Analysis
The United States, Israel and the Iran Question, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
The United States, Israel and the Iran Question, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
In the theatre of West Asian geopolitics, few rivalries have proved as enduring, combustible and globally consequential as that between the Islamic Republic of Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other. Though there has been no formally declared all-out war between Washington, Tel Aviv and Tehran, what has unfolded over decades is a sustained shadow war—punctuated by assassinations, cyberattacks, proxy confrontations, economic strangulation and calibrated military strikes. To describe it merely as standoff is to understate its strategic depth; to label it a conventional war is to misunderstand its hybrid, multi-layered character.
The roots of hostility between the United States and Iran trace back to 1979. On February 11 of that year, the Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a key American ally in the Persian Gulf. The subsequent seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, and the 444-day hostage crisis marked a definitive rupture. Diplomatic relations were severed in April 1980. Since then, relations have oscillated between cautious engagement and open confrontation, but never reconciliation.
For Israel, Iran’s transformation into an ideologically anti-Zionist state posed an existential dilemma. The Islamic Republic’s leadership has consistently refused to recognise Israel and has supported armed groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. This ideological antagonism hardened over time into strategic rivalry, especially as Iran expanded its regional footprint in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.
The nuclear question sharpened the conflict. In 2002, revelations about undisclosed Iranian nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak intensified Western suspicions about Tehran’s intentions. Israel, under successive prime ministers including Ariel Sharon and later Benjamin Netanyahu, framed Iran’s nuclear programme as an existential threat. Netanyahu’s address to the United States Congress on March 3, 2015—delivered in opposition to then-President Barack Obama’s policy—underscored Israel’s resistance to any deal that, in its view, left Iran with nuclear latency.
That deal materialised on July 14, 2015, when Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany) signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The agreement imposed strict limits on Iran’s uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. However, on May 8, 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the accord, describing it as “the worst deal ever negotiated.” The reimposition of sweeping sanctions under the “maximum pressure” campaign plunged Iran’s economy into recession and escalated rivalries across the Gulf.
What followed was a cycle of escalation. On January 3, 2020, a US drone strike near Baghdad International Airport killed Major General Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force. The strike marked one of the most dramatic overt confrontations between the two states. Iran responded on January 8, 2020, by launching ballistic missiles at US bases in Iraq, injuring dozens of American personnel. The region teetered on the brink of open war, but both sides ultimately calibrated their actions to avoid full-scale conflict.
Parallel to the US-Iran confrontation, Israel intensified what it termed the “campaign between wars” (MABAM), targeting Iranian military infrastructure in Syria. Since 2013, Israel has conducted hundreds of airstrikes aimed at preventing Iran from entrenching itself militarily near Israeli borders. The covert dimension of this war has included cyber operations—most notably the Stuxnet virus, widely attributed to US-Israeli cooperation around 2010, which damaged Iranian centrifuges at Natanz—and assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, including Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, killed on November 27, 2020.
Geopolitically, the conflict is nested within broader power realignments. The Abraham Accords, signed on September 15, 2020, normalised relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, later joined by Morocco and Sudan. Though framed as peace agreements, they also represented the crystallisation of a tacit anti-Iran coalition among certain Arab states and Israel. Saudi Arabia, while not formally part of the Accords, has long viewed Iran as its principal regional rival, particularly in Yemen and the Gulf.
Iran, for its part, has relied on asymmetric warfare and proxy networks. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen and various militias in Syria form what analysts describe as Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” This network enables Tehran to project power without inviting direct conventional confrontation with superior US and Israeli forces.
The world economy sits uncomfortably at the heart of this contest. Iran borders the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 per cent of global oil supply transits. Any significant disruption would reverberate through energy markets. During periods of heightened crisis—such as June 2019, when oil tankers were attacked near the Gulf of Oman—global crude prices spiked. The mere spectre of closure of the Strait can unsettle markets from New York to Shanghai.
Sanctions have had mixed global effects. For Iran, they have meant currency depreciation, inflation and reduced oil exports. For global markets, they have tightened supply, particularly when combined with other shocks such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Energy-importing countries, including many in sub-Saharan Africa, feel the downstream effects in fuel prices and inflationary pressures. Nigeria, despite being an oil producer, is not insulated; global price volatility influences domestic subsidy debates, fiscal planning and foreign exchange stability.
Allies of the United States are caught in a delicate balancing act. European signatories to the JCPOA—France, Germany and the United Kingdom—have consistently supported diplomatic engagement while criticising Iran’s ballistic missile programme and regional activities. The European Union has attempted to preserve the nuclear deal framework even after Washington’s withdrawal, though with limited success. NATO as an institution is not formally engaged in hostilities with Iran, but US actions inevitably affect alliance cohesion.
