Analysis
Abroad and the Mirage of Greener Pastures, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
Abroad and the Mirage of Greener Pastures, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
For many Nigerians, the idea of leaving the country in search of greener pastures has evolved from a personal aspiration into a collective obsession. It is discussed in living rooms, amplified on social media and often framed as the ultimate proof of success. Yet, beneath this powerful narrative lies a far more complex and troubling reality. The migration journey of many Nigerians abroad has increasingly become a cycle defined by delusion, deportation and depression, exposing not only the personal costs of mass emigration but also the structural failures that continue to make Nigeria unattractive to its own citizens.
The delusion begins with the belief that crossing Nigeria’s borders is a guaranteed escape from hardship. Economic instability, high youth unemployment, currency depreciation, insecurity and declining public services have made life at home feel suffocating for many. According to national labour data in recent years, millions of young Nigerians remain unemployed or underemployed, surviving on informal work with little security. In such an environment, the stories of Nigerians “making it” abroad often exaggerated and selectively told. Social media reinforces this illusion, projecting curated images of success while concealing years of struggle, legal uncertainty and social isolation. Migration, therefore, becomes less a carefully planned economic decision and more a desperate gamble.
What is often ignored is the reality that destination countries are no longer welcoming in the way they once were. Immigration systems across Europe, North America and parts of the Middle East have grown increasingly restrictive over the last decade. Entry visas are harder to obtain, asylum thresholds are higher, and undocumented migrants face swift enforcement. Many Nigerians, unable to meet legal migration requirements, resort to irregular pathways that expose them to exploitation, detention and eventual removal. The assumption that “once you enter, you will settle” has become one of the most dangerous myths fuelling migration today.
Deportation figures over the last five years reveal the scale of this problem. Between 2019 and 2024, official records from the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement show that 902 Nigerians were deported from the U.S. alone. This made Nigeria the African country with the highest number of deportations from the United States within that period. The numbers fluctuated yearly with a peak in 2019 and renewed increases after the COVID-19 slowdown but the trend remained consistent: Nigerians continued to rank among the most deported African nationals. As of late 2024, over 3,600 Nigerians were still listed on active deportation dockets in the U.S., meaning thousands more face the possibility of forced return.
These figures only tell part of the story. Deportations from the United States represent a fraction of global removals. Nigerians have also been deported from the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Turkey and several Gulf countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates. While comprehensive global figures are difficult to aggregate due to varying reporting standards, Nigerian government confirmations and international media reports indicate that hundreds are returned annually from Europe and the Middle East for visa violations, overstaying, or irregular entry. In some cases, deportations occur quietly through “voluntary returns” under pressure, masking the true scale of the problem.
Deportation is not just a bureaucratic process; it is a traumatic human experience. Many deportees return with nothing but the clothes they wore during detention. Savings are wiped out, families are embarrassed, and years of effort collapse overnight. For those who borrowed money or sold property to finance migration, the consequences can be catastrophic. The psychological impact is severe. Depression, anxiety and a sense of personal failure are common among returnees, yet Nigeria’s mental health infrastructure remains ill-equipped to support them. In a society where success is often measured by foreign residence, deportation carries a stigma that deepens isolation and despair.
This emotional toll is worsened by the reality that many deportees return to the same economic conditions that pushed them out in the first place, sometimes worse. Without reintegration support or job opportunities, some struggle to rebuild their lives. Others attempt to migrate again, repeating the cycle. What emerges is not a story of adventure or progress, but one of circular displacement, with human lives caught between hope and rejection.
The uncomfortable truth is that migration itself is not the problem. People have always moved in search of better opportunities. The problem arises when migration becomes a mass escape route driven by structural neglect at home rather than opportunity abroad. Countries whose citizens show little desire to emigrate offer valuable lessons. Japan, for example, consistently records one of the lowest emigration rates in the world, with just over one percent of its population living abroad. This is not because Japanese citizens lack the means to travel, but because living standards, job security, healthcare, infrastructure and social cohesion make staying attractive. The same applies to countries like Finland and Denmark, where strong welfare systems, transparent governance and inclusive economic policies reduce the push factors that drive mass migration.
