Understanding Kwara’s New Security Landscape, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman

There are journeys that leave you with more questions than answers. There are also journeys that challenge the assumptions carefully built from social media commentaries, political arguments and sensational headlines. Kwara’s security story belongs in that category.

For months, the dominant narrative has oscillated between two extremes. On one side are those who insist that the state has become a model of coordinated security response under Governor AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq. On the other are critics who argue that nothing has changed because kidnappings still occur, farmers are occasionally attacked and some communities continue to live under the shadow of fear. The truth, as is often the case, lies somewhere in between.

Security is perhaps the most difficult sector to evaluate because its greatest achievements are rarely visible. A school can be commissioned. A road can be measured in kilometres. A hospital can be counted in beds. But how does one measure an attack that never happened because intelligence intercepted the perpetrators? How does one quantify the confidence of a farmer who returns to his farmland after months of uncertainty? How do you calculate the value of a market that gradually comes alive again because armed patrols now dominate routes that were once deserted?

These questions came to mind while reflecting on the evolving security landscape across Kwara North and parts of Kwara South during my tour in the days leading to this year’s Eid-el-Adha (Big Sallah) celebration.

What became obvious is that the conversation should no longer be about whether insecurity exists. It does. The more useful debate is whether Kwara today is better prepared to confront it than it was a few years ago. That distinction matters.

The events of February 3 and 4, 2026, remain one of the darkest moments in the state’s contemporary history. Terrorists descended on Woro and Nuku Communities in Kaiama Local Government Area, killing scores of residents, burning homes, destroying livelihoods and abducting others after months of reported threats to the communities. The attacks left entire families shattered and forced many survivors into displacement. Estimates of the death toll varied, but humanitarian agencies and international media reported that well over 160 people were killed, making it one of the deadliest attacks in Nigeria this year.

The attack fundamentally altered Kwara’s security conversation. It was no longer about isolated kidnappings or criminal gangs seeking ransom. It exposed the growing danger of extremist elements exploiting the vast forests around Kaiama, Baruten and neighbouring parts of Niger State.

The immediate aftermath painted a heartbreaking picture. Reports showed that Woro, once a thriving agrarian community, became largely deserted as survivors fled in search of safety. Only a fraction of the population remained behind to bury the dead and protect what little was left. Shops were shut. Schools stopped functioning. Farming activities halted almost completely. A community that had once depended on agriculture suddenly found itself battling for survival.

It was against this backdrop that the Governor AbdulRazaq administration faced perhaps its greatest security test.

To be fair, no state government possesses constitutional control over the military, police or intelligence agencies. Governors are called chief security officers largely by convention rather than operational authority. Yet citizens naturally hold them accountable whenever insecurity escalates. Rather than retreat into constitutional excuses, the administration adopted a multi-layered response.

As was relayed by both Traditional Rulers of Woro and Babanla, Alhaji Saliu Bio Umar and Oba Aliyu Alabi Yusuf (Arojojoye II) during my tour to their respective domain said Governor AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq visited the affected communities shortly after the attacks, describing the killings as a deliberate massacre and assuring residents that the government would not abandon them.

He subsequently engaged President Bola Tinubu and federal security authorities, pushing for stronger military intervention in the affected axis. That engagement resulted in the approval and eventual launch of Operation Savannah Shield, a joint military operation involving the Nigerian Army, Navy and Air Force to secure Kwara and adjoining parts of Niger State.

Operation Savannah Shield did not emerge in isolation. It came after months of increasing concern over terrorist infiltration into the forests stretching across Kaiama, Baruten and Edu Local Government Areas. The operation introduced additional troops, armoured assets, aerial surveillance, intelligence-driven operations and coordinated patrols aimed at dismantling criminal enclaves around the Kainji axis.

The operation was also consistent with the Federal Government’s broader security strategy for the first half of 2026, during which Kwara featured prominently among the country’s operational flashpoints alongside Borno, Yobe, Taraba, Katsina, Zamfara, Sokoto, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Oyo and Kaduna.

According to the Joint Security Press Briefing by the Defence Headquarters and other national security agencies on Thursday, 2nd of July, 2026, troops conducted 14,221 coordinated security operations nationwide between January and June 2026. These operations resulted in the neutralisation of 1,597 terrorists and insurgents, the rescue of 1,516 kidnapped victims, the recovery of 451 firearms, 16,726 rounds of ammunition, and 161 explosives and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Intelligence-driven raids, clearance missions and rescue operations specifically covered flashpoints that included Kwara, demonstrating the state’s strategic importance in the national counter-insurgency effort.

But military deployments alone do not tell the whole story. Secretary to the State Government, Professor Mamman Saba Jibril, during an interview with some Defence Editors in Ilorin in May said “Long before the Woro tragedy, the Kwara State Government had consistently invested in strengthening security logistics. Through Operation Harmony, the administration procured patrol vehicles, distributed motorcycles to all sixteen local government areas, supported communication equipment, provided operational logistics and sustained collaboration with the Nigeria Police Force, the Nigerian Army, the Department of State Services, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, the Nigeria Immigration Service and local vigilante groups. These interventions were designed to improve mobility, intelligence gathering and rapid response across vulnerable communities.”