Israel’s allies, particularly the United States, have reaffirmed an “ironclad” commitment to its security. Military aid to Israel has averaged approximately $3.8 billion annually under a 10-year memorandum of understanding signed in 2016. In times of heightened tension, Washington has deployed carrier strike groups to the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf as a deterrent signal to Tehran.
On the other side, Iran’s strategic partnerships with Russia and China have deepened. In March 2021, Iran and China signed a 25-year cooperation agreement covering energy, infrastructure and security. Russia and Iran have also expanded military and economic ties, particularly after Western sanctions isolated Moscow in 2022. Yet neither Beijing nor Moscow appears eager to be drawn into a direct war on Iran’s behalf; their support is calibrated, not unconditional.
What of the broader Global South? Countries in Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia often view the US-Iran-Israel confrontation through the prism of non-alignment and economic pragmatism. Many rely on Gulf remittances, energy imports or trade routes vulnerable to instability. An open war would likely trigger oil price surges, shipping disruptions and currency volatility. For fragile economies already grappling with debt distress and food insecurity, such shocks could prove destabilising.
There is also the nuclear proliferation dimension. If Iran were to cross the nuclear threshold—an outcome Israeli leaders have repeatedly vowed to prevent—regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia might pursue their own nuclear capabilities. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated in a March 2018 interview with CBS that if Iran developed a nuclear weapon, “we will follow suit as soon as possible.” The prospect of a multipolar nuclear Middle East would dramatically alter global security calculations.
Yet it is important to distinguish rhetoric from reality. As of the latest publicly available assessments by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has enriched uranium to high levels but has not formally declared a nuclear weapons programme. Israel, widely believed to possess nuclear weapons though it maintains a policy of ambiguity, has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The asymmetry complicates diplomatic discourse and fuels mutual suspicion.
What, then, is expected of allies? For the United States, allies will likely provide diplomatic backing, intelligence cooperation and, in some cases, logistical support. Direct troop commitments appear improbable outside extreme scenarios. For Israel, regional partners under the Abraham Accords may quietly facilitate airspace access or intelligence sharing, though overt participation in strikes against Iran would risk domestic backlash.
For Iran’s allies and partners, the expectation would centre on economic lifelines and diplomatic shielding at the United Nations Security Council. Russia and China could veto resolutions perceived as authorising force. However, both powers must weigh their broader economic ties with Gulf states and Israel.
Ultimately, the “war” waged on Iran by the United States and Israel is less a single conflagration than a prolonged strategic contest. It is fought in airspace over Syria, in the waters of the Gulf, in cyber networks and in negotiating rooms from Vienna to New York. Its tempo fluctuates, but its structural drivers—ideology, security dilemmas, regional hegemony and nuclear anxieties—remain entrenched.
For the global world, the implications are sobering. Energy markets remain hostage to escalation. International law is strained by targeted killings and covert operations. Multilateral diplomacy oscillates between revival and collapse. In an era already defined by great power rivalry, the Iran question adds another layer of volatility.
The lesson of the past four decades is that neither maximum pressure nor calibrated strikes have resolved the underlying dispute. Nor has Iran’s strategy of resistance compelled recognition on its terms. The path forward, if there is one, lies not in rhetorical absolutism but in a recalibration of deterrence and diplomacy.
Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com
Analysis
Why Plot Against Peter Obi Will Fail, by Boniface Ihiasota
Why Plot Against Peter Obi Will Fail, by Boniface Ihiasota
From the diaspora, Nigeria’s political trajectory is often assessed with a mix of distance and clarity. The patterns are familiar—elite coalitions, shifting loyalties, and strategic calculations ahead of every electoral cycle. Yet, as the 2027 general elections begin to gather, one constant remains: the enduring relevance of Peter Obi. Despite recurring narratives about efforts to edge him out of contention, the structural and political realities suggest that such plots are unlikely to succeed.
A central reason lies in the nature of Obi’s political base. Unlike traditional candidates whose influence is tied to party machinery or regional kingmakers, Obi’s support cuts across demographics, particularly among young voters and urban professionals. This base, which gained visibility during the 2023 elections under the Labour Party, is not easily dismantled by conventional political maneuvering. It is decentralized, digitally connected, and ideologically driven—qualities that make it resilient in the face of elite opposition.
