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When Two Powerful Heads Meet …

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When Two Powerful Heads Meet …

 

By Boniface Ihiasota, Washington DC and Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman, Nigeria

 

When United States President Donald Trump welcomed Chinese President Xi Jinping to Washington this week, the world watched not merely two presidents meeting, but two competing centres of global power attempting to put limits on a relationship increasingly defined by economic rivalry, technological competition and strategic mistrust.

 

Xi arrived in the United States on Wednesday, September 23, 2026, for a three-day state visit at Trump’s invitation. The visit, which ended on Friday, September 25, was the first visit by a Chinese president to the White House in more than a decade and the first time a Chinese leader had made two formal state visits to the United States.

 

On Thursday, September 24, Trump and Xi stood together at the White House during a formal state arrival ceremony, followed by bilateral discussions and a state dinner. On Friday, they met again over tea before visiting the National Archives, where they viewed documents connected with the history of the United States.

 

The ceremony conveyed warmth. The substance of the talks revealed something more complicated.

 

The meeting produced agreements and additional channels for cooperation, particularly in trade, investment, artificial intelligence and law enforcement. But it did not resolve the principal disputes that have placed Washington and Beijing on a strategic collision course.

 

Diaspora Watch Newspaper reports that the United States and China have spent years imposing tariffs and restrictions on each other’s goods, creating uncertainty for manufacturers, farmers, technology companies and consumers. The two governments had already reached a framework during Trump’s May 2026 visit to Beijing, but implementation remained uneven before Xi’s arrival in Washington.

 

During the September meeting, the two countries operationalised the US-China Board of Trade and Board of Investment, mechanisms created during the May summit.

 

Under the Board of Trade, Washington and Beijing reached consensus on recommendations for more favourable tariff treatment covering $30bn of non-sensitive goods in each direction. The products include American agricultural goods, fish and seafood, logs and wood products, cosmetics and medical devices, as well as Chinese consumer products such as small appliances, toys, holiday decorations and children’s car seats.

 

China also agreed to import at least 10 million metric tonnes of American coal in both 2027 and 2028.

 

On paper, the arrangement represents a substantial commercial opportunity. But it would be premature to describe it as the end of the US-China trade conflict.

 

Reuters reported that the wider trade truce was extended for only two months, meaning that some of the most difficult questions remain subject to further negotiations. The two governments therefore appear to have chosen continuity over confrontation without yet reaching a permanent economic settlement. That is perhaps the most revealing aspect of the meeting. The relationship is not being reset. It is being managed.

 

For China, access to the American market remains important. For the United States, Chinese manufacturing capacity and supply chains remain difficult to replace quickly. Both governments consequently have reasons to negotiate even while they continue to prepare for greater competition.

 

The question of rare-earth minerals illustrates the problem. China occupies a dominant position in important parts of the global rare-earth supply chain. The minerals are used in electronics, electric vehicles, advanced manufacturing and defence-related technologies. Washington has increasingly regarded its dependence on Chinese processing capacity as a strategic vulnerability.

 

The White House said the two countries were continuing discussions over shortages involving rare earths and other critical minerals, with the objective of returning shipments to appropriate levels. The issue has therefore moved beyond conventional trade policy.

 

For Washington, critical minerals are now linked to economic and national security. For Beijing, control over important supply chains provides negotiating leverage at a time when the United States is attempting to restrict China’s access to some advanced technologies. That produces an unusual form of interdependence.

 

America possesses enormous financial, technological and military capabilities. China possesses enormous manufacturing capacity and occupies critical positions in several global supply chains. Neither country can easily ignore the other’s leverage.

 

Artificial intelligence added another layer to the discussion. Washington and Beijing are competing intensely over AI, a technology that is increasingly relevant to economic productivity, scientific research, communications and national security. Yet both governments also recognise that competition in such a rapidly developing field requires channels for communication.

 

The two sides agreed to establish a US-China “Super Intelligence” dialogue to discuss the risks and benefits associated with emerging technologies, with another exchange expected by November. They also agreed to establish a bilateral communication channel for incidents involving such technologies.

