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ASUU Strikes: The Endless Loop Nigeria Must Break 

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ASUU Strikes: The Endless Loop Nigeria Must Break

ASUU Strikes: The Endless Loop Nigeria Must Break 

 

By Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman

 

If there is any rhythm that has refused to change in Nigeria’s academic calendar, it is the drumbeat of strikes by the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU). Each cycle begins with a warning, swells into protests, and collapses into months of classroom paralysis. It makes students stranded, parents helpless, and the nation’s tertiary education trapped in recurring stagnation.

 

For decades, ASUU strikes have become a permanent punctuation in Nigeria’s educational story, making occurrences a tragedy that has outlived governments, policy directions, and even generations of undergraduates. The irony is that every new strike looks like the last: same demands, same government responses, same media debates, and the same outcome — suspension, not resolution.

 

How did Nigeria get here? And why does this crisis appear so cyclical, almost generational?

 

The Academic Staff Union of Universities was founded in 1978, emerging from the ashes of the Nigerian Association of University Teachers (NAUT). From inception, ASUU was not just a trade union; it was a conscience of the academia, a body that saw itself as guardian of intellectual autonomy, national development, and academic integrity.

 

But its relationship with the government has always been uneasy. The first major showdown came in 1988 during General Ibrahim Babangida’s regime, when ASUU embarked on a strike to demand fair wages, university autonomy, and funding. The government’s response was swift and draconian. ASUU was banned, its leaders detained, and salaries withheld. Yet, the union’s resilience prevailed, and by 1990, it was reinstated.

 

Since then, ASUU has gone on strike over twenty times, spanning military and democratic dispensations alike. The issues have remained stubbornly familiar: poor funding, unpaid allowances, inadequate infrastructure, decaying research capacity, and government’s failure to honour previous agreements.

 

The landmark agreement of 2009 between ASUU and the Federal Government was supposed to be a turning point. It captured key demands that included better welfare for lecturers, revitalisation of infrastructure, and university autonomy. But, as with many government pacts in Nigeria, the implementation was half-hearted and short-lived. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2013, 2017, and 2020 merely recycled promises, each one becoming a prelude to the next crisis.

 

Every ASUU strike has two layers — the visible and the political. On the surface, it’s about funding and welfare. Beneath that lies distrust, ego, and inconsistent leadership.

 

Government negotiators often approach agreements as temporary pacifications rather than binding contracts. Ministries change, priorities shift, and promises fade. ASUU, on its part, wields strikes as its strongest bargaining tool. Sometimes effective but increasingly self-defeating.

 

Both sides share blame for the cyclical failure. Government often defaults, while ASUU, in its moral fervour, sometimes resists pragmatic reform, especially in accountability and diversification of funding. The result is a predictable dance: delay, protest, strike, negotiation, suspension and then repeat.

 

The consequences are devastating. Millions of students lose valuable academic time, universities fall behind global peers, and research collapses. Parents endure emotional and financial stress; employers distrust local degrees; and private universities quietly benefit from public dysfunction.

 

During the eight-month strike in 2022, Nigeria lost an estimated ₦1.5 trillion in productivity. Many lecturers relocated abroad, deepening brain drain. The crisis is no longer a union-government quarrel but a national emergency that undermines development.

 

Nigeria isn’t alone in facing academic labour disputes but other countries learned, adapted, and reformed.

 

In India, repeated strikes in the 1990s led to creation of the University Grants Commission Reforms, which institutionalised regular wage reviews and infrastructure funding insulated from political manipulation.

 

In South Africa, the “Fees Must Fall” crisis of 2015 forced government and universities to form oversight committees of academics and students to monitor education spending. Transparency replaced tension, restoring confidence.

 

Kenya went further. It enacted a Collective Bargaining Framework that legally binds both government and unions for four-year terms. No administration can unilaterally breach it without parliamentary approval. Predictability replaced confrontation.

 

Nigeria can learn from these examples. The problem is not absence of ideas but absence of political will and institutional discipline.

 

The heart of the problem is philosophical: Nigeria treats education as expenditure and not investment. That mindset must change.

 

While Ghana invests about 6.5% of GDP in education, Nigeria spends less than 2%. South Korea channels more into research than oil. Their progress is no mystery. They fund their future.

