Will Africa Follow Niger Republic? By Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

Africa’s greatest economic contradiction is buried beneath its own soil. Across the continent lie enormous deposits of oil, gas, uranium, gold, lithium, cobalt, copper, diamonds and other strategic minerals, yet many of the countries sitting on these resources continue to struggle with poverty, unemployment, weak industrialisation and the steady movement of their young people towards Europe, North America and other destinations in search of better opportunities.

For decades, much of Africa’s natural wealth has travelled outward as raw material, while the greater economic value created through processing, refining, manufacturing and technology has accumulated elsewhere. Africa has supplied the resources that feed global industries, but has too often remained at the lower end of the economic chain, buying back finished products at prices far removed from what it earned when those raw materials left its soil.

That contradiction is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore because of what is happening in Niger Republic. Since General Abdourahamane Tiani came to power following the July 26, 2023 coup, his government has increasingly pursued greater control over Niger’s natural resources. What initially appeared to be part of the broader political rupture between Niamey and its former colonial power, France, has gradually developed into a wider policy of resource nationalism.

On June 19, 2025, Niger’s Council of Ministers approved the nationalisation of Société des Mines de l’Aïr, SOMAÏR, the uranium company operating at Arlit in the Agadez region. SOMAÏR was established in 1968 and began uranium production in 1971. Before nationalisation, French nuclear company Orano held 63.4 per cent, while Niger’s state mining company, SOPAMIN, held 36.6 per cent.

Between 1971 and 2024, SOMAÏR produced 81,861 tonnes of uranium, of which 80,518 tonnes were commercialised. Figures presented by the Nigerien government showed that Orano had taken 86.3 per cent of the commercialised production, while SOPAMIN accounted for 9.2 per cent.

In August 2026, the government took another step. It awarded the In Azaoua large-scale uranium mining permit in Arlit to Teloua Safeguarding Uranium Mining Company, TSUMCO, the state company created to replace SOMAÏR and continue operations over the former SOMAÏR perimeter. At its August 21 meeting, the Council of Ministers also approved the reassignment of another uranium permit, Madaouela I, to the state-linked Madaouela Mining Company.

The government has adopted a similar approach in the petroleum sector. On June 12, 2026, Niger’s Petroleum Minister, Hamadou Tini, announced that the government was reviewing the hydrocarbons code and preparing a new production-sharing contract model. He said the reforms were intended to strengthen the state’s negotiating capacity and increase the economic benefits accruing to Niger. He also disclosed plans to review provisions relating to cost recovery by petroleum operators and stressed the importance of training Nigerien professionals capable of negotiating more effectively with international companies.

Niger has also established MAZOUMAWA National Gold Company as part of its attempt to strengthen national control over gold resources and the country’s gold value chain. In January 2026, its Director-General, Abdou Ousseini, said the company intended to contribute to gold exploitation while controlling the valorisation and value chains of gold in Niger. The company had two exploration permits in the Dan Issa area and had collected more than 6,000 samples for analysis.

There is, therefore, something much bigger than the Niger-France dispute at stake. It is the ownership of Africa’s economic future.

For generations, the structure has remained remarkably familiar. Africa digs, pumps, cuts and exports. Someone elsewhere processes, refines, manufactures, finances and markets. The finished product eventually returns to African consumers at a considerably higher price.

That arrangement is not entirely without benefits. Foreign companies bring capital, technology, technical expertise, international markets and, in some cases, infrastructure that many African countries would struggle to provide on their own. The problem begins when that relationship becomes permanent, when Africa remains trapped at the extraction end of the value chain while the greater economic benefits of its resources accumulate elsewhere.

The African Union has recognised this problem for years through initiatives such as the African Mining Vision and its commodities strategy. The objective is for Africa to move from being primarily a supplier of raw materials towards greater value addition, stronger local content, higher returns from commodities and meaningful participation in global value chains.