 

The significance lies not in the creation of a new diplomatic label, but in the recognition that technological competition can generate risks that neither side can manage in isolation.

 

The United States wants to preserve its technological advantages. China wants to expand its own technological capabilities and reduce dependence on American technology. Those objectives have not changed.

 

What has changed, at least temporarily, is the effort to create a mechanism through which the two governments can communicate while that competition continues. The same pattern emerged in discussions on law enforcement.

 

The White House said China had introduced export controls on two additional fentanyl precursor chemicals and that Chinese authorities had arrested 21 Chinese citizens in August following information supplied by US law enforcement. Washington has pressed Beijing for stronger action against the supply of precursor chemicals linked to illicit fentanyl production in North America.

 

For Trump, the issue has direct domestic significance. For Beijing, cooperation provides an opportunity to demonstrate that engagement with Washington can produce practical results even when disagreements persist elsewhere.

 

But perhaps the most difficult subject remains Taiwan. China regards Taiwan as part of its territory and opposes moves towards Taiwanese independence. The United States does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan but has longstanding unofficial relations with Taipei and provides defensive support to the island.

 

Xi used the Washington meeting to restate Beijing’s position on Taiwan and national reunification. Reporting from the talks showed that the issue remained among the major areas of disagreement between the two governments. No new settlement emerged.

 

That is significant because Taiwan is not simply a question of sovereignty between Beijing and Taipei. It sits at the intersection of American security commitments, Chinese national policy, military strategy and the global semiconductor industry.

 

A serious crisis around the island could disrupt shipping, technology supply chains and financial markets while creating the possibility of direct confrontation between American and Chinese forces.

 

The absence of a new agreement on Taiwan therefore does not mean the issue has become less important. It demonstrates the limits of the current rapprochement.

 

The same caution applies to Iran. Trump raised China’s relationship with Tehran during the Washington talks and warned Beijing against supporting Iran, according to US Ambassador to China David Perdue.

 

Reuters reported that Trump received assurances from Xi that China would not provide such support, amid American concerns over Chinese-Iranian economic and military links.

 

The discussion illustrates another reality of the US-China relationship: bilateral diplomacy increasingly takes place against the background of conflicts and alliances elsewhere.

 

Washington and Beijing are not merely negotiating about their own economies. Their policies affect Russia, Iran, North Korea, Taiwan, international shipping and the broader balance of power.

 

The two leaders also discussed Russia, North Korea and Iran and agreed to support each other as hosts of the G20 and APEC meetings. The White House said Trump and Xi intend to attend each other’s summits.

 

Yet the most striking feature of the summit may have been what did not happen as there was no comprehensive trade settlement. There was no breakthrough over Taiwan. There was no end to the technology rivalry. There was no agreement that fundamentally altered the strategic competition between Washington and Beijing.

 

Reuters described the summit as producing few major public breakthroughs, while noting that the meeting was heavily focused on personal diplomacy and symbolism. That should not necessarily be interpreted as a failure of diplomacy.

 

Relations between major powers are rarely transformed by one meeting. More often, summits create mechanisms for managing disagreements and preventing them from escalating.

 

In that sense, the most important product of the Trump-Xi meeting may be the continuation of dialogue.

 

The alternative would be a relationship in which economic retaliation, technology restrictions, military manoeuvres and diplomatic disagreements occur without reliable channels between the two governments.

 

For two countries with enormous military capabilities and competing interests across the Indo-Pacific, such a situation would carry significant risks. The personal relationship between Trump and Xi is therefore only one component of the equation.

 

Trump has demonstrated a preference for leader-to-leader negotiations and tangible economic outcomes. Xi operates within a Chinese political system built around long-term strategic planning and the pursuit of what Beijing describes as national rejuvenation.

 

The two leaders can therefore reach tactical understandings without necessarily sharing the same long-term objectives.