Those investments complemented rather than replaced federal security operations. The administration’s sustained logistical support enabled security agencies to improve operational mobility across the difficult terrain stretching from Kaiama through Baruten to Edu. Equally important was the growing integration of local vigilantes, hunters and community intelligence networks with conventional security agencies, recognising that defeating armed groups operating inside forests requires both military capability and local knowledge.

Critics are quick to ask an understandable question: if all these interventions exist, why do kidnappings still occur? It is a fair question. Yet it also reflects the temptation to judge security by isolated incidents rather than broader trajectories.

No serious security analyst measures success by expecting absolute zero crime. Even countries with the world’s most sophisticated policing systems continue to confront organised criminality. The relevant question is whether institutions are becoming stronger, whether response times are improving, whether intelligence networks are expanding and whether communities are regaining confidence.

In Kwara, evidence suggests cautious but measurable progress. Beyond the increased visibility of troops and security patrols, law enforcement agencies have recorded concrete operational successes. During the first half of 2026, the Nigeria Police Force dismantled a 33-member criminal network involved in terrorism, cattle rustling and violent attacks in Kwara State. Intelligence-led policing also intensified across the forest corridors linking Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Ekiti, Kwara and Kogi States—routes long exploited by kidnappers, terrorists and armed gangs. In another major breakthrough, police dismantled a railway vandalism syndicate operating across Nasarawa, Bauchi and Kwara States, recovering approximately 60 tonnes of vandalised railway materials valued at about ₦400 million, thereby disrupting another organised criminal network.

Several communities that experienced disruption earlier in the year are gradually witnessing the return of commercial transport, weekly markets and farming activities under increased security presence. Farmers who abandoned portions of their farmlands are slowly returning, though many still do so with understandable caution. Commercial vehicles that once avoided certain routes now operate under the reassurance of military patrols and security checkpoints. Confidence remains fragile, but it is no longer absent.

The emotional scars, however, remain visible. The people of Woro continue to appeal to government at every level not merely to rebuild houses but to rescue those still abducted during the attacks. Families remain hopeful that missing relatives will someday return. Their request is simple: security operations should continue until every criminal network responsible for the tragedy is dismantled and those still in captivity regain their freedom. That appeal reminds everyone that security is ultimately about people rather than statistics.

Another lesson emerging from Kwara’s experience is that security cannot be divorced from economic development. Kaiama, Baruten, Edu and parts of Patigi constitute important agricultural belts. Whenever insecurity keeps farmers away from their fields, the consequences extend far beyond those communities. Food production declines, rural incomes collapse and local markets weaken. It is therefore unsurprising that Governor AbdulRazaq has repeatedly linked security operations with food security, arguing that protecting farming communities is as much an economic imperative as it is a law enforcement responsibility.

There is also a quieter aspect of the administration’s intervention that rarely attracts headlines. Traditional rulers, community leaders, hunters and local vigilante formations have become increasingly integrated into intelligence gathering.

Security agencies understand that the first indication of suspicious movement often comes not from technology but from local residents who know their environment intimately. Nationally, this community-centred approach has become a key pillar of military operations. Between January and June 2026, the Armed Forces conducted 33 peacebuilding initiatives, 13 public sensitisation campaigns and 33 stakeholder engagement meetings involving traditional rulers, religious leaders and community stakeholders. Kwara has increasingly benefited from this collaborative security model.

None of this suggests that government has solved every problem. It has not.

Remote communities still require greater security presence. Forest surveillance must become even more sophisticated. Border management around the Benin Republic axis deserves continued strengthening. More permanent security formations may still be necessary in vulnerable areas. Victims of terrorism require sustained rehabilitation beyond emergency relief. Yet fairness also demands acknowledging what has changed.

Professor Mamman Saba Jibril further noted during the interview that Kwara of today is not confronting insecurity with the same institutional capacity it possessed a few years ago, affirming operational mobility has expanded through improved logistics and state support. “Federal and state collaboration has deepened considerably. Intelligence coordination among the Armed Forces, Nigeria Police Force, Department of State Services, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Nigeria Immigration Service and local security volunteers has become more structured,” Jibril emphasized.

The dismantling of a 33-member criminal network in Kwara, intensified military operations within the Kainji axis and sustained intelligence-led operations across vulnerable communities underscore a more proactive security posture than previously existed. These developments do not erase tragedy, but they significantly improve the state’s capacity to prevent future attacks and respond more effectively when threats emerge.

Ultimately, security is measured not only by the absence of attacks but by the resilience of institutions. Kwara’s experience over the past year illustrates this reality. The February massacre in Woro and Nuku exposed dangerous vulnerabilities, but it also triggered one of the most coordinated security responses the state has witnessed in recent years. Military deployments increased, intelligence sharing improved, criminal networks were dismantled, and communities previously isolated by fear gradually began reclaiming normal life. While the threat has not disappeared, the institutional response is demonstrably stronger than before. Perhaps that is the real lesson.

