Analysis
Are Killings in Niger State Beyond Ordinary? By Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
Are Killings in Niger State Beyond Ordinary? By Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
There is something increasingly unsettling about what is happening in Niger State. It is not simply the frequency of killings that should worry anymore. It is the changing character of the deaths, the places where they occur, the people caught up in them and, perhaps most importantly, the growing difficulty of explaining them as separate incidents.
It disturb one, of recent, to know that in one part of the state, terrorists are killing security personnel and civilians. In another, communities are settling old grievances with blood. Elsewhere, worshippers are taken away after Friday prayers. Then, within the same week, 37 suspected illegal miners die while in the custody of a government security agency. Each incident has its own immediate explanation, but when placed side by side, they begin to suggest something much bigger than ordinary insecurity.
Niger State has lived with banditry, kidnapping and communal violence for years, particularly in parts of Shiroro, Rafi, Munya, Mariga and other vulnerable areas. But 2026 has brought a succession of incidents that should make any serious observer pause.
On April 9, reports emerged of coordinated attacks in Shiroro Local Government Area in which scores of people were killed. Premium Times reported that at least 60 people, including more than 40 security operatives, were reportedly killed in attacks on communities including Bagna and Lanta. Although the details varied between accounts, but the central fact was difficult to ignore: armed men were able to attack several communities and inflict heavy casualties on both civilians and those deployed to protect them.
The disastrous event of Shiroro goes beyond the number of casualties. On many occasions, residents of the area have complained about the difficulty of getting timely security intervention whenever armed men move into their communities. The problem is not merely that criminals possess weapons. It is that rural communities are often separated from effective security response by bad roads, difficult terrain, inadequate communication and the sheer size of the state.
Then came the violence around Tegina in Rafi Local Government Area. On July 1, Premium Times reported that at least 48 people had been killed in violence involving Fulani and Kamuku communities. Residents said 42 people, largely women, children and elderly persons, were killed in an attack on a Kamuku community, while about six herders were subsequently killed in retaliation. The incident was particularly disturbing because it demonstrated how quickly communal grievances can become a cycle in which one death produces another. Once that cycle begins, the state is no longer dealing with one criminal incident. It is dealing with the gradual destruction of trust between communities.
But the August attacks in Borgu Local Government Area brought another dimension to the crisis. On August 21, armed men attacked communities during Friday prayers and abducted Muslim worshippers. The eventual account from the local government chairman, Mohammed Abdullahi, was that more than 60 people had been abducted across four villages and nearly 30 killed. The affected communities included Gbeji, Kpenya, Giyan Gbasu and Dekara. The fact that the victims were gathered for Jumaat prayers made the incident particularly disturbing, but it also exposed how far insecurity has penetrated ordinary life. Places of worship, which should represent sanctuary, are not immune. Villagers cannot assume that gathering for prayer will protect them from armed men.
The Borgu attack also exposed the practical weakness of the state’s security response. Difficult terrain and a damaged bridge were cited among the obstacles confronting security personnel. That may be a genuine operational problem, but it raises another question: if authorities know that communities are isolated by terrain and infrastructure, what preventive arrangements exist for those communities? Security cannot always depend on a distress call followed by a journey through impassable roads. Intelligence, local surveillance, communication networks and rapid-response arrangements are supposed to compensate for precisely these weaknesses. When they do not, citizens are left to hope that the attackers will not come.
Strangely, the deaths of 37 suspected illegal miners in NSCDC custody on September 17 have changed the character of the conversation entirely. According to the NSCDC, the victims were among scores of people arrested during enforcement operations against suspected illegal mining at the M.I. Wushishi/Lukoto axis on September 15 and 16. The corps initially said the detainees were found dead after what it described as a suspected disease outbreak, while stressing that the actual cause had not been established and would require medical examination.
That explanation cannot simply be accepted or rejected before the investigation is completed. Governor Mohammed Umaru Bago has ordered forensic examinations and autopsies, while the police, NSCDC and other security agencies have opened investigations. The Federal Government has also suspended the Niger State NSCDC Commandant, Suberu Siyaka Aniviye, pending the outcome of the investigation. There have been allegations from relatives and other sources about overcrowding, poor detention conditions and possible mistreatment, but those allegations must be established by evidence. At this stage, the scientifically established cause of the 37 deaths is still pending.