 

Trump wants an economic relationship he considers fairer to American workers, farmers and businesses. Xi wants continued access to international markets while resisting what Beijing regards as attempts to constrain China’s technological and strategic rise. Those objectives overlap in some areas and collide in others. The result is a relationship that can simultaneously produce cooperation and confrontation. The Washington summit demonstrated precisely that contradiction.

 

The two countries can agree on coal purchases while competing over energy and technology. They can cooperate against illicit drug trafficking while imposing restrictions on strategic exports. They can establish an AI communication channel while competing intensely for technological leadership. They can discuss global stability while remaining divided over Taiwan.

 

That is the nature of the contemporary US-China relationship. It is neither a new Cold War in the traditional sense nor a normal commercial partnership. It is a complicated combination of economic interdependence, strategic competition and selective cooperation.

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Diplomacy

Trump, Putin, Xi meeting: A new world order or diplomatic spectacle?

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Trump, Putin, Xi meeting: A new world order or diplomatic spectacle?

 

The planned gathering of the leaders of the United States, Russia and China in Shenzhen comes at a critical moment for global security, nuclear arms control, the wars in Ukraine and Iran, and the shifting balance of international power. But beyond its historic symbolism, the meeting faces the difficult task of reconciling three competing national interests.

 

The international community is preparing for an extraordinary diplomatic encounter as United States President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping are scheduled to meet in China next week in what could become one of the most consequential gatherings of world leaders in recent years.

 

The White House confirmed on Friday that the three leaders would hold a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen, southern China, marking an unprecedented gathering of the leaders of the three countries with the world’s largest nuclear arsenals.

 

The announcement, made on November 13 and further reported on November 14, has attracted international attention because of its potential implications for global security, nuclear weapons control, the wars in Ukraine and Iran, and the increasingly complicated relationship between Washington, Moscow and Beijing.

 

White House Assistant Press Secretary Olivia Wales said Trump would conclude his visit to China with the trilateral engagement, following a bilateral meeting and working lunch with Xi.

 

The meeting is expected to take place on Thursday, November 19, during the APEC summit scheduled for November 18 and 19. A senior American official, however, has cautioned that Washington does not expect an immediate agreement to emerge from the discussions.

 

While the gathering carries considerable historical symbolism, its success will depend on whether the three leaders can move beyond diplomatic appearances and address the substantive disagreements separating their governments.

 

According to reports by Reuters and the Associated Press on November 14, discussions over the format and agenda had remained delicate, with the three countries approaching the proposed encounter from different strategic positions.

 

The meeting therefore presents a paradox: the world’s three most influential nuclear powers are preparing to sit together at a time when their interests increasingly overlap in some areas but sharply diverge in others.

 

Nuclear weapons at the centre of the negotiations

 

One of the principal issues expected to dominate the meeting is nuclear arms control, particularly following the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, popularly known as New START, between Washington and Moscow in February 2026.

 

The treaty, signed in 2010, provided limits on the strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Russia. It capped each country at 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 700 deployed delivery systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

 

Its expiration removed the last major legally binding framework restricting the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two countries.

 

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres described the development on February 5 as a grave moment for international peace and security, warning that the world had entered a period without binding limits on the strategic nuclear arsenals of its two largest nuclear powers.

 

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 2025 assessment estimated that Russia possessed 5,459 nuclear warheads in its total inventory, while the United States had approximately 5,177. China’s inventory was estimated at 600 warheads at the beginning of 2025.

 

More recent estimates published by the Federation of American Scientists put Russia’s total inventory at approximately 5,420, the United States at 5,042 and China at 620 in 2026.

 

These figures include different categories of warheads, including deployed, stored and retired weapons awaiting dismantlement. Collectively, the three countries account for the overwhelming majority of the world’s nuclear weapons.

 

Trump’s interest in bringing China into a new nuclear arms control arrangement is therefore understandable from Washington’s strategic perspective. An agreement covering only Russia and the United States would leave China’s expanding nuclear capabilities outside the framework.

 

However, Beijing has little incentive to accept restrictions designed around arsenals several times larger than its own.