 

Every strike pushes Nigeria’s future further behind. Education is not just another sector; it is the soil on which every other grows. Without it, national development becomes guesswork.

 

Although ASUU’s struggle is noble but must evolve. Activism must give way to innovation. The union should complement resistance with reform, proposing alternative funding models, driving research-commercial partnerships, and mentoring new lecturers for modern academic challenges.

 

The government, on the other hand, must understand that signing agreements without intention to implement is governance without honour. Each broken promise erodes trust and provokes another strike.

 

A serious government should measure progress not by the number of schools built but by the quality of minds produced. When airports function better than universities, the country builds departures, not destinies.

 

If Nigeria truly wishes to end the ASUU strikes, both sides must shift from rhetoric to reform.

 

Every ASUU–Federal Government agreement should be backed by legislation. Once domesticated by the National Assembly, any breach becomes actionable, not negotiable. Education cannot thrive on verbal promises.

 

Beyond TETFund, Nigeria needs an Education Stabilisation Fund co-managed by government, ASUU, private sector, and alumni networks. Funding can come from education levies, grants, and endowments. This would provide consistent support regardless of annual budget politics.

 

ASUU must demonstrate stewardship. Universities should publish audited reports on how revitalisation or research funds are spent. Accountability strengthens credibility.

 

Set a four-year salary review cycle tied to inflation, GDP, and minimum wage benchmarks. Once automatic, it removes salary from recurring contention.

 

A permanent University Industrial Mediation Council (UIMC), composed of respected scholars, jurists, and labour experts, can serve as an early-warning system — intervening before crises escalate.

 

A public online dashboard showing government disbursements and ASUU obligations would foster accountability. When citizens can see the truth, both sides act more responsibly.

 

The future lies in structure, not sentiment. A binding framework, transparent governance, and joint accountability can end the strike culture permanently.

 

ASUU must rise beyond protest politics, and the government must govern with integrity. Both must see education as a shared project and not a battlefield.

 

If Nigeria’s leaders can build political peace accords and implement oil-sharing formulas, they can certainly fund and protect the education sector.

 

Until then, the next strike will not surprise anyone. It will simply mark another sequel in a story that should have ended years ago.

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Opinion

EDITORIAL: Tackling Poverty in Africa 

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EDITORIAL: Tackling Poverty in Africa 

 

Poverty remains Africa’s greatest paradox. The continent possesses nearly one-third of the world’s mineral resources, about 60 per cent of the world’s uncultivated arable land, a youthful population projected to exceed two billion by 2050, and enormous renewable energy potential. Yet millions of Africans continue to struggle for daily survival. This contradiction underscores not a shortage of resources but a persistent deficit of governance, inclusive growth and political will.

 

The scale of the challenge is sobering. According to the World Bank’s Poverty, Prosperity and Planet Report 2024, nearly 700 million people worldwide live in extreme poverty, surviving on less than $2.15 a day. More troubling is the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa, home to just 16 per cent of the global population, accounts for about 67 per cent of the world’s extremely poor people. The region has effectively become the global epicentre of poverty.

 

Economic growth alone has not translated into prosperity for ordinary Africans. Although African economies have shown resilience in recent years, the World Bank has repeatedly warned that growth remains too weak and too unequal to significantly reduce poverty. Rising public debt, inflation, conflict, climate shocks and governance failures continue to erode development gains across many countries.

 

The causes of poverty in Africa are well known. Armed conflicts have displaced millions and destroyed livelihoods from Sudan to the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and the Sahel. Climate change has intensified droughts, floods and food insecurity, particularly in the Horn of Africa. Weak institutions, corruption, inadequate infrastructure and overdependence on commodity exports have further constrained sustainable development. Meanwhile, millions of young Africans enter labour markets every year only to find few productive jobs.

 

Former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon once observed that “there is no development without peace, no peace without development, and neither without respect for human rights.” His words remain profoundly relevant. Peace and security are indispensable foundations for economic progress. Without them, investment declines, education suffers and poverty deepens.

 

Yet Africa’s future need not be defined by deprivation. Encouraging examples exist across the continent. Countries that have invested consistently in agricultural productivity, financial inclusion, education and digital innovation have demonstrated that poverty can be reduced. Kenya’s mobile money revolution expanded financial access to millions. Ethiopia’s agricultural reforms boosted rural productivity for years before conflict interrupted progress. Rwanda has prioritised healthcare, technology and institutional reforms to improve living standards. These experiences show that sound policies can produce measurable results.