That caution, however, should not diminish the seriousness of what happened. Thirty-seven people did not die in a battlefield. They died after being arrested and taken into the custody of a government security organisation. The state therefore has a heightened responsibility to explain, with evidence, what happened between the moment of arrest and the moment their bodies were taken to the mortuary. Were they medically screened when arrested? How many people were held in the detention facility? How long were they there? What did they eat and drink? Was there ventilation? Was medical assistance available? Were any of them sick before their arrest? Were hazardous substances associated with mining involved? Were there minors among them? These are not questions for social media speculation. They are questions that a credible investigation must answer.
Governor Bago himself said possible causes being examined included suffocation from overcrowding and exposure to hazardous chemicals associated with illegal mining, while cautioning that no conclusion should be reached before forensic and medical examinations were completed. That is the right approach. The tragedy should not become another occasion for competing political narratives to outrun evidence.
But there is a larger issue here that Niger State cannot afford to overlook. The state is dealing simultaneously with armed insurgents, banditry, communal violence, illegal mining and growing public distrust. These are not entirely unrelated problems. Illegal mining, for instance, is not simply an environmental or economic offence when it takes place in insecure areas. Mining sites can become sources of informal wealth, weapons, local influence and criminal networks. Communities struggling with poverty may depend on the activity even when government considers it illegal. Security agencies then arrive to enforce the law, often in places where trust between residents and authorities is already weak. The possibility of conflict is therefore high.
This is why the deaths in NSCDC custody deserve an investigation that goes beyond finding one or two individuals to blame. The country has seen too many official inquiries become exercises in administrative containment. A commandant is suspended, a committee is announced, condolences are issued and, after public attention moves elsewhere, the families are left with questions. Niger State should not allow this case to follow that familiar path.
If the detainees died from disease, the investigation should establish what disease, how it spread, whether it was detectable and whether reasonable medical precautions were taken. If overcrowding contributed, somebody must answer for the decision to keep so many people in unsuitable conditions. If toxic exposure contributed, the circumstances of the arrests and detention must be examined. If there was negligence or deliberate abuse, those responsible should face the law.
The same seriousness is required in the fight against the armed groups terrorising rural communities in the state. It is not enough to announce that troops have been deployed after another village has been attacked. Niger State is too large and too strategically important to be treated as a collection of isolated rural emergencies. Its proximity to the Federal Capital Territory, its international boundary with Benin Republic, its vast forests and its extensive rural settlements make its security problems a national concern.
The temptation will be to treat each tragedy separately. The Shiroro killings will be classified as terrorism. The Tegina violence will be described as a farmers-herders or communal clash. The Borgu deaths will be treated as another kidnapping incident. The NSCDC deaths will be called an unfortunate detention tragedy. Technically, those descriptions may be correct. But they cannot stop at classification. The real responsibility is to understand why so many different forms of violence are flourishing within the same geographical space.
There is also a danger in allowing residents to become accustomed to death. When a community loses ten people, the next community loses twenty, another loses forty, and then dozens die in custody, society can gradually develop a frightening tolerance for casualty figures. That is perhaps the most dangerous stage of a security crisis. Numbers begin to replace human beings. Thirty dead becomes a headline. Forty-eight becomes another headline. Sixty becomes another statistic. Yet behind every figure is a family, a household, a child, a livelihood and a future that has been abruptly removed.
Niger State should therefore resist the urge to normalise what is happening. These killings may have different immediate causes, but their cumulative effect is the same: they weaken citizens’ confidence that the state can protect life. That confidence is not restored by press statements. It is restored when communities see attackers arrested, when victims receive justice, when intelligence prevents attacks, when security personnel are held accountable for misconduct and when people taken into custody return alive to their families.
The question, therefore, is not whether every killing in Niger State has one hidden explanation. There is no evidence to support such a conclusion. The more credible concern is that the state is facing several overlapping failures at once, and each failure makes the others harder to contain. Terrorism creates displacement. Displacement creates economic hardship. Economic hardship can deepen dependence on illegal activities. Communal killings produce revenge. Weak institutional trust encourages rumours and vigilantism.
