By Reid Smith

Sometimes, the most crucial test of a powerful country involves not its strength but its judgment. The United States faces just such a test now, as Israel wages a determined campaign against Iran and U.S. President Donald Trump weighs whether to join it.

In recent days, the president has sent mixed signals. “We now have complete and total control of the skies over Iran,” he posted yesterday on Truth Social, pointedly using the first-person plural. In other posts the same day, he mused about killing the supreme leader of Iran and demanded “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!” from the Islamic Republic. After months of talking up the prospects for diplomacy with Iran (and years of bemoaning past American military failures in the Middle East), the famously mercurial Trump seemed to have embraced a more hawkish view.

Earlier today, however, he was more equivocal. “I may do it,” he told reporters. “I may not do it. I mean, nobody knows what I’m going to do.”

If the United States does wind up at war with Iran, it would hardly come as a shock. Enmity toward the Islamic Republic runs deep in Washington—and understandably so. The Iranian regime has held Americans hostage and supported terrorists and insurgents who have killed U.S. service members in Lebanon and Iraq. And a sense of American solidarity with Israel naturally springs from cultural bonds, mutual security interests, and decades of strategic partnership. What is more, this is a fight that makes sense for Israel—a country that is pursuing the kind of strategic clarity that Washington has failed to achieve in its own recent wars. Emerging from the trauma of the October 7 attacks, Israel has sought to eliminate profound threats rather than merely manage them. Israel shattered Hezbollah’s command structure and political standing in Lebanon, helped collapse Bashar al-Assad’s brutal regime in Damascus, and devastated Hamas in Gaza. With Iran’s proxies dismantled and Syrian airspace suddenly open to Israeli jets, the Islamic Republic has become a far more vulnerable adversary. It now faces an Israeli military with formidable intelligence capabilities, superior weaponry, and the political resolve to finish the fight.

There is little doubt that the world is better off without a nuclear-armed Iran. And the United States should always support its allies and partners. But those countries’ wars of necessity should not become Washington’s wars of choice. The United States has a role to play in this conflict, but it should not cross the threshold into direct military action against Iran. Calls for U.S. military strikes rest on the dangerous assumption that such action would be clean, quick, and contained. If Trump decides to enter this war, however, it would likely escalate in ways that would produce severe negative consequences for the United States, its allies, and the global economy. Washington can and should continue to assist Israel by providing missile defense interceptors and logistical aid to protect Israeli civilians from Iranian drone and missile attacks. But it should not take part in airstrikes against Iranian targets, join in any efforts to carry out regime change, or deploy U.S. ground forces. Simply put, the United States should not become a co-combatant in this war.

Doing otherwise would represent a catastrophic error of judgment on Trump’s part. It would also compromise the “America first” foreign policy that helped bring him to power and that a large majority of Americans support. When he burst onto the political scene in 2015, a significant part of Trump’s appeal rested on his refreshing honesty about Washington’s blunders in the Middle East. At a time when most Republican officials were still trying to say as little as possible about the disastrous Iraq war, Trump loudly echoed the conclusion that the vast majority of Americans had reached years earlier: “Obviously, the war in Iraq was a big, fat mistake,” as he put it in an early GOP primary debate that year.

Now, however, Trump risks making a similarly significant error in the Middle East. His strategic instincts seem to be leading him astray. With any luck, his strong political instincts will kick in, and he will step back from the brink.

ONE THING LEADS TO ANOTHER

The notion that the United States could conduct a limited action against Iran without provoking a desperate and ferocious response reflects a lack of imagination. What begins as a surgical strike on hardened Iranian enrichment facilities buried deep underground at the Fordow site risks spiraling in unpredictable directions. Reprisal attacks would ensue, and all sides would climb the escalation ladder.

Iran would likely retaliate against U.S. troops stationed at exposed and vulnerable bases in Iraq and Syria. It might also hit major American military installations such as the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. Cyberattacks targeting American energy, financial, and communications infrastructure could follow. Iran could cripple global shipping by lining the Strait of Hormuz with mines and encouraging the Yemen-based Houthi militia to step up its attacks on ships in the Red Sea. In response, the U.S. would almost certainly launch its own retaliatory strikes at a broad array of Iranian military and proxy targets across the region.

As in past American interventions in the Middle East, the conflict could become self-perpetuating. Political off-ramps may evaporate under the inevitable pressure to escalate. What began as a limited strike could transform into a regional war.

Meanwhile, China would probably seek to exploit such a situation to advance its own interests. In recent days, after the Pentagon ordered the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier to relocate from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, the Chinese military carried out provocative sea and air patrols in which it shadowed U.S. allies in contested waters. If U.S. forces wind up deployed to the Middle East for a longer period, China could increase its pressure on Taiwan and ramp up its harassment of vessels from the Philippines and Japan. Such provocations would test the resolve of U.S. allies in the region and raise doubts about Washington’s reliability.