 

The African Continental Free Trade Area also offers a historic opportunity. By creating the world’s largest free trade area by participating countries, AfCFTA has the potential to stimulate industrialisation, expand intra-African trade, create millions of jobs and reduce dependence on external markets. However, success will depend on governments implementing complementary reforms in transport, energy, customs administration and the rule of law.

 

Development partners equally have responsibilities, but foreign aid cannot substitute for domestic accountability. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan famously remarked, “Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.” African leaders must therefore strengthen institutions, fight corruption relentlessly, improve tax administration, invest in quality education and healthcare, empower women and create an enabling environment for private enterprise.

 

Ultimately, poverty is not inevitable. It is the consequence of choices made—and sometimes avoided—by governments and institutions. Africa possesses the human capital, natural wealth and entrepreneurial energy to transform its fortunes. What is urgently required is leadership that places citizens above politics, productivity above patronage and long-term development above short-term political gains.

 

The fight against poverty must now move beyond lofty declarations and conference communiqués. Africans deserve governments that deliver jobs instead of excuses, infrastructure instead of slogans, and opportunities instead of dependency. The continent’s greatest resource is neither oil nor gold, but its people. Investing in them is not merely good economics; it is the surest pathway to Africa’s enduring prosperity.

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Analysis

Lessons from the Catholic Bishops’ Visit to Tinubu, by Boniface Ihiasota 

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Lessons from the Catholic Bishops’ Visit to Tinubu, by Boniface Ihiasota 

 

The recent visit of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria to President Bola Ahmed Tinubu at the Presidential Villa was more than a ceremonial engagement. It became one of the clearest illustrations yet of the widening gap between official optimism and the daily realities confronting millions of Nigerians. The discussions that followed—and the public reactions they generated—have once again underscored the indispensable role of religious institutions in shaping national conversations on governance, accountability and social justice.

 

Led by the President of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria, Archbishop Matthew Man-Oso Ndagoso, the bishops used the opportunity to raise concerns over insecurity, economic hardship, unemployment and the general welfare of Nigerians. They also urged President Tinubu to formally invite Pope Leo XIV to Nigeria, arguing that such a visit would strengthen peace, unity and national reconciliation.

 

President Tinubu, on his part, defended his administration’s reforms, insisting that the difficult decisions taken since assuming office were necessary to rescue the economy from years of structural distortions. He maintained that security architecture was being repositioned and that prosperity would eventually follow the current sacrifices.

 

Ordinarily, such exchanges between government and faith leaders are healthy in every democracy. However, the conversation assumed greater significance after Cardinal John Onaiyekan publicly disclosed that the President disagreed with many of the bishops’ assessments. According to the Cardinal, the bishops told Tinubu that “the economy is not helping our poor people,” while the President maintained that the economy was improving. The revelation immediately triggered widespread debate across political and religious circles because it exposed two sharply contrasting narratives about the state of the nation.

 

Yet, facts remain stubborn. Nigeria continues to face severe economic challenges. Inflation has remained elevated over the past two years, food prices have climbed dramatically, and millions of households continue to struggle with declining purchasing power. The World Bank has repeatedly warned that while reforms such as fuel subsidy removal and exchange-rate liberalisation may improve long-term fiscal sustainability, they also impose painful short-term costs on vulnerable citizens unless accompanied by robust social protection measures.

 

This explains why the bishops’ intervention resonated beyond the Catholic faithful. Religious leaders occupy a unique position in Nigerian society. They interact daily with ordinary citizens who seek assistance through churches, mosques and community organisations. Consequently, their assessment of public suffering often reflects grassroots realities that official statistics may not immediately capture.

 

The reactions also revealed an important democratic principle. Criticism of government should not automatically be interpreted as political opposition. Throughout Nigeria’s democratic history, both Christian and Muslim leaders have consistently spoken against corruption, insecurity, injustice and poverty irrespective of which party occupies Aso Rock. Their constitutional freedom to speak truth to power remains essential to democratic accountability.

 

At the same time, government officials equally have the responsibility to explain policies and defend their decisions. Democracy thrives not when everyone agrees but when disagreements are managed through dialogue rather than hostility. The exchange between Tinubu and the bishops should therefore be viewed as evidence that democratic engagement remains alive, provided both sides continue to listen respectfully.