That is why the 37 deaths in NSCDC custody cannot be treated as an unrelated footnote to the wider security crisis. Neither should the killing of Muslim worshippers in Borgu be dismissed as just another kidnapping. Both incidents raise the same fundamental issue from different directions: what value does the Nigerian state place on the life of the ordinary person when that person is outside the protection of privilege?
For Niger State, the answer must now be demonstrated, not merely spoken. The dead deserve more than condolences. The families deserve facts. The communities living under the shadow of terrorists and bandits deserve protection. Those detained by security agencies deserve humane treatment, regardless of the offence for which they are suspected. And the institutions entrusted with keeping people safe must understand that accountability is not an obstacle to security; it is part of security.
Perhaps that is what makes the events of 2026 so troubling. Niger State is not experiencing one crisis. It is experiencing a convergence of crises. Until government confronts that reality with the same urgency with which it responds to individual attacks, the killings will continue to look like separate tragedies when, in fact, they are becoming chapters of the same larger story.
Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com
Analysis
What Succour Has CNG Brought? By Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
What Succour Has CNG Brought? By Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
When President Bola Ahmed Tinubu announced the removal of the petrol subsidy on May 29, 2023, Nigerians were told that the decision, though painful, would eventually redirect public resources towards productive sectors, strengthen the economy and eliminate the distortions associated with the subsidy regime. What followed, however, was an immediate and devastating increase in the cost of living, with transportation becoming one of the most difficult expenses for millions of Nigerians to manage.
For a country where millions of workers depend on commercial buses, taxis, motorcycles and tricycles to earn their daily living, the increase in petrol prices was not merely an adjustment in the energy market. It has affected virtually everything, including household incomes, access to education, healthcare, employment and small businesses. The price of transportation rose, food became more expensive because of distribution costs, and the purchasing power of ordinary Nigerians continued to deteriorate.
It was against this background that the Federal Government introduced Compressed Natural Gas, CNG as a major alternative to petrol-powered transportation through the Presidential CNG Initiative, with commercial rollout and initial asset deliveries commenced in October 2023. The initiative was presented as a practical intervention that would reduce the cost of operating vehicles, encourage investment in domestic gas utilisation, create employment and ultimately bring down transportation fares.
The idea was not misplaced. Nigeria is endowed with enormous natural gas resources, estimated at approximately 215 trillion cubic feet of proven reserves. There is little economic justification for a country with such resources to remain excessively vulnerable to the price of imported petroleum products and the volatility of international energy markets.
But nearly three years after the programme began, what succour has CNG actually brought to the Nigerian commuters and the populace? The answer cannot be determined by government announcements, commissioned facilities or the number of conversion kits distributed. It must be measured by the difference between what Nigerians paid for transportation before the intervention and what they pay today.
There is evidence that CNG has delivered benefits to some vehicle owners and selected public transport corridors. However, there is equally compelling evidence that the promised relief has not been felt by the majority.
The Presidential Initiative on CNG and Electric Vehicles has reported substantial progress. Its October 2026 impact report puts the number of vehicles converted at more than 140,000, with over 400 certified conversion centres established nationwide. It also reports more than $2.5bn in secured investment, over 5,880 jobs created and more than 8,000 technicians trained.
The initiative’s published station register, updated in October 2026, lists 105 CNG refuelling stations across 24 states and the Federal Capital Territory. This is an improvement from the earlier network of 61 operational stations reported in January 2026. The figures demonstrate expansion, but they also expose the distance between the country’s ambition and the infrastructure currently available.
At the maiden National CNG Summit in Abuja on November 4, 2026, the Executive Chairman of the Presidential Initiative on CNG and Electric Vehicles, Ahmad Ismael, disclosed that Nigeria had 105 operational stations, while another 127 were at various stages of completion. He said the government was working towards establishing 1,000 additional stations, comprising an earlier target of 500 and another 500 subsequently announced. These are encouraging projections, but a station under construction cannot serve a passenger today.
There is also a need to distinguish between CNG refuelling stations, gas processing facilities, mother stations, daughter stations and factories manufacturing conversion equipment or cylinders. They are different components of the value chain. A mother station compresses gas for distribution, while a daughter station receives compressed gas transported by specialised trucks. Neither should be described as a manufacturing factory.