The African Development Bank estimates that Africa possesses about 30 per cent of the world’s mineral reserves and could capture more than 10 per cent of the projected $16tn revenues from key green minerals by 2030. Yet the same institution reported that Africa received about $190.7bn in financial inflows in 2022 while losing approximately $587bn through financial leakages.

The implication is clear: Africa does not necessarily need to chase away foreign investors. It needs to become a better negotiator, a more capable participant and, ultimately, a stronger owner of the industries built around its own resources.

Botswana offers an important illustration. Its diamond industry was not built by simply shutting foreign capital out. Debswana, the company at the centre of Botswana’s diamond production, is jointly owned by the Government of Botswana and De Beers, with each holding 50 per cent. The partnership has become a major contributor to Botswana’s GDP, foreign exchange earnings and government revenue and employs about 5,000 staff and 6,000 contractors.

Tanzania has pursued another route by giving the state a minimum 16 per cent non-dilutable free-carried interest in mining companies, alongside taxation, royalties and other government participation mechanisms. Its local-content framework also seeks to ensure that Tanzanian companies participate in supplying goods and services to the mining industry.

Ghana has moved in a different direction. Rather than nationalising its gold mines, it has sought to increase domestic participation through regulation. Its 2025 local-content framework required surface mining operations to be undertaken by wholly Ghanaian-owned contractors, while underground contract mining requires at least 50 per cent Ghanaian ownership.

Zimbabwe’s lithium policy provides perhaps an even clearer example of beneficiation as a development strategy. After banning exports of unprocessed lithium ore in 2022, Zimbabwe announced in June 2025 that it would prohibit the export of lithium concentrates from January 1, 2027. The objective is to encourage greater domestic processing. Zimbabwe is Africa’s leading lithium producer, while Chinese-owned companies have invested more than $1bn in the country’s lithium sector since 2021.

If lithium is increasingly important to batteries and energy storage, Zimbabwe wants more of the economic activity generated by that demand to take place within Zimbabwe rather than elsewhere. That is precisely the direction Africa needs to consider.

The International Energy Agency reported in October 2025 that Africa captures less than one per cent of the value generated from manufacturing clean-energy technologies and their components, despite supplying around 75 per cent of global manganese, 70 per cent of cobalt and nearly 20 per cent of copper. The IEA estimates that moving into beneficiation, processing and manufacturing could raise the market value of minerals produced in Africa to about $120bn by 2040.

This is why the African Union’s Africa Green Minerals Strategy, adopted in March 2025, is significant. The strategy calls for Africa to move beyond raw mineral exports towards value addition at source, regional industrialisation, local beneficiation, job creation and economic diversification. The AU’s African Forum on Mining subsequently called for stronger continental bargaining power and high-level African critical-minerals diplomacy to ensure that mineral agreements prioritise local value addition rather than simply facilitate the export of raw materials.

Niger, therefore, should not be judged simply by whether its nationalisation policy succeeds or fails. Its experiment should be watched for what it reveals about both the possibilities and dangers of greater resource control.

National ownership does not automatically produce efficient management. A government can own a mine and still mismanage it. It can control petroleum and still import refined products. It can take over gold operations while communities around the mines remain poor. It can remove foreign companies and replace foreign inefficiency with domestic corruption.

Niger itself has already encountered some of these complications. Orano has pursued arbitration over the nationalisation of its interest in SOMAÏR. In September 2025, Reuters reported that about 1,500 tonnes of uranium, valued at roughly $270m, remained stockpiled at the former SOMAÏR mine. Orano had begun arbitration proceedings and warned against the material being transferred or sold without authorisation.

A country seeking greater control over its resources needs competent geologists, engineers, lawyers, accountants, negotiators, regulators and financial institutions. It needs reliable electricity, roads, railways and ports. It needs research institutions capable of developing technology. It needs transparent contracts and systems through which citizens can know what governments receive from their natural resources and how those revenues are spent.

Without these foundations, nationalisation can become an expensive political gesture. But Africa should not allow the imperfections of resource nationalism to become an excuse for maintaining a system in which the continent remains primarily an exporter of raw materials.