The United Arab Emirates presents another instructive case. Despite being one of the world’s largest migrant-receiving countries, over 99 percent of Emirati citizens choose to live at home. This reflects deliberate state investment in citizen welfare, education, housing and employment. Development in these countries did not happen by accident; it was the product of long-term planning, institutional discipline and a shared national vision that prioritised citizen wellbeing.
Nigeria’s situation stands in sharp contrast. The country has the human capital, natural resources and entrepreneurial energy to offer its citizens fulfilling lives at home, yet governance failures continue to erode trust in the system. Infrastructure deficits increase the cost of doing business, insecurity discourages investment, and inconsistent policies undermine long-term planning. As long as these conditions persist, foreign lands will continue to appear attractive even when evidence shows that the odds of success are increasingly slim.
What makes the situation more tragic is that the Nigerian diaspora itself is proof of what Nigerians can achieve under functional systems. Nigerians abroad excel in medicine, technology, academia, sports and business, contributing billions of dollars annually in remittances. These successes, however, highlight a painful paradox: Nigerians thrive elsewhere not because they are better suited to foreign environments, but because those environments reward talent, hard work and innovation more consistently.
The fixation on leaving Nigeria has also created a dangerous moral hazard. When migration becomes the default solution, pressure on leaders to fix systemic problems weakens. Citizens disengage, hoping to exit rather than reform. This mindset erodes national solidarity and undermines the collective responsibility required for development. No country has ever developed sustainably through mass emigration of its most productive population.
Reversing this trend requires more than slogans about patriotism. It demands credible action. Economic policies must translate into real jobs, not just growth figures. Education must align with labour market needs, equipping young people with skills relevant to a modern economy. Security must be restored so that lives and investments are protected. Institutions must function predictably so citizens can plan their futures with confidence. Without these, calls for Nigerians to “believe in the country” will ring hollow.
Equally important is honest public conversation about migration. Young Nigerians deserve accurate information about the risks, legal realities and psychological costs of irregular migration. Romanticising life abroad while ignoring deportation statistics and mental health consequences does a disservice to an already vulnerable population. Migration should be a choice made from strength, not desperation.
Analysis
Tinubu, EFCC and the Danger of Political Interference, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
Tinubu, EFCC and the Danger of Political Interference, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
There are moments when the intention behind an official decision may be defensible, yet the decision itself opens a door that ought to concern every citizen. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s intervention in the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission’s freezing of an Osun State Government account is one of those moments.
On August 6, 2026, with the Osun governorship election only nine days away, Tinubu directed the EFCC to return to court, vacate the order freezing an account belonging to the Osun State Government and discontinue the action it had instituted. The President said he was “deeply embarrassed” not by the EFCC’s exercise of its mandate, which he acknowledged was backed by a court order, but by its timing.
His explanation was understandable. Tinubu said actions taken by federal institutions were ordinarily attributed to him as President, whether or not he had prior knowledge of them. Since the election was approaching, he argued, nothing should be done that could create the impression that the EFCC or another Federal Government agency was being used to influence the election.
The argument is “morally” correct. But it also creates a difficult constitutional and institutional question: where does legitimate presidential concern about an election end and operational interference in an anti-corruption agency begin?
The EFCC did not arbitrarily descend on Osun. The commission said it had observed “huge transfers of funds into different corporate entities” from the state account and had acted to halt what it considered suspicious movement of public money. It argued that the approaching election could not become an excuse for an anti-corruption agency to ignore suspected movement of public funds.
Governor Ademola Adeleke, however, said the account was used for workers’ salaries and had been placed on a “Post No Debit” status. He demanded an explanation from EFCC Chairman Ola Olukoyede and described the action as another assault on Osun’s democracy.
The political atmosphere surrounding the matter had also been poisoned long before the account was frozen. In June, the Diaspora Committee of the All Progressives Congress Governorship Campaign Council in Osun asked the EFCC to freeze accounts allegedly connected with a reported N13.7bn annual ghost-workers payroll scandal. The committee claimed the money could be diverted to finance vote-buying ahead of the August 15 election. That background makes the EFCC’s action politically sensitive. But sensitivity is precisely why institutional independence matters.