As at the time of writing this column, there is no sufficiently detailed, consolidated and independently verifiable public inventory establishing the number of dedicated CNG manufacturing factories operating in Nigeria, their production capacities and their respective locations. The government must publish this information rather than allowing infrastructure announcements to blur the distinction between local manufacturing, gas compression, vehicle conversion and retail dispensing.
Geographical distribution is another concern. The official register demonstrates that CNG infrastructure is no longer restricted to Lagos and Abuja. Edo, Delta, Rivers, Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Ondo, Ekiti, Osun, Enugu, Imo, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Kogi, Nasarawa, Kwara, Niger, Adamawa, Gombe and Borno are among the states represented in the published network, alongside the FCT. However, the remaining states are not adequately represented in the register.
This is not the sort of national spread required for a country with 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. A resident of a state without a conveniently accessible refuelling facility cannot enjoy the economic advantage of CNG simply because a station has been commissioned in another geopolitical zone.
Even within states where stations exist, accessibility remains a practical challenge. A commercial driver who must travel several kilometres, queue for gas and return to his route has additional operational costs. The savings that appear attractive on paper can become less substantial when time, distance, availability and maintenance are considered.
Taken all in all, the most troubling aspect of the programme is the failure to establish a dependable relationship between cheaper fuel and cheaper transportation.
On October 17, 2026, TheCable published an investigation illustrating this issue through the experience of commercial transport operators in Lagos. At the time of its report, petrol sold for between N1,385 and N1,400 per litre in Ogba, while CNG sold for about N380 per standard cubic metre. Despite this considerable difference, a seven-seater commercial bus operating between Ogba and Ojota charged N500 per passenger, irrespective of whether it used petrol or CNG.
The investigation reported that a CNG-powered bus operator spent approximately N5,000 daily on gas, compared with about N30,000 spent by a petrol-powered operator. Yet passengers paid the same fare.
One driver, Olawale Aremu, explained that charging less would undermine the business of other drivers on the same route because passengers would naturally prefer the cheaper vehicle. This is a revealing admission. It shows that the problem is not simply the price of gas but the structure of commercial transportation, where fares are often determined collectively rather than by the actual operating expenses of individual vehicles. In other words, some of the economic benefits of CNG are being retained by operators instead of reaching the commuters whose suffering justified the intervention in the first place.
There are exceptions that demonstrate what is possible when government deliberately connects alternative energy with public transportation policy. In a statement issued on September 19, 2026, President Tinubu cited Borno, where alternative-energy buses were reportedly carrying passengers for between N50 and N100 on routes where commercial operators charged between N300 and N600.
He also reported that Kaduna’s 100 CNG-powered buses carried approximately 3.2 million passengers during their first year, saving commuters more than N3.5bn. In Oyo, the Lagos-Ibadan fare reportedly fell from about N8,000 to N3,200 during the initial deployment of CNG buses by Pacesetter Transport. Enugu reportedly reduced the Enugu-Nsukka fare from N2,500 to N1,500 through its CNG bus deployment.
These examples deserve recognition. They also establish an important point: CNG can reduce transportation costs when government takes responsibility for ensuring that the savings are transferred to passengers. But isolated achievements should not be mistaken for a nationwide transformation. Nigerians must be able to experience the benefits in their respective communities, not merely hear about them at government events.
The experience of other countries offers Nigeria a useful lesson. India, for instance, has demonstrated what sustained investment, regulatory coordination and deliberate expansion of gas distribution infrastructure can achieve. According to India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, the country had 9,096 CNG stations as of July 31, 2026. Its CNG infrastructure is supported by an extensive city gas distribution network, regulatory planning and the growing use of gas-powered public transport.
India’s experience did not emerge from the mere declaration of an alternative energy policy. It involved years of investment in pipelines, distribution networks, vehicle conversion, public transport fleets and private-sector participation. The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board has also reported that India added 1,206 CNG stations during the 2024/2025 financial year, while its CNG vehicle fleet increased from 5.861 million in March 2023 to 8.195 million in March 2025.