 

The larger lesson is that perception matters almost as much as policy. Economic indicators may improve on paper, but if ordinary Nigerians cannot afford food, healthcare, education or transportation, public confidence will remain elusive. Governments ultimately earn legitimacy not through optimistic speeches but through measurable improvements in people’s quality of life.

 

As Nigeria journeys toward the 2027 elections, the meeting between the Catholic bishops and President Tinubu should remind both leaders and citizens that governance is not merely about defending statistics or winning arguments. It is about restoring hope. That hope will be strengthened only when policy outcomes begin to match the lived experiences of the millions whose voices the bishops sought to amplify.

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Analysis

Obasanjo, Atiku and the Burden of Broken Trust, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

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Obasanjo, Atiku and the Burden of Broken Trust, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

 

In politics, alliances are often built on interests, sustained by necessity and destroyed by distrust. Few relationships illustrate this reality more profoundly than that of former President Olusegun Obasanjo and former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar. What began as one of the strongest political partnerships in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic gradually degenerated into one of its most bitter rivalries, leaving enduring consequences not only for the two principal actors but also for the country’s democratic evolution.

 

Their story is not merely about two ambitious politicians. It is a study of trust, betrayal, power, succession and the burdens of political ambition. More importantly, it explains why Atiku Abubakar, despite his enormous political network, financial resources and national appeal, has remained one of Nigeria’s greatest political nearly-men.

 

Politically, the relationship predates the return to democracy in 1999. During the military era, Atiku had become a leading figure in the Shehu Musa Yar’Adua-led Peoples Democratic Movement (PDM), arguably Nigeria’s most organised political structure at the time. Following General Sani Abacha’s death on June 8, 1998, General Abdulsalami Abubakar initiated a transition programme that opened the way for democratic elections.

 

As political parties emerged, the newly formed Peoples Democratic Party became the dominant platform. Within the PDP, Atiku was among the strongest presidential aspirants. He had built an extensive grassroots network through the PDM and enjoyed significant support among party delegates.

 

However, circumstances changed dramatically when former military Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo, who had recently been released from prison by General Abdulsalami Abubakar, entered the presidential race. Many influential political leaders believed Nigeria required a Yoruba president to heal the wounds created by the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election won by late Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola.

 

At the PDP presidential convention held in Jos in December 1998, Obasanjo defeated Alex Ekwueme to secure the party’s ticket. Atiku, recognising the prevailing political mood, aligned with Obasanjo and reportedly mobilised substantial support from the PDM machinery for the former military ruler.

 

To reward both political loyalty and strategic value, Obasanjo selected Atiku as his running mate ahead of the 1999 presidential election. Together they defeated the Alliance for Democracy-All People’s Party ticket of Chief Olu Falae and Dr Umaru Shinkafi.

 

Initially, on what appeared a perfect political marriage, Obasanjo concentrated on governance and Nigeria’s re-engagement with the international community, while Atiku chaired the National Economic Council and the National Council on Privatisation. The vice-president became one of the principal architects of Nigeria’s economic reform programme, overseeing privatisation policies that fundamentally reshaped sectors such as telecommunications, banking and manufacturing.

 

Obasanjo’s military background inclined him towards centralised authority, discipline and firm control of government. Atiku, by contrast, was a consummate coalition builder whose strength lay in negotiation, consultation and political networking.

 

Interestingly, the first visible cracks appeared shortly after their inauguration. Several influential figures accused Atiku of maintaining an independent political structure outside Aso Rock. Rather than functioning merely as the vice, he continued nurturing relationships with governors, legislators and party leaders across the federation. For Obasanjo, this increasingly looked like preparation for succession rather than loyalty and by 2002, mutual suspicion had become impossible to conceal.

 

As the 2003 election approached, rumours circulated that Obasanjo considered replacing Atiku with another running mate. It was further rumoured that Atiku’s political associates equally questioned whether the President intended to honour what they believed was an understanding that power would eventually pass to the vice-president. Neither man publicly admitted the existence of such an agreement. The crisis intensified after the 2003 elections, which returned both men to office. The second term proved far more turbulent than the first.

 

Cabinet meetings reportedly became battlegrounds of competing interests. PDP leaders increasingly aligned themselves with either Obasanjo or Atiku. Government gradually transformed into two competing political camps operating under one administration.