The EFCC is a creation of statute. Under the EFCC (Establishment) Act, its chairman and members are appointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, while the law also provides for the chairman’s tenure and removal. The Presidency therefore has substantial influence over the commission’s leadership. That, however, does not make the President the operational head of every EFCC investigation.
There is an important distinction between constitutional authority over an institution and operational control of its investigations. A President may appoint the EFCC chairman, exercise statutory powers concerning the office, formulate broad government policy and demand accountability from federal agencies. But an anti-corruption agency must retain sufficient operational independence to determine whom to investigate, what evidence to pursue and what enforcement action to take.
Curiously, Tinubu himself made this case in the same statement. He said that since assuming office in May 2023, he had consistently maintained that anti-corruption and law-enforcement agencies should perform their statutory responsibilities independently and professionally, “without fear or favour, or political interference.” He added that he had deliberately refrained from directing or interfering in EFCC operations. That is why the Osun intervention becomes more concerning.
If a President can intervene in an operational decision because its timing might create an appearance of political interference, then the President has necessarily exercised influence over an operational decision. That does not automatically make the intervention unlawful. But it creates a precedent that future administrations may exploit.
Tinubu may genuinely believe the EFCC action could have been interpreted as an attempt to influence the Osun election. Another President could make the same argument about an investigation involving a governor, a minister, a major campaign financier or a politically influential contractor. If the principle becomes that the Presidency can intervene whenever enforcement action creates political controversy, the exception could eventually swallow the rule.
Nigeria’s history with the EFCC offers enough warnings. The commission was established in 2002 and began operations under President Olusegun Obasanjo, with Nuhu Ribadu becoming its pioneer chairman in 2003. Ribadu’s aggressive pursuit of governors, ministers, bankers and other powerful Nigerians gave the EFCC international prominence. But his controversial removal in 2007 also generated questions about the vulnerability of the commission to presidential and political interests.
Farida Waziri’s tenure produced another controversy. Appointed by President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua in 2008, she was removed by President Goodluck Jonathan on November 23, 2011. Years later, Waziri alleged that Jonathan’s administration had interfered with investigations and that her refusal to back down from a probe contributed to her removal. Though Jonathan rejected the allegation and challenged her to identify whom he had allegedly ordered her not to investigate.
The significance of those disputes is not simply who was right. It is that Nigerians repeatedly witnessed a situation in which the political leadership had enormous influence over the institution expected to investigate politically powerful people.
The Muhammadu Buhari administration provided another example. Buhari appointed Ibrahim Magu as acting EFCC chairman in 2015, despite the controversy that followed the Senate’s rejection of his nomination for substantive confirmation. On July 10, 2020, Buhari approved Magu’s suspension to allow a presidential panel to investigate allegations against him.
Again, the larger issue was institutional. The leadership of the EFCC remained heavily dependent on the Presidency, even though the commission’s work could directly affect members and allies of the governing political establishment. That is the weakness Nigeria has failed to resolve.
The President appoints the EFCC chairman. The commission investigates people who may have enormous political connections. The chairman therefore operates within an institutional structure in which the most powerful political office in the country has significant influence over the leadership of the agency.
This is why the Osun matter cannot be reduced to whether Tinubu had the right to be concerned about the election. Of course, he did. Elections must be protected from intimidation, manipulation and the misuse of state institutions. The harder question is whether that legitimate concern should be exercised through a presidential direction concerning a live EFCC enforcement matter.
There is also an important constitutional distinction regarding Adeleke. Section 308 of the 1999 Constitution grants a sitting governor immunity from civil or criminal proceedings in specified circumstances. But immunity is not exoneration. It does not mean a governor cannot be investigated, that evidence cannot be gathered or that public funds associated with a state government are beyond investigation.
If the EFCC had credible evidence of suspicious transfers, Adeleke’s candidacy should not automatically extinguish the commission’s investigative responsibility. Conversely, the approaching election should not give the EFCC licence to turn an investigation into a political weapon. The law must be stronger than both impulses.