The comparison is important. Nigeria cannot reasonably expect a transportation revolution with barely over 100 operational stations when a country such as India has developed thousands. Their population sizes and transport systems differ, but that does not diminish the lesson about infrastructure, continuity and policy execution.
What Nigeria needs is a programme that goes beyond vehicle conversion. The Federal Government must develop a national CNG distribution framework that connects gas-producing facilities to major commercial centres, industrial corridors, interstate highways and rural transportation networks. States should be encouraged to identify suitable locations, provide land, facilitate private investment and establish clear implementation targets.
More importantly, government must prioritise mass transportation. Rather than concentrating largely on individual vehicle conversions, there should be a deliberate expansion of affordable CNG-powered buses, tricycles and other public transport fleets. State transport authorities should operate these services on routes with demonstrable passenger demand and publish their fares, operational costs and passenger numbers.
There must also be a transparent fare-monitoring arrangement. Where public funds, subsidised conversion kits or government-supported gas infrastructure reduce operators’ expenses, a measurable portion of those savings should translate into lower passenger fares. Transport unions should be involved in negotiating practical fare arrangements without allowing collective pricing practices to erase the advantages of cheaper fuel.
Analysis
On the Killing of Masussuka, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
On the Killing of Masussuka, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman
Religion is supposed to illuminate the human conscience, not extinguish the lives of those who understand it differently. Yet, in a country where religious differences are increasingly manipulated by extremists, the murder of Sheikh Yahaya Ibrahim Masussuka in Dutsin-Ma, Katsina State, on October 26, 2026, presents a disturbing thought.
A Muslim preacher who reportedly advocated peaceful coexistence between Christians and Muslims was allegedly targeted because his religious convictions and public positions offended those who claimed to defend Islam. If the circumstances surrounding his assassination and the subsequent claim of responsibility by Ansaru are established, it means there is fire on the mountain.
Masussuka, 47, was reportedly shot alongside his associate, Adamu Abubakar, by two motorcycle-riding gunmen outside his residence. Both men were taken to a nearby hospital but were pronounced dead. The Katsina State Police Command confirmed the incident and announced the deployment of security personnel to apprehend the perpetrators.
Born in Bauchi State but resident in Dutsin-Ma, Masussuka reportedly began preaching in Quranic schools at 13, studied at Al-Azhar University in Egypt and pursued further studies in Oman. He was associated with a Quran-centred interpretation of Islam, questioning the authority of certain Hadith traditions and rejecting some established teachings concerning life after death. These positions generated disagreements with mainstream Islamic scholars, particularly those who consider the Sunnah indispensable to understanding the Qur’an and practising Islam.
His views were controversial, but as it should be, controversy is not a crime punishable by death. Islamic scholarship has historically accommodated disagreements over theology, jurisprudence and interpretation. Scholars have challenged one another, defended competing positions and subjected religious arguments to rigorous intellectual examination. Such disagreements are part of scholarship.
Masussuka’s activities extended beyond preaching. In April 2024, he established Qur’an TV/Radio and Masussuka International School in Dutsin-Ma, combining religious and conventional education. He also used social media to communicate his teachings. His advocacy for peaceful coexistence earned him a Peace Ambassador Award from the Network for Good Governance and Transparency in June 2025.
More significantly, he was preparing to organise a peace gathering on October 31, 2026, barely five days after his murder. In a recorded message concerning the event, he spoke about restoring the cordial relationships that once existed among people of different religious persuasions. There is a painful irony in the fact that a man preparing to convene a gathering for peace was killed before he could host it.
His disagreements with other Islamic scholars had previously attracted government attention. In November 2025, the Katsina State Government summoned him following complaints about his teachings. The government also acknowledged his complaints about insults and threats from individuals he associated with Jama’atu Izalatil Bidia Wa Ikamatus Sunna, popularly known as JIBWIS. The matter was referred to the Katsina Emirate Council, while Governor Dikko Umaru Radda directed him to appear before a committee of Islamic scholars.
There is no established evidence that JIBWIS, as an institution, ordered or participated in his assassination. Indeed, Imam Ibrahim Aliyu Kaduna, a JIBWIS official speaking in his personal capacity, condemned the killing despite disagreeing with Masussuka’s religious positions.