 

China’s position has consistently been that its nuclear capabilities are primarily defensive and that countries possessing substantially larger nuclear stockpiles should take the lead in disarmament.

 

This creates a fundamental negotiating difficulty. Washington wants Beijing included in a new arrangement, while Beijing is reluctant to accept obligations that could restrict its strategic development without comparable reductions by the other two powers.

 

The challenge is not simply persuading three presidents to sit around a table. It is developing a framework that recognises the different sizes, doctrines and security concerns of their nuclear forces.

 

A senior American official has already indicated that Washington does not expect an agreement from next week’s meeting. Rather, the administration considers it an entry point for discussions at the highest political level.

 

Such a starting point could still matter. Renewed communication between the three nuclear powers could reduce the possibility of miscalculation, establish channels for future negotiations and create momentum towards a more comprehensive arms control arrangement.

 

Ukraine and the question of a new Yalta

 

The proposed meeting has generated considerable anxiety over the future of Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 fundamentally changed European security and relations between Moscow and Western governments. The conflict has continued despite several diplomatic initiatives, with the United States seeking to facilitate negotiations between the two countries.

 

Putin has a strong interest in using the gathering to discuss the conflict and Russia’s desired terms for ending it. However, Washington has indicated that Ukraine is unlikely to feature in the trilateral discussions because it is pursuing a separate diplomatic process involving Kyiv and Moscow.

 

China has maintained relations with Russia throughout the conflict and has become an increasingly important economic partner to Moscow. Its purchases of Russian energy and supply of goods and technological components have helped sustain bilateral economic relations amid Western sanctions.

 

According to Associated Press reporting, Beijing has also been reluctant to place Ukraine at the centre of the proposed three-way meeting.

 

For Putin, however, the opportunity to meet Trump and Xi together carries diplomatic significance beyond the immediate question of a ceasefire.

 

The proposed meeting has consequently attracted comparisons with the Yalta Conference of February 1945, when the leaders of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union met to discuss the post-Second World War settlement.

 

The historical comparison is particularly sensitive because Yalta became associated with decisions concerning the post-war political arrangement in Europe and the distribution of influence among major powers.

 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has expressed concern about the possibility of major powers discussing his country’s future without its participation.

 

There is also a difference between the 1945 gathering and the proposed Shenzhen meeting. China was not a participant in the Yalta Conference, while the forthcoming encounter would involve three nuclear-armed countries with competing interests in an international system that includes numerous independent states and multilateral institutions.

 

The meeting should therefore not automatically be interpreted as a new agreement to divide the world into spheres of influence.

 

Nevertheless, its implications for countries outside the negotiating room deserve attention. Ukraine, European governments and other states concerned about the security consequences of a possible settlement will be watching closely.

 

Iran, the other major flashpoint

 

Iran is another issue expected to feature in the discussions.

 

Trump has indicated that he wants to discuss the conflict involving Iran with Putin and Xi. The White House has also confirmed that the subject is expected to be raised during the trilateral engagement.

 

The United States has a direct interest in the outcome because of its military and security involvement. Russia has maintained strategic relations with Tehran, while China has cultivated significant economic and diplomatic ties with Iran.

 

For Beijing, the stability of the Middle East is particularly important because of its energy requirements and commercial interests.

 

China is one of the world’s largest oil importers, and instability around the Persian Gulf threatens energy supplies, international shipping and economic activities extending far beyond the region.

 

Russia also has reasons to preserve its relationship with Iran, particularly in the context of its wider confrontation with Western governments.

 

Consequently, any American attempt to secure Russian and Chinese cooperation on Iran would require addressing their separate interests and relationships with Tehran.

 

The three leaders may agree on the need to prevent further escalation without necessarily agreeing on how to achieve it.

 

China’s delicate position as host

 

While Trump and Putin have their respective diplomatic objectives, Xi faces perhaps the most delicate balancing exercise.

 

China is hosting the 33rd APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Shenzhen from November 18 to 19 under the theme, Building an Asia-Pacific Community to Prosper Together.