That is why the better solution should have been procedural rather than presidential. If the EFCC had obtained a freezing order from a court and concerns subsequently arose about its timing or effect on essential state services, those concerns could have been presented before the court. If salaries needed to be paid, the government could have sought appropriate judicial relief.
Adeleke, too, must allow due process to take its course. If the EFCC acted unlawfully, the courts provide the remedy. If the allegations are false, evidence and due process should establish that fact.
For Olukoyede, the lesson is equally clear. The EFCC’s greatest asset is not proximity to the President but distance from political instruction. The commission must be prepared to investigate opposition politicians and members of the ruling party, governors and former governors, ministers and political financiers according to the same evidentiary standard.
Tinubu’s intervention, even if motivated by a legitimate desire to protect the integrity of the Osun election, should concern Nigerians. Institutions survive governments. Presidents come and go. Political parties win and lose elections.
If Tinubu truly wants Nigerians to believe that the EFCC is independent, the next step is obvious. He should help build an institutional framework in which no future President will need to intervene to prove that the EFCC is not being used politically. That is the real test of leadership. And that is the difference between fighting corruption under a President and building a country where the fight against corruption does not depend on the President.
Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com
Analysis
Jingir’s Words and the Challenge of Religious Tolerance, by Boniface Ihiasota
Jingir’s Words and the Challenge of Religious Tolerance, by Boniface Ihiasota
Nigeria’s greatest strength has always been its diversity. Muslims, Christians, traditional worshippers and citizens of other beliefs have lived, worked, traded and built families across the country’s complicated social landscape. That is why recent utterances attributed to Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jingir deserve more than partisan applause or condemnation. They demand reflection.
At an event attended by, among others, Kano State Governor Abba Yusuf and Jigawa State Governor Umar Namadi, Sheikh Jingir renewed his support for a Muslim-Muslim presidential ticket ahead of the 2027 elections. He argued that Muslims should mobilise behind such a ticket and urged his audience to obtain their Permanent Voter Cards. He also referred to those opposed to his position as “infidels” and said Muslims should “show the infidels their limit.”
There is, of course, nothing inherently undemocratic about a Muslim advocating for Muslim candidates. Democracy gives every citizen the right to support candidates according to personal convictions, including religious convictions. The problem begins when political competition is framed as a contest between religious communities, particularly in a country where religious identity has historically been capable of provoking suspicion, fear and violence.
From the perspective of many Nigerians in the diaspora, this language is especially troubling. Those of us watching Nigeria from abroad understand that the country’s image is not determined only by government policies or economic statistics. It is also shaped by how Nigerians treat one another. When influential religious voices appear to portray fellow citizens as outsiders or enemies because of their faith, the damage extends beyond politics.
Nigeria is constitutionally a secular state, and Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution prohibits discrimination against citizens on grounds including religion. The implication is important: political participation is a citizenship right, not a privilege reserved for members of the religious majority.
This is where religious leadership carries an enormous responsibility. A Sheikh, pastor or traditional religious leader does not speak only to those seated before him. His words travel through social media, enter homes, influence young people and can be repeated long after the original gathering has ended.
Femi Fani-Kayode, Nigeria’s ambassador-designate to South Africa, made precisely this point in his reaction to Jingir’s comments, describing the rhetoric as provocative and warning that Nigeria is neither a Muslim nor a Christian country but a secular, multi-religious state. Human-rights lawyer Deji Adeyanju similarly warned on August 10, 2026, that religious rhetoric capable of deepening divisions between Christians and Muslims threatens national cohesion.
The lesson should not be that religious people must abandon their convictions. Quite the opposite. Strong faith should make Nigerians more committed to justice, dignity, compassion and peaceful coexistence. Nigeria does not need religious leaders who pretend that differences do not exist. It needs leaders mature enough to acknowledge those differences without turning them into political weapons.