MR. MERCURIAL

In addition to posing risks to U.S. interests, American military intervention in Iran could also hurt the very party it intended to help: Israel. For decades, Israeli leaders have made the case that they must defend themselves, by themselves. They have invested heavily in airpower, missile defenses, and cyber-capabilities precisely to ensure that, during a crisis, they are not dependent on an outside power or the whims of their patrons in Washington. American intervention now would render those efforts meaningless, solidifying Israel’s dependence and its junior-partner role in its relationship with Washington.

An American entry could also alter the contours of Israel’s war aims. Even if Trump decides to enter the fight, he may have another change of heart and pressure (or force) Israel to stop short of what Israeli leaders would otherwise consider a satisfactory end state. Trump, after all, is hardly a paragon of consistency. A mere month ago, he demoted his national security adviser, Mike Waltz, by nominating him to serve instead as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations; according to The Washington Post, Trump was irritated that, while he was pursuing a deal with Iran, Waltz had been coordinating closely with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on plans to attack. Now, however, Trump himself has apparently leapt into such planning.

Trump might reverse course again, however, especially if he believes the American public—and, in particular, his supporters—are not on board. An Economist/YouGov poll of Americans conducted between June 12 and June 16 asked: “Do you think the U.S. military should get involved in the conflict between Israel and Iran?” Just 16 percent of respondents said yes, while a striking 60 percent said no. Even among Trump voters, who are not necessarily more hawkish but tend to fall in line with the president, only 19 percent supported U.S. military intervention, whereas 53 percent opposed it. Trump is likely keeping a close eye on such numbers—as is Netanyahu.

American military intervention in Iran could hurt the very party it intended to help: Israel.

There is also the question of congressional authorization for any American military action, which remains a bedrock constitutional requirement, although one that has been routinely ignored in the past few decades. There is no standing Authorization for Use of Military Force that applies to Iran. If the administration believes direct military action is warranted, it should appear before Congress and make the case to the American people.

Trump, however, is highly unlikely to ask for congressional approval before acting. With a pliant GOP in charge of both houses, he may feel he can ignore Capitol Hill altogether. But Congress could complicate things for Trump, especially if a critical mass of Republican legislators began to oppose U.S. military action. Prominent conservatives are already sowing doubt. “I don’t want us fighting a war. I don’t want another Mideast war,” Senator Josh Hawley, a Republican from Missouri and a fervent supporter of Israel, told a reporter from CNN earlier today. “I’m a little concerned about our sudden military buildup in the region,” he added. American intervention, particularly if U.S. service members are killed, could trigger high-profile congressional hearings and vocal opposition in conservative media outlets. This could amplify public skepticism and further erode support for U.S. participation in the war.

Given these strategic, political, and constitutional considerations, the United States should help Israel finish this war on its own, and on its own terms. But that is all Washington should do. This is Israel’s fight, and Israel’s war to win. There is no reason to make it Washington’s war to lose.

By Tosin Adeoti

You may be hearing about the ongoing attacks between Israel and Iran. In practice, it’s been Israel attacking Iran since whatever Iran has been throwing at Israel has been largely ineffective. So, what’s going on?

Israel’s security doctrine has always been governed by the specter of the Holocaust. “Never again” is the state’s informal first law of defense. In 1981, Israeli jets destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. In 2007, they eliminated Syria’s secret reactor.

The unifying logic is that if a sworn enemy could build a nuclear bomb, it must be stopped before it becomes real. So, Israel couched the attack as a preemptive attack. But why now?

In early 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency revealed that Iran had enough enriched uranium for three nuclear warheads and was spinning IR-9 centrifuges that could triple production speed. Mossad intelligence indicated these weapons could be operational within weeks.

It was in 2005 that Iran’s new president created a sense of outrage in the west by describing Israel as a “disgraceful blot” that should be “wiped off the face of the earth”. Recalling the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of Iran’s Islamic revolution, he said: “As the imam said, Israel must be wiped off the map.”

Prime Minister Netanyahu, long obsessed with Iran’s nuclear ambitions, believed time was up. How best is Iran planning to alienate Israel than through nuclear means?

If this had happened during Joe Biden’s presidency, the response from Washington might have been tempered by diplomatic caution. This is considering the fact that Iran currently insists that the weapons were for civilian use, not military. But in January 2025, Donald Trump was sworn in for a second term, bringing back a familiar cast of national security hawks. One former official reportedly joked that the “band was getting back together.”

For Netanyahu, Trump’s re-election was a green light. He said on live TV that Trump is the greatest friend Israel has ever had in the White House. In Trump’s first term, the U.S. had withdrawn from the Iran nuclear deal, imposed maximum pressure sanctions, and killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani. In his second, he offered unqualified support to Israeli security actions, sometimes even ahead of congressional consultation.

Netanyahu and Trump spoke privately on June 5, just days before the strike. While the White House has denied it authorized any operation, sources close to the administration say Trump “understood what needed to be done.” Iran’s Revolutionary Guards say Israeli attack has been carried out with full knowledge and support of ‘wicked rulers in White House and terrorist US regime’.