 

According to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Xi will chair the gathering, deliver remarks, host participating leaders and hold bilateral meetings.

 

APEC has 21 member economies, including the United States, Russia, China, Japan, Australia, Canada and several Southeast Asian countries. The organisation accounts for more than 60 per cent of global gross domestic product and approximately 40 per cent of the world’s population.

 

The presence of Trump and Putin could, however, shift international attention away from APEC’s economic cooperation agenda towards the geopolitical implications of the trilateral encounter.

 

China wants to maintain its position as a major advocate of international trade, economic cooperation and multilateral diplomacy. At the same time, its relationship with Russia has deepened considerably since the outbreak of the Ukraine war.

 

Beijing and Moscow have expanded economic cooperation, particularly in energy, trade and technology. China has become a major destination for Russian energy exports, while Russian businesses increasingly depend on Chinese markets and supplies following Western sanctions.

 

However, China’s relationship with the United States remains economically significant.

 

The two countries are major trading partners, and their economic relationship affects global manufacturing, technology, financial markets and supply chains.

 

The recent trade tensions between Washington and Beijing, particularly over tariffs, rare earth minerals and advanced semiconductor technology, demonstrate how disagreements between the two economies can affect countries worldwide.

 

Trump’s bilateral discussions with Xi are therefore expected to cover the implementation of existing trade arrangements and outstanding economic disagreements.

 

Reuters reported on November 14 that American officials intended to raise concerns about the pace and level of Chinese rare earth supplies to the United States.

 

For Xi, the challenge is to welcome Trump and Putin without allowing the meeting to undermine China’s broader diplomatic objectives or its relationships with other international partners.

 

What does the meeting mean for the international community?

 

The proposed gathering raises an important question about the changing character of global leadership.

 

For decades, international security has been shaped by institutions and arrangements established after the Second World War, including the United Nations, the nuclear non-proliferation framework and various bilateral and multilateral agreements.

 

However, the increasing rivalry between major powers, the weakening of arms control arrangements and the persistence of regional conflicts have placed these institutions under considerable pressure.

 

A meeting involving Washington, Moscow and Beijing could create opportunities for cooperation on issues that require the participation of the world’s most powerful countries.

 

These include nuclear disarmament, artificial intelligence governance, international security, energy stability and the prevention of military escalation.

 

But there are also legitimate concerns about the implications of allowing three powerful governments to dominate discussions on matters affecting other sovereign nations.

 

The United Nations Charter recognises the sovereign equality of states. Consequently, any arrangement concerning the territorial integrity, political independence or security of another country must respect its rights and participation.

 

For African countries, the implications are equally important.

 

The continent has economic, security and diplomatic relationships with all three powers. China is a major trading partner and infrastructure financier for several African countries, Russia maintains security and military relationships across parts of the continent, while the United States remains an important partner in trade, investment, development and security cooperation.

 

Any major shift in relations among the three countries could affect African economies, particularly through commodity prices, energy markets, foreign investment, international financing and the availability of development assistance.

 

African governments must therefore avoid becoming passive observers of decisions made elsewhere. Their interests require coordinated engagement through the African Union, the United Nations and other multilateral platforms.

 

The same applies to other developing economies whose economic and security interests are often affected by decisions taken by major powers.

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US withdraws diplomats’ families from Gulf amid Houthi attacks

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US withdraws diplomats’ families from Gulf amid Houthi attacks

 

The United States has ordered non-emergency government employees and their families to leave its diplomatic missions in Saudi Arabia following deadly attacks on the kingdom’s airport and oil infrastructure.

 

The decision comes amid escalating regional tensions and concerns over further attacks by Iran-aligned Houthi forces, with Washington also planning to withdraw family members from its missions in other Gulf countries.

 

US State Department spokesman Tommy Pigott said the department had ordered the departure of non-emergency American government employees and their families in Saudi Arabia, citing attacks on civilian targets and critical infrastructure.

 

The attacks killed at least three people and injured eight others, according to Saudi authorities.