Looking ahead to 2027, this evolving voter bloc could become even more significant. Nigeria’s youth population continues to expand, and with it, a growing demand for governance defined by accountability and economic competence. Obi’s consistent messaging around prudent management of resources and institutional reforms positions him as a natural beneficiary of this demographic shift. Attempts to sideline him risk underestimating how deeply this sentiment has taken root, both within Nigeria and among its diaspora.
The diaspora itself remains a critical factor in shaping Obi’s political future. Nigerians abroad, many of whom actively supported his 2023 campaign, have sustained advocacy through funding, media engagement, and policy discourse. Their influence, amplified by digital platforms, has helped maintain Obi’s visibility beyond election cycles. As 2027 approaches, this network is likely to play an even more strategic role—not only in mobilization but also in shaping narratives that counter attempts to delegitimize his candidacy.
Equally important is the broader transformation within Nigeria’s political landscape. The 2023 contest, which featured Obi alongside Bola Tinubu and Atiku Abubakar, marked a departure from the long-standing dominance of two major parties. Obi’s performance challenged the assumption that electoral success must always flow through established structures. As political actors recalibrate for 2027, this disruption cannot be easily reversed. Any strategy aimed at marginalizing him must contend with an electorate that has already demonstrated a willingness to embrace alternatives.
Another reason such plots are likely to fail is Obi’s personal political brand. His tenure as governor of Anambra State continues to serve as a reference point for supporters who view him as disciplined and comparatively transparent.
While critics remain, his reputation has proven relatively durable in Nigeria’s often volatile political environment. This consistency makes it difficult for opponents to construct narratives that significantly erode his credibility ahead of another electoral cycle.
However, the road to 2027 is not without challenges. For Obi to convert goodwill into electoral victory, he will need to strengthen party structures, expand his reach in rural areas, and possibly build strategic alliances. Nigerian elections are not won on sentiment alone; they require organization, negotiation, and adaptability. The resilience of his support base does not eliminate the need for political pragmatism.
Yet, even these challenges reinforce the central argument: efforts to plot against Obi are unlikely to achieve their intended outcome because they often focus on the individual rather than the movement. What emerged in 2023 was not just a candidacy but a shift in political consciousness. That shift—driven by a demand for competence and accountability—has continued to evolve beyond the ballot.
In all, Obi’s prospects for 2027 will depend less on the success or failure of political plots and more on how effectively he harnesses the forces already working in his favor. For many in the diaspora, his continued relevance reflects a broader transformation within Nigeria’s democracy—one that is still unfolding, but increasingly difficult to reverse.
Analysis
ADC and Its House of Confusion, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
ADC and Its House of Confusion, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
In the space of a few days, the African Democratic Congress, ADC has managed to compress into itself the full drama of Nigeria’s party politics involving elite bargaining, judicial intervention, strategic defections, and the ever-present shadow of electoral deadlines. What should have been a defining moment for a party positioning itself as the nucleus of a broad opposition coalition ahead of 2027 has instead become a study in instability. The ADC today is not merely in crisis; it is in a state of suspended legitimacy.
The roots of the present turmoil can be traced to the ambitious political engineering that began in 2025, when the party’s founding leadership led by Ralph Okey Nwosu ceded control to a new power bloc designed to attract heavyweight politicians across party lines. The arrangement brought in former Senate President, David Mark as National Chairman and former Osun State governor, Rauf Aregbesola as National Secretary. The idea was straightforward: rebrand the ADC into a credible “third force” capable of uniting disparate opposition figures, including former Anambra State governor and the Labour Party presidential candidate in 2023, Peter Obi, ex-Kaduna governor Nasir El-Rufai, and other influential actors disenchanted with both the ruling party and the existing opposition structure.
For a brief moment, the strategy appeared to be working. Meetings were held in Abuja and Lagos throughout late 2025 and early 2026, with coalition talks reportedly involving figures such as former Rivers State governor, Rotimi Amaechi, former Sokoto State governor, Aminu Tambuwal, and ex-Senate President, Bukola Saraki. Though not all formally joined the ADC, the party became the focal point of negotiations around a possible mega opposition platform. The optics alone elevated its status in national discourse.
But coalition politics in Nigeria has a well-documented vulnerability: it often prioritises elite consensus over institutional clarity. The ADC’s leadership transition, while politically expedient, lacked the procedural rigour necessary to withstand internal contestation. Almost immediately, dissenting voices within the party began to question the legality of the handover, arguing that due process as stipulated in the party constitution had not been fully observed.