The most disturbing development came on October 27, when Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan, popularly known as Ansaru, reportedly claimed responsibility for the assassination in a four-minute video obtained by PREMIUM TIMES. The group allegedly described Masussuka as an infidel and accused him of confusing Muslims and undermining Islam. His advocacy for interfaith coexistence and disagreement with certain Hadith traditions were reportedly cited among the reasons for his killing. It also threatened others accused of belittling the Hadith.
Although the claim requires independent investigation and must not be mistaken for conclusive proof of the identities of the attackers, its ideological implications are frightening. It suggests that an armed organisation believes it possesses the authority to determine the boundaries of religious orthodoxy and eliminate anyone who falls outside them.
What kind of religious belief requires the murder of another person to establish its authority? What kind of faith cannot withstand intellectual disagreement? And what kind of movement mistakes the elimination of an ideological opponent for the defence of religion?
Nigeria has witnessed the destructive consequences of extremist ideologies through the Boko Haram insurgency and other violent organisations. The reported circumstances of Masussuka’s death should therefore be treated as a serious security warning.
Perhaps the greatest injustice in this tragedy is the attempt to present intolerance and murder as expressions of Islamic devotion. The Qur’an is explicit on religious freedom. Surah Al-Baqarah, verse 256, declares: “There is no compulsion in religion.” This principle leaves little room for anyone to claim that faith can legitimately be imposed through threats or violence.
In Surah Al-Mumtahanah, verse 8, Allah permits kindness and justice towards those who neither fight Muslims on account of religion nor drive them from their homes. Surah Al-Hujurat, verse 13, further explains that humanity was created in different nations and tribes so that people might know one another. Diversity is therefore not an invitation to hostility.
More importantly, Surah Al-Ma’idah, verse 32, describes the unlawful killing of an innocent person as comparable to killing all humanity, while saving a life is likened to saving all humanity. The Hadith recorded in Sahih al-Bukhari also warns against killing a non-Muslim who enjoys a covenant of protection.
These teachings cannot reasonably be reconciled with the deliberate assassination of people because of their religious opinions or relationships with adherents of other faiths.
This does not mean Masussuka’s theological positions were beyond criticism. Imam Ibrahim Aliyu Kaduna argued that the Sunnah is indispensable to understanding Islamic worship, including the practical requirements of prayer and pilgrimage. That is a legitimate scholarly position. Other scholars have every right to challenge Masussuka’s rejection of certain Hadith traditions and defend their understanding of Islam through evidence and reason. But disagreement must remain within the boundaries of peaceful engagement.
A religion confident in its teachings does not need armed men to defend it. Knowledge, scholarship, persuasion and moral example are stronger instruments of religious conviction than intimidation and murder.
Islamic jurisprudence treats murder as one of the gravest offences. Surah Al-Baqarah, verse 178, establishes Qisas, or lawful retribution, while recognising forgiveness and compensation, known as Diyah, within the prescribed legal framework. This is not an invitation for individuals or organisations to appoint themselves judges and executioners. Justice requires evidence, lawful adjudication and competent judicial authority.
Nigeria’s Constitution is equally clear. Section 33 of the 1999 Constitution protects the right to life, while Section 38 guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Murder attracts the prescribed criminal punishment when established through due process. Where evidence establishes a terrorist motive or involvement, applicable provisions of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 may also be invoked.
The Katsina State Government must also explain what followed its November 2025 intervention. Having received complaints concerning threats and religious disagreements surrounding Masussuka, were the allegations investigated? Were protective measures considered? Did the authorities assess the possibility that the dispute could escalate into violence? These questions deserve answers, not as an attempt to assign blame without evidence, but to determine whether preventable warning signs were overlooked.
The police must identify and prosecute everyone involved in the murders of Masussuka and Abubakar, including those who planned, financed or facilitated the operation. Religious identity must not become protection from criminal accountability.
Religious leaders, meanwhile, must confront the misuse of takfir, the practice of declaring another Muslim an unbeliever, particularly when it is employed to legitimise persecution and violence. No theological disagreement gives anyone the authority to take another person’s life.
Masussuka was not infallible, and his teachings should remain open to scholarly scrutiny. But neither his controversial positions nor his advocacy for interfaith coexistence justified his murder. His death must not become another opportunity for religious factions to trade accusations or deepen divisions.