 

One person was killed and eight others injured in an attack on King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, while two people died in a drone attack targeting a facility at Saudi Aramco’s Shaybah oilfield.

 

Four US officials told Reuters that American missions in other Gulf states would also order family members to leave. Pigott, however, did not confirm changes to diplomatic missions outside Saudi Arabia.

 

The latest development follows an escalation of fighting in Yemen amid a wider regional conflict triggered by the US-Israeli war on Iran, which began in late February.

 

The conflict has disrupted global energy trade and heightened security concerns across the Gulf, a region central to international oil supplies and shipping.

 

Saudi Arabia’s energy ministry said its air defences intercepted a drone attempting to strike a facility at the Shaybah oilfield, resulting in two deaths.

 

The country’s civil aviation authority separately reported the deadly attack on King Fahd International Airport.

 

The US Embassy in Riyadh had earlier issued a security alert warning of possible further Houthi attacks following deadly strikes, including an attack on Riyadh’s airport.

 

The embassy and a Central Intelligence Agency station operating from the facility were also targeted by drones in early March, as Iran launched attacks across the region.

 

The withdrawal order signals Washington’s growing concern over the security of its personnel as attacks threaten civilian facilities, diplomatic installations and energy infrastructure across the Gulf.

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Diplomacy

CARICOM, Türkiye explore cooperation in trade, energy, food security

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CARICOM, Türkiye explore cooperation in trade, energy, food security

 

The Caribbean Community, CARICOM and the Republic of Türkiye have explored opportunities to strengthen cooperation in trade, investment, food security, renewable energy, disaster management and maritime connectivity.

 

The two sides also identified health, port development and climate resilience as priority areas for deeper engagement during the second meeting of the CARICOM-Republic of Türkiye Consultation and Cooperation Mechanism held on October 12, 2026.

 

According to a joint press release, the meeting reaffirmed both parties’ commitment to strengthening political dialogue and advancing practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest.

 

The meeting was co-chaired by the Permanent Secretary in Suriname’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Business and Cooperation, Ambassador Miriam Mac Intosh, and Türkiye’s Director-General for Latin America and the Caribbean in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Erkan Aytun.

 

Mac Intosh, who represents the current chair of the CARICOM Council for Foreign and Community Relations, said the partnership was founded on constructive dialogue, mutual respect and a shared commitment to development.

 

She commended Türkiye for its support for development projects and humanitarian assistance across the Caribbean, noting that the contributions had delivered tangible benefits to the region.

 

“We remain committed to identifying and advancing further initiatives that contribute to the Region’s resilience and sustainable development,” she said.

 

Convened under a memorandum of understanding signed in 2011, the meeting reviewed developments in relations between the two parties and examined opportunities to expand cooperation.

 

High-level officials from CARICOM member states presented practical proposals covering trade and investment, disaster management, food security, renewable energy, health, maritime connectivity and port development.

 

Representatives of Turkish institutions also outlined how their technical expertise, technology and institutional capacity could support the priorities of Caribbean countries.

 

The discussions further examined preparations for the 31st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, known as COP31, scheduled to take place in Antalya, Türkiye, from November 9 to 20, 2026.

 

Türkiye, which will preside over the conference, presented its strategic priorities and preparations for the global climate summit.

 

Aytun said the country wanted COP31 to focus on implementing climate commitments, following consultations with participating countries and other stakeholders.

 

“We need to make COP31 an implementation COP,” he said.

 

He identified 10 priority themes for the climate action agenda, including clean energy transition and electrification, zero waste and methane reduction, climate-resilient cities, green industrialisation, youth and education, food security, oceans and seas, resilient health systems, synergies among the Rio conventions and a climate implementation bridge.

 

CARICOM and Türkiye have expanded their engagement over the years through development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and support for regional initiatives.

 

Recent areas of cooperation include contributions to Caribbean disaster recovery efforts, support for the Caribbean Development Fund and assistance in strengthening the CARICOM Secretariat’s information and communications infrastructure.

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