 

Then came the defining episode. The proposed constitutional amendment that would have allowed a third presidential term for Obasanjo became the turning point. Although Obasanjo repeatedly denied personally sponsoring the amendment, many political actors believed forces loyal to him actively supported it. On the other side, Atiku vehemently opposed the proposal.

 

Going forward, on May 16, 2006, the National Assembly rejected the constitutional amendment, effectively ending any possibility of a third term. That single event irreversibly destroyed whatever trust remained between President and Vice-President. The aftermath was brutal.

 

Obasanjo publicly accused Atiku of disloyalty and corruption. The Federal Executive Council recommended investigations into allegations arising from the United States-based Jefferson bribery scandal involving former Congressman William Jefferson and Vice-President Atiku’s former wife, Jennifer Douglas. Atiku consistently denied wrongdoing and was never convicted of corruption either in Nigeria or the United States.

 

The administration also attempted to exclude Atiku from contesting the 2007 presidential election through the Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC, after the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC listed him among politicians allegedly indicted for corruption.

 

However, in a landmark judgment delivered on April 16, 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that INEC lacked constitutional powers to disqualify candidates without a court conviction. That judgment remains one of Nigeria’s most significant electoral precedents. By then, however, political damage had already been done. Atiku had left the PDP for the Action Congress, contested the presidency against the late Umaru Musa Yar’Adua and finished third.

 

Since then, Atiku has contested the presidency repeatedly—in 1993 (Social Democratic Party primaries), 2007 (Action Congress), 2011 (PDP), 2019 (PDP) and 2023 (PDP)—without success.

 

Many factors explain these defeats, but the collapse of his relationship with Obasanjo remains among the most consequential. Since Obasanjo described Atiku as unreliable and overly ambitious, many Nigerians began viewing the former vice-president through that lens.

 

Perhaps the most quoted criticism came from Obasanjo’s 2019 public letter in which he wrote that “Atiku is not the person to entrust the future of Nigeria with.” Ironically, only weeks earlier, the same Obasanjo had publicly endorsed Atiku’s presidential ambition after reconciling with him under the Coalition for Nigeria Movement.

 

For Atiku, the consequences have been profound. The very networking ability that made Atiku indispensable to Obasanjo’s emergence in 1999 later became one of the reasons their partnership collapsed. Obasanjo reportedly interpreted Atiku’s independent political influence as a direct threat rather than an institutional asset. Trust, once broken, rarely returns unchanged, they say.

 

Although both men occasionally reconciled for political expediency, notably, before the 2019 elections, the warmth of their earlier partnership never fully returned. Ahead of the 2023 presidential election, Obasanjo endorsed Labour Party candidate Peter Obi instead of Atiku, reinforcing public perception that the former President had permanently lost confidence in his erstwhile deputy.

 

Even though to some extent, Obasanjo restored Nigeria’s global standing after years of military dictatorship and implemented significant economic reforms. Atiku played a pivotal role in driving those reforms and expanding Nigeria’s private-sector economy through privatisation and investment promotion. Together, they achieved more than either is often willing to acknowledge.

 

However, their fractured relationship offers broader lessons for Nigeria’s political class. Institutions suffer when personal distrust supersedes constitutional responsibility. Democracy weakens when political partnerships collapse under the weight of suspicion rather than being managed through dialogue and internal party mechanisms.

 

For Atiku personally, the Obasanjo years permanently shaped his political identity. He emerged as a formidable coalition builder, an indefatigable presidential contender and one of Nigeria’s most recognisable democratic figures. Yet he also carried the enduring burden of questions about loyalty, consistency and political trust—questions amplified by his multiple party defections between the PDP, Action Congress and the All Progressives Congress before returning to the PDP and now ADC.

 

Whether those perceptions are entirely fair remains debatable. What is beyond dispute is that the Obasanjo-Atiku rupture altered the trajectory of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic and influenced every presidential election in which Atiku subsequently participated.

 

As the ancient Roman philosopher Cicero observed, “Nothing is more noble, nothing more venerable than fidelity.” In politics, as in life, trust is difficult to build, easy to lose and almost impossible to restore. The Obasanjo-Atiku story remains Nigeria’s most compelling reminder that political alliances may win elections, but only trust can sustain leadership.

 

Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com

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