This internal disagreement escalated into litigation, with factions approaching the Federal High Court in Abuja to challenge the legitimacy of the Mark-led leadership. The situation became more complicated when conflicting orders emerged from different courts, a familiar pattern in Nigeria’s political jurisprudence. At one point, a Court of Appeal ruling imposed a “status quo ante bellum” order, effectively freezing the leadership structure as it existed before the contested transition.
That order, however, did not settle the matter; it deepened the confusion. Both factions interpreted the ruling in ways that favoured their positions, leading to parallel claims of authority. Party activities slowed to a near halt, as uncertainty over who legitimately controlled the ADC made it difficult to convene meetings, conduct congresses, or engage meaningfully with the Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC.
The turning point, if it can be called that, came on April 30, 2026, when the Supreme Court intervened. In a judgment delivered in Abuja, the apex court set aside the Court of Appeal’s status quo order and directed that the substantive case be returned to the Federal High Court for determination. The ruling was immediately seized upon by the Mark-Aregbesola faction as validation of their leadership, while their opponents insisted that the court had merely removed an interim order without deciding the core issue.
Legally, as a Lawyer friend argued, the latter interpretation is closer to the truth. The Supreme Court did not pronounce on who leads the ADC; it addressed only a procedural question. By vacating the preservative order, it reopened the space for the Mark-led executives to function, but it left the substantive dispute unresolved. In practical terms, the party now operates in a grey zone, neither fully validated nor definitively invalidated.
This ambiguity could not have come at a worse time. Nigeria’s electoral cycle, though seemingly distant from 2027, is already in motion. The Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC requires political parties to adhere to strict timelines, beginning with the submission of updated membership registers and culminating in the nomination of candidates. While INEC has yet to release the full timetable for the 2027 general elections, precedents from previous cycles indicate that primaries and candidate submissions typically occur at least a year before the polls.
Under the Electoral Act 2022, particularly Sections 29 and 84, parties must conduct primaries within specified windows and submit their candidates within deadlines that are not subject to extension. Any irregularity in the process, especially one arising from disputes over party leadership can render a candidate’s nomination invalid. Nigerian courts have consistently upheld this principle, as seen in cases involving Zamfara and Rivers states in previous election cycles, where parties lost entire slates of candidates due to procedural defects.
For the ADC, this legal framework presents an existential risk. If the leadership question remains unresolved by the time primaries are due, any exercise conducted by one faction could be challenged by another, leading to protracted litigation that may ultimately disqualify the party from fielding candidates in key elections. This is not a theoretical concern; it is a scenario with ample precedent in Nigeria’s electoral history.
Meanwhile, the political consequences of the crisis are beginning to manifest. High-profile figures who had been linked to the ADC are reportedly reconsidering their options. Peter Obi, whose 2023 presidential bid galvanised a significant youth following, has been cautious in his engagement with the party, mindful of the legal uncertainties. Similarly, Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso and some political bigwigs seen as potential power brokers in any opposition coalition are said to be weighing alternative platforms should the ADC fail to stabilise.
The logic behind these recalibrations is straightforward. Political heavyweights require not just a platform, but a secure one. A party entangled in litigation cannot guarantee ticket security, campaign coherence, or post-election legitimacy. In a system where court judgments often determine electoral outcomes, legal vulnerability is a liability no serious contender can afford.
The irony is that the ADC’s crisis is largely self-inflicted. In its bid to rapidly transform into a coalition platform, it overlooked the slow, painstaking work of institution-building. The absorption of powerful figures was not matched by the creation of mechanisms to manage their competing ambitions. Nor was there sufficient attention to aligning the party’s constitutional framework with the new political realities. The result is a structure that is expansive in ambition but weak in cohesion.
There is also a deeper structural issue at play: the tendency of Nigerian political actors to resort to the courts as the first line of dispute resolution. While judicial intervention is essential in a constitutional democracy, its overuse in intra-party conflicts often leads to prolonged uncertainty. Courts are bound by procedure and timelines that do not always align with the urgency of political processes. As the ADC is now discovering, a case can move through multiple judicial layers without delivering the kind of decisive clarity required for political stability.
Yet, it would be premature to write off the party entirely. The ADC still possesses assets that many smaller parties lack: national visibility, a growing network of political actors, and a narrative that resonates with voters seeking alternatives. If it can resolve its leadership dispute quickly, either through judicial determination or political compromise, it may yet reclaim its position as a viable opposition platform.
Such a resolution, however, will require more than legal victories. It will demand a conscious effort to rebuild trust within the party, clarify its organisational structure, and establish transparent processes for decision-making. The ambitions of key stakeholders such as Atiku Abubakar, Abubakar Malami, Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso, Rotimi Amaechi, Peter Obi, Nasir El-Rufai, and others must be reconciled within a framework that prioritises institutional stability over individual advantage.