Nigeria illustrates the urgency. The country has oil, gas, gold, lithium, iron ore, coal and other minerals, but its economic history has repeatedly demonstrated the danger of exporting natural resources without developing sufficient downstream capacity.

The Tinubu administration has increasingly emphasised local processing and value addition in critical minerals. In July 2026, President Bola Tinubu commissioned a $250m lithium mining and processing plant in Nasarawa State with a capacity of 6,000 tonnes of lithium processing per day. It was described as Africa’s largest lithium processing facility.

Nigeria should not stop at processing lithium. It should be thinking about the battery industry, electric vehicles, energy-storage systems, industrial chemicals, research and the skilled workforce required to support those industries.

The same thinking should apply across Africa. A Congolese citizen living beside cobalt deposits should have access to opportunities created by cobalt. A Zambian living around copper mines should benefit from industries built around copper. A Ghanaian should see gold not merely as something extracted and exported, but as an opportunity for refining, jewellery, financial services and manufacturing. A Nigerien should be able to look at uranium and see engineering, science, technology and industrial opportunities. And a Nigerian should be able to look at oil and gas without accepting that the country’s natural destiny is simply to export crude and import refined products.

If Africa can retain more value from its resources, that value can help finance universities, technical schools, electricity, transport infrastructure, healthcare, manufacturing and technology. Those investments can create productive employment. Productive employment can reduce the economic pressure pushing young Africans towards foreign shores.

The real lesson from Niger, therefore, is not that every African government should wake up tomorrow and nationalise every foreign-owned mine, oilfield or industrial operation. That would be a simplistic reading of what is happening. The lesson is that the old bargain deserves serious reconsideration.

Africa should welcome investors, but it should negotiate better. It should welcome technology, but build its own capacity. It should welcome international capital, but ensure that African capital also grows. It should permit extraction, but demand value addition. It should collect royalties and taxes, but also build industries around the resources generating them.

Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com

The Ondo Air Crash and the Cost of Losing Those Who Protect Nigeria, by Boniface Ihiasota 

The Nigerian Air Force aircraft crash in Igbokoda, Ondo State, has once again confronted Nigeria with a painful question that goes beyond mourning: how much does the country truly value the lives of the men and women entrusted with protecting it?

The tragedy occurred on Monday, October 5, 2026, when an NAF ATR-42 aircraft, tail number NGR 931, disappeared from radar at about 9:13am while travelling from Benin City, Edo State, to Lagos. The aircraft eventually crashed in a swampy area close to the Naval Base in Igbokoda, headquarters of Ilaje Local Government Area. The Nigerian Air Force confirmed that it was on a routine mission.

It is important to correct one early description of the incident. Initial reports from Igbokoda referred to a helicopter, largely because residents saw a military aircraft go down. The NAF subsequently established that the aircraft was an ATR-42, a twin-engine turboprop platform used by the service for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as other military operations.

The human cost is devastating. There was initially confusion over the number of people aboard. The Minister of Aviation and Aerospace Development, Festus Keyamo, reported 25 passengers and seven crew members, making 32 people. President Bola Tinubu’s statement also referred to 25 passengers and seven crew members. However, the NAF’s subsequent release on October 6 identified 20 passengers and five crew members, 25 people in all, and confirmed that there were no survivors.

That discrepancy itself deserves clarification. In a tragedy involving human lives, figures cannot be treated as mere administrative details. Families deserve certainty about who was aboard, while the public deserves an authoritative account of what happened. The investigation must therefore establish not only the cause of the crash but also the definitive passenger and crew manifest.

President Tinubu has already ordered a thorough investigation, while the NAF has directed a comprehensive inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the accident. The Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau has said the crash, involving a military aircraft, falls outside its statutory mandate unless formally invited by the military.

This is where the tragedy must become more than another funeral and another condolence statement.

Nigeria’s military aviation history contains too many painful reminders of what happens when questions surrounding aircraft serviceability, maintenance, operational pressure, training, procurement and institutional accountability are not subjected to sustained scrutiny. An investigation should therefore not become a bureaucratic exercise whose final report disappears into official archives. It must establish what happened, why it happened and, most importantly, what will change.