Security is not a destination where governments eventually arrive and declare victory. It is a continuous process of adaptation against adversaries who constantly evolve. Every patrol vehicle deployed, every intelligence report acted upon, every community engagement held and every kilometre of forest reclaimed represents another step in that long journey.

Those who insist that nothing has changed ignore these institutional improvements. Those who claim everything is perfect ignore the grief of families still mourning loved ones, the fear of communities rebuilding from trauma and the reality that isolated attacks continue to occur. The wiser position lies between both extremes.

Kwara’s new security landscape is neither the paradise described by enthusiastic supporters nor the hopeless battlefield portrayed by relentless critics. It is a state confronting an evolving threat with increasing resolve, improved coordination and sustained investment, while recognising that the journey towards lasting peace is still unfinished. Beyond the gunfire and beyond the politics, perhaps that is the story that deserves to be told.

Alabidun is a Journalist and Editor and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com

The Politics of Akara and Kuli-Kuli Empowerment, by Boniface Ihiasota 

In a country battling one of its worst economic crises in decades, every statement and public programme from those in positions of leadership carries enormous symbolic weight. Nigerians are not only listening to what their leaders say; they are also measuring whether government actions reflect the daily struggles of ordinary citizens. That is why the recent empowerment initiative championed by Nigeria’s First Lady, Senator Oluremi Tinubu, has generated widespread criticism across the country.

The initiative, which encouraged women to embrace small-scale ventures such as akara frying, corn roasting and similar petty businesses, may have been conceived as a grassroots poverty alleviation programme. Across Nigeria, countless women have built respectable livelihoods through food vending and other micro-enterprises. There is dignity in honest labour, and no profession should be ridiculed.

However, the criticism is not directed at these occupations themselves. Rather, it is about the apparent disconnect between the scale of Nigeria’s economic challenges and the kind of empowerment being promoted by the nation’s highest office dedicated to women.

Since President Bola Ahmed Tinubu assumed office on May 29, 2023, his administration has implemented sweeping economic reforms, including the removal of petrol subsidy and the liberalisation of the foreign exchange market. While these policies were presented as necessary for long-term economic recovery, they have also contributed to soaring inflation, rising transportation costs and an unprecedented increase in the prices of food and essential commodities. Millions of Nigerian households have seen their purchasing power eroded.

According to the National Bureau of Statistics, food inflation has consistently remained among the highest components of the country’s inflation figures over the past two years. For many families, survival has become a daily struggle rather than a long-term economic plan.

Against this backdrop, many Nigerians expected empowerment programmes that would focus on access to affordable credit, vocational training in technology and manufacturing, agricultural value chains, digital entrepreneurship and medium-scale business development. Such interventions would not only provide immediate relief but also create pathways for sustainable wealth creation.

Instead, the emphasis on traditional petty trading has been interpreted by many as lowering the aspirations of Nigerian women at a time when countries across Africa are investing heavily in innovation, digital skills and industrial development.

The First Lady’s office occupies a unique position in Nigeria’s governance structure. Although it is not a constitutional office, it has historically been used to champion major social causes. Previous First Ladies have led campaigns on maternal health, education, HIV/AIDS awareness, women’s rights and humanitarian interventions. Consequently, every initiative launched from the office inevitably attracts national scrutiny.

Critics have also pointed to previous public engagements involving the First Lady, including the distribution of vehicles to party women leaders at periods when the country was grappling with serious security concerns, including the abduction of schoolchildren in different parts of northern Nigeria. Whether fair or not, such images reinforce a perception that political elites remain insulated from the hardships confronting ordinary Nigerians.

Perception matters in governance. Leadership is not merely about implementing programmes; it is equally about understanding the emotional pulse of the people. At a time when many women are university graduates, professionals, innovators and entrepreneurs seeking access to finance, markets and modern business opportunities, public messaging should inspire ambition rather than reinforce subsistence.

Constructive criticism should not be mistaken for ethnic or partisan hostility. Democratic accountability requires citizens to question public officials irrespective of tribe, religion or political affiliation. Holding leaders accountable strengthens democracy rather than weakens it.

The challenge before Nigeria is not whether women should sell akara, roast corn or produce local snacks. Many successful businesses have humble beginnings. The real question is whether government should limit its vision of women’s economic empowerment to survival-level enterprises while millions seek opportunities to participate meaningfully in a modern economy.

Nigerian women deserve policies that match their talents, education and aspirations. Empowerment should not simply help citizens survive poverty; it should equip them to escape it permanently. That is the standard by which every government initiative should be measured.

The Economics of Terrorism in Nigeria, by Alabidun Shuaib AbdulRahman 

The Nigerian state has spent well over a decade chasing terrorists through forests, mountains and isolated villages. Thousands of soldiers have been deployed, billions of naira have been committed to military hardware, while countless gallant officers have paid the supreme price in the battle against Boko Haram, the Islamic State West Africa Province, ISWAP and other violent groups. Yet, amid these sacrifices, one question has remained unanswered: how