The best way to honour Masussuka is not to endorse every theological position he held, but to defend the fundamental right to life, freedom of conscience and peaceful coexistence. A society that allows people to be killed for interpreting religion differently has surrendered both its humanity and its sense of justice.
Faith should inspire conviction, not violence. And no individual, however loudly he claims to defend religion, has the authority to place himself above the sanctity of human life.
Analysis
Pastor Adeboye, Tinubu and the Pulpit, by Boniface Ihiasota
Pastor Adeboye, Tinubu and the Pulpit, by Boniface Ihiasota
There is a question increasingly finding its way into Nigeria’s public conversation, particularly among citizens struggling to reconcile the economic realities of today with the interventions of influential religious leaders during previous administrations: Does the courage to speak truth to power change when the person occupying the seat of power becomes someone closer to the pulpit?
The controversy surrounding Pastor Enoch Adejare Adeboye, General Overseer of the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), has reopened this uncomfortable conversation. Popular social media activist, Martins Vincent Otse, better known as VeryDarkMan (VDM), has questioned the cleric’s perceived response to the economic hardship under President Bola Tinubu, drawing comparisons with his public interventions during previous administrations.
Nigeria’s economic circumstances provide sufficient reason for such questions. On May 29, 2023, President Tinubu announced the removal of the petrol subsidy in his inauguration speech. Within days, petrol prices rose from the regulated levels of approximately ₦185 per litre in parts of the country to between ₦488 and ₦557, depending on location. By October 2024, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company had increased prices to approximately ₦998 per litre in Lagos and ₦1,030 in Abuja. The National Bureau of Statistics subsequently reported an average retail price of ₦1,034.76 per litre in January 2026.
Behind these figures are households spending more on transportation, businesses struggling with operating costs, manufacturers battling energy expenses and families adjusting their food budgets to accommodate rising living costs.
The question, therefore, is not whether Nigerians have reasons to complain. They do. It is whether those who previously considered it necessary to speak forcefully about national suffering maintain the same moral urgency when the political circumstances change.
Adeboye has publicly acknowledged President Tinubu as his beloved in-law, while First Lady Oluremi Tinubu was ordained an RCCG assistant pastor in 2018. These relationships have inevitably attracted public attention, although they do not, by themselves, establish that the cleric’s public interventions are influenced by family or religious connections.
Indeed, RCCG has maintained that Adeboye has not been silent about national challenges. The church has cited his November 2025 intervention on insecurity, during which he reportedly urged the government to hold security chiefs accountable and tackle both terrorists and their sponsors.
Yet, Nigerians are entitled to examine the tone, frequency and substance of such interventions. A religious leader does not have to organise street demonstrations to demonstrate concern about the suffering of citizens. But neither should spiritual authority become a reason to shield political leaders from difficult questions.
There is an important distinction between encouraging citizens to exercise patience and asking them to accept prolonged suffering without demanding accountability. Governments may require time to implement reforms, and the removal of fuel subsidies was defended on fiscal grounds, including the enormous cost of maintaining the system. The World Bank, however, documented the immediate 170 per cent increase in petrol prices following the May 2023 policy announcement and warned of the wider economic implications.
Religious leaders have a unique position in Nigerian society. Their congregations cut across economic classes, political interests and geographical boundaries. Their words can inspire hope, but they can also encourage accountability. That influence comes with a responsibility to speak consistently, particularly when ordinary citizens are bearing the consequences of public policies.
This is not a demand that Pastor Adeboye should become an opposition politician, nor is it an invitation to condemn him based on unverified social media videos. It is a reminder that moral authority must remain independent of political convenience.
From the Diaspora, the concern is not about whether a particular pastor supports a particular president. It is about whether the pulpit remains a platform for speaking truth to power or becomes increasingly cautious when the powerful happen to be familiar.
Nigeria needs religious leaders who can pray for presidents without surrendering the responsibility to question them. It needs voices that can encourage patience without normalising hardship and offer spiritual hope without diminishing the urgency of economic justice.
When the poor are hurting, should the pulpit speak differently because the occupant of the presidential villa is a friend, an associate or an in-law?
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