The ATR-42 involved also carries an important history. In July 2020, the NAF announced the reactivation of another ATR-42 after it had accumulated 5,000 operational hours. The aircraft underwent major maintenance in Germany, described by the Air Force as its first periodic depot maintenance after 10 years of operation. That history does not establish the cause of the Igbokoda crash, but it demonstrates why aircraft maintenance and serviceability must remain central to any serious investigation.

The 25 people officially confirmed dead were not simply numbers. They were pilots, technicians, military personnel and civilians. The NAF’s published list includes Squadron Leader MI Aburime, the flight captain; Squadron Leader AP Man-Ugwueje and Flight Lieutenant IS Bako, both identified as co-pilots; two aircraft technicians and 20 passengers.

Nigeria has rightly mourned them. President Tinubu also declared three days of national mourning and ordered flags to fly at half-mast. But genuine remembrance should extend beyond ceremonies.

Those who fly into danger to defend Nigeria deserve an aviation system in which their safety is treated as a national security priority. The Igbokoda crash should therefore compel Nigeria to ask uncomfortable questions, demand transparent answers and implement whatever corrective measures the investigation produces.

A nation cannot adequately honour its fallen defenders by mourning them today and forgetting the lessons of their deaths tomorrow.

Lee backs Trump-Kim talks, seeks phased North Korea denuclearisation

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has backed renewed talks between United States President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, saying a meeting between the two leaders could provide an opportunity to restart diplomatic engagement over the Korean Peninsula.

Addressing the 81st United Nations General Assembly in New York, Lee said Trump’s willingness to engage Kim represented an opportunity for change and expressed hope that dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang could resume.

Lee said Seoul wanted to use renewed US-North Korea engagement as a basis for broader discussions aimed at formally ending the Korean War and establishing a lasting peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

The Korean War ended in 1953 with an armistice rather than a peace treaty, meaning the two Koreas remain technically at war.

Lee said his government would pursue a phased approach to North Korea’s nuclear programme, beginning with efforts to halt further development of its nuclear and missile capabilities, followed by reductions and, ultimately, the goal of a denuclearised Korean Peninsula.

The South Korean leader has previously acknowledged that achieving complete denuclearisation in a single step would be difficult given North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and missile technology.

Lee’s call for dialogue came as Trump reaffirmed his willingness to engage with Pyongyang during a meeting with the South Korean president on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.

The two leaders held a 30-minute summit in New York on Tuesday, during which they discussed North Korea, defence cooperation and several strategic projects between Washington and Seoul.

South Korean National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said Trump reaffirmed his commitment to dialogue with North Korea during the meeting.

The discussions also covered South Korea’s plans concerning nuclear-powered submarines, uranium enrichment and spent nuclear-fuel reprocessing, as well as the transfer of wartime operational control of South Korean forces from Washington to Seoul.

The leaders also discussed cooperation in shipbuilding and progress on strategic investment projects linked to the two countries’ economic relationship.

However, efforts to revive negotiations with Pyongyang face significant obstacles.

Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, has rejected the prospect of denuclearisation negotiations, while North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and missile capabilities.

Pyongyang has also maintained that its nuclear weapons programme is essential to its national security.

Trump met Kim three times during his first administration, including summits in Singapore and Vietnam, but those meetings failed to produce a lasting agreement on denuclearisation.

Lee has nonetheless continued to advocate a step-by-step approach, arguing that gradual measures could create conditions for rebuilding trust between the two Koreas and Washington.

His administration has also sought to reduce tensions with Pyongyang while maintaining South Korea’s alliance with the United States.

The South Korean President said the immediate objective should be to halt further advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes, before pursuing reductions and eventually a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

The latest diplomatic push comes amid renewed North Korean missile activity and growing concern over the country’s expanding military capabilities.

Lee’s position places Seoul in a role of encouraging dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang while maintaining close security cooperation with the United States.