immediate, high-visibility presidential presence can create a vacuum that fuels public frustration and erodes trust.

 

None of this diminishes the importance of international diplomacy. Nations do not pause their external engagements indefinitely because of internal challenges. However, the sequencing and sensitivity of decisions become critical when lives have just been lost. Leadership must constantly balance competing demands, but it must also recognise moments when symbolism carries as much weight as substance.

 

As events unfold in London, Nigeria confronts a dual reality. One is a nation seeking relevance and renewal on the global stage, eager to attract investment and strengthen alliances. The other is a country still grappling with persistent insecurity, where citizens in places like Maiduguri continue to bear the brunt of violence.

 

Bridging these realities requires more than policy declarations. It demands coherence between domestic stability and international ambition. Until that alignment is achieved, each diplomatic success abroad risks being overshadowed by unresolved crises at home, leaving observers to question which narrative truly defines the Nigerian state.

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