What tipped the scales was certainly uranium, but it was also fire from Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Yemen.

Since late 2024, Israel had been bombarded by drones and missiles from all directions. Hamas, once weakened after the 2021 war, had been quietly rearmed with Iranian funds and technology.

Worse still, Hezbollah began striking from the north. In January 2025, two IDF soldiers were killed in a drone strike near the Lebanon border. Then, from the south, a new and unexpected front opened.

The Houthi rebels in Yemen, armed with Iranian drones and ballistic missiles, began targeting Eilat, Israel’s southern port. On March 2, a precision drone strike destroyed a naval radar station in Eilat. It marked the first time Yemen-based forces had inflicted strategic damage on Israeli soil.

This was no coincidence. This was a pincer movement; Hamas from Gaza, Hezbollah from Lebanon, Iraqi militias in Syria, and Houthis from Yemen. All are part of what Iran proudly calls its “Axis of Resistance,” and all had escalated simultaneously.

For Israeli intelligence, the conclusion was chilling: Iran was not just a sponsor of terror. It was the conductor of an orchestrated siege.

Thus, Operation “Rising Lion” was launched. Some would say it was to neutralize uranium, but others would see that it is indeed to decapitate a network. On the night of June 12, over 90 Israeli aircraft, including stealth F-35s and drones, penetrated Iranian airspace using routes coordinated with silent Gulf partners.

The strikes were surgical but devastating: enrichment facilities in Natanz and Fordow; missile research labs near Shiraz; command centers used by the IRGC to coordinate proxy forces. Israeli cyber teams paralyzed Iran’s air defenses and communications in the first two hours of the operation.

Notably, Israeli commandos also targeted IRGC intelligence hubs reportedly used to relay instructions to Hezbollah and the Houthis. Ali Shamikhani, a senior advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader and who was involved in nuclear talks with the US, has been killed. Iranian state television confirms that top nuclear scientists Abbasi and Tehranchi were killed. Israel’s defense minister says that most of Iran’s air force leadership was killed while gathered in underground headquarters.

In Tehran, electricity flickered and internet access has been affected. In Damascus, Hezbollah commanders went into hiding. And in Sanaa, Houthi broadcasts fell silent for six hours.

Iran launched a retaliatory barrage, including cruise missiles from Khuzestan and Basra. Most were intercepted by Israel’s Iron Dome and Arrow 3 defense systems. The few that landed caused minor damage and injuries.

Arab governments issued formal protests. Turkey’s foreign ministry has condemned Israeli strikes on Iran, warning it could ‘lead to greater conflicts’. Saudi Arabia has also condemned the strikes. Off the record, some Gulf diplomats expressed relief: “Iran was pushing too far. This was inevitable,” one said.

In the markets, oil soared 15% overnight. In aviation, air traffic over the Gulf have been rerouted indefinitely.

Whether Operation Rising Lion was a preventive strike or the opening salvo of a broader conflict remains unclear. Iran has vowed retaliation, likely through its proxies. Hezbollah has already increased cross-border attacks. The Houthis have warned of a “second phase of resistance.”

Yet Israel insists it acted to prevent a far more devastating war. “We struck because we had to,” Netanyahu has inferred. “We did not wait for Tel Aviv to glow in the dark.”

Now, the region waits; suspended between two possibilities: a forced return to diplomacy or a plunge into wider war.

For Israel, the calculation is unchanged: better to act decisively now than to weep helplessly later.

And so, in the early hours of June 12, fire rained from the sky, not out of rage, but out of a nation’s belief that its very survival was on the line.

Iran says that starting a war with it is like ‘playing with a lion’s tail’ and that ‘revenge is near’.

Bluff or real threat? The next few days or weeks will reveal.

The African oil and gas industry is experiencing a significant transformation with the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning technologies.

These technologies are being used to optimize operations, extend field life, and maximize output. The market value of AI in the oil and gas industry is expected to reach $6.4 billion by 2030.

Global oilfield technology companies like Baker Hughes, Halliburton, and SLB have opened bases in Africa, with SLB’s technology backing several billion-dollar oil projects in Angola.

The company has also introduced the Africa Performance Centre in Luanda this year.

AI is being used to enhance oil recovery (EOR) in mature oilfields, unlocking access to large datasets and enabling operators to make informed decisions.

With deep geological and production data in hand, reservoir management and pattern identification become much simpler.

Many African countries are streamlining policy to support EOR at legacy assets. Angola, for example, implemented its Incremental Production Initiative in 2024, which offers tax incentives to encourage reinvestments in mature oilfields.

The African Union Commission has also declared AI as a strategic priority for the continent, citing its role in transforming the continent’s development trajectory.

The African Energy Week (AEW): Invest in African Energies 2025, scheduled to take place from September 29 to October 3 in Cape Town, will feature discussions on the role of AI in the oil and gas industry.

The event will provide a platform for industry stakeholders to explore opportunities and challenges in the sector.