The 2027 elections will come and go. Presidents will change, parties will win and lose, and politicians will eventually leave office. But Nigeria will remain. Muslims will continue living beside Christians; Christians will continue doing business with Muslims; and millions of families will continue to transcend religious boundaries. That enduring relationship is more important than any political ticket.
From the diaspora, therefore, the message is simple: Nigerians may disagree passionately about candidates, parties and policies, but we must never allow political competition to convince us that our fellow citizens are less Nigerian because they worship differently. Religious freedom means the freedom to believe. Religious tolerance means allowing another citizen to believe differently without treating that difference as a threat. Nigeria needs both.
Analysis
Lessons from the Catholic Bishops’ Visit to Tinubu, by Boniface Ihiasota
Lessons from the Catholic Bishops’ Visit to Tinubu, by Boniface Ihiasota
The recent visit of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria to President Bola Ahmed Tinubu at the Presidential Villa was more than a ceremonial engagement. It became one of the clearest illustrations yet of the widening gap between official optimism and the daily realities confronting millions of Nigerians. The discussions that followed—and the public reactions they generated—have once again underscored the indispensable role of religious institutions in shaping national conversations on governance, accountability and social justice.
Led by the President of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria, Archbishop Matthew Man-Oso Ndagoso, the bishops used the opportunity to raise concerns over insecurity, economic hardship, unemployment and the general welfare of Nigerians. They also urged President Tinubu to formally invite Pope Leo XIV to Nigeria, arguing that such a visit would strengthen peace, unity and national reconciliation.
President Tinubu, on his part, defended his administration’s reforms, insisting that the difficult decisions taken since assuming office were necessary to rescue the economy from years of structural distortions. He maintained that security architecture was being repositioned and that prosperity would eventually follow the current sacrifices.
Ordinarily, such exchanges between government and faith leaders are healthy in every democracy. However, the conversation assumed greater significance after Cardinal John Onaiyekan publicly disclosed that the President disagreed with many of the bishops’ assessments. According to the Cardinal, the bishops told Tinubu that “the economy is not helping our poor people,” while the President maintained that the economy was improving. The revelation immediately triggered widespread debate across political and religious circles because it exposed two sharply contrasting narratives about the state of the nation.
Yet, facts remain stubborn. Nigeria continues to face severe economic challenges. Inflation has remained elevated over the past two years, food prices have climbed dramatically, and millions of households continue to struggle with declining purchasing power. The World Bank has repeatedly warned that while reforms such as fuel subsidy removal and exchange-rate liberalisation may improve long-term fiscal sustainability, they also impose painful short-term costs on vulnerable citizens unless accompanied by robust social protection measures.
This explains why the bishops’ intervention resonated beyond the Catholic faithful. Religious leaders occupy a unique position in Nigerian society. They interact daily with ordinary citizens who seek assistance through churches, mosques and community organisations. Consequently, their assessment of public suffering often reflects grassroots realities that official statistics may not immediately capture.
The reactions also revealed an important democratic principle. Criticism of government should not automatically be interpreted as political opposition. Throughout Nigeria’s democratic history, both Christian and Muslim leaders have consistently spoken against corruption, insecurity, injustice and poverty irrespective of which party occupies Aso Rock. Their constitutional freedom to speak truth to power remains essential to democratic accountability.
At the same time, government officials equally have the responsibility to explain policies and defend their decisions. Democracy thrives not when everyone agrees but when disagreements are managed through dialogue rather than hostility. The exchange between Tinubu and the bishops should therefore be viewed as evidence that democratic engagement remains alive, provided both sides continue to listen respectfully.
The larger lesson is that perception matters almost as much as policy. Economic indicators may improve on paper, but if ordinary Nigerians cannot afford food, healthcare, education or transportation, public confidence will remain elusive. Governments ultimately earn legitimacy not through optimistic speeches but through measurable improvements in people’s quality of life.
As Nigeria journeys toward the 2027 elections, the meeting between the Catholic bishops and President Tinubu should remind both leaders and citizens that governance is not merely about defending statistics or winning arguments. It is about restoring hope. That hope will be strengthened only when policy outcomes begin to match the lived experiences of the millions whose voices the bishops sought to amplify.
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