The stakes are high, not just for the ADC but for Nigeria’s democratic trajectory. A fragmented opposition benefits the incumbent by default, reducing electoral competition and limiting voter choice. Conversely, a cohesive and credible alternative can energise the political landscape, introduce new ideas, and enhance accountability.
As things stand, the ADC is at a crossroads. One path leads to consolidation and relevance; the other to fragmentation and irrelevance. The difference between the two will be determined in the coming months, as court proceedings continue and political actors make strategic decisions about their futures.
For now, the party remains what it has become over the past few days, ‘a house of confusion’, where legal uncertainty, political ambition, and institutional weakness collide. Whether it can transform that confusion into clarity will not only shape its own destiny but also influence the contours of the 2027 general elections and the balance of power that emerges in their aftermath.
Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com
Analysis
Wale Edun’s Exit and the Questions It Leaves Behind, by Boniface Ihiasota
Wale Edun’s Exit and the Questions It Leaves Behind, by Boniface Ihiasota
The sudden removal of Nigeria’s immediate past Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister of the Economy, Wale Edun, on April 21, 2026, has triggered widespread debate across political, economic and public spheres, owing largely to the manner of his exit and the absence of a clear, unified explanation from the government.
President Bola Ahmed Tinubu approved what was officially described as a “minor cabinet reshuffle,” which saw Edun and the Minister of Housing, Ahmed Musa Dangiwa, removed from the Federal Executive Council. The announcement was conveyed through a statement from the presidency on the same day, confirming that Edun’s tenure— which began in August 2023—had come to an abrupt end.
In his place, Taiwo Oyedele, who had only been appointed Minister of State for Finance in March 2026, was elevated to take over as substantive Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister of the Economy. The speed of the transition, barely weeks after Oyedele’s earlier appointment, added to the perception that the reshuffle was more consequential than officially portrayed.
The circumstances surrounding Edun’s removal remain contested. While some official sources suggested he resigned on health grounds, other accounts describe his exit as a dismissal, with no detailed justification provided by the presidency. This lack of clarity has fueled speculation and competing narratives about the real reasons behind his departure.
Political reactions were swift. Former lawmaker Dino Melaye publicly questioned the rationale for the removal, alleging possible financial misconduct and calling for transparency from the government. Similarly, analysts and commentators pointed to deeper structural issues within Nigeria’s fiscal management system, including concerns over budget execution, debt levels, and revenue shortfalls, as possible contributing factors.
Indeed, Edun’s tenure had come under scrutiny in the months leading up to his removal. Reports indicated that the National Assembly had raised concerns about oil revenue gaps and Nigeria’s rising public debt profile, estimated at over ₦152 trillion, alongside challenges in funding budgetary commitments. These economic pressures formed the backdrop against which his exit occurred, suggesting that performance concerns may have played a role.
Beyond elite political discourse, the reaction within the Federal Ministry of Finance itself was unusually dramatic. A viral video showed some ministry staff staging what was described as a “mock funeral” to celebrate his removal, an episode that underscored internal dissatisfaction and hinted at crisis within the ministry’s bureaucracy. Such a public display is rare in Nigeria’s civil service and reflects the depth of sentiment surrounding his tenure.
Public opinion has been sharply divided. Some Nigerians view the move as a necessary reset in the face of persistent economic hardship, inflationary pressures, and slow fiscal reforms. Others interpret it as evidence of policy inconsistency within the administration, especially given that Edun was widely regarded as a key member of the President’s economic team and a central figure in coordinating reform efforts.
Economically, the implications are significant. Edun had been closely associated with major policy directions, including subsidy removal and fiscal consolidation. His removal raises questions about continuity, investor confidence, and the future direction of Nigeria’s economic reforms. Analysts note that abrupt leadership changes in critical economic portfolios often send mixed signals to both domestic and international stakeholders.
In the aftermath, attention has shifted to Oyedele’s capacity to stabilise the situation and deliver on expectations. As a tax reform expert, his appointment is seen by some as a pivot toward revenue mobilisation and structural reform. However, the broader challenge remains restoring confidence in economic governance at a time when Nigeria faces mounting fiscal constraints.
Ultimately, the unceremonious nature of Wale Edun’s exit—marked by conflicting official narratives, political controversy, and unusual institutional reactions—has made it more than a routine cabinet reshuffle. It has become a defining moment in the Tinubu administration’s economic management, exposing underlying challenges and raising critical questions about accountability, transparency, and policy direction in Africa’s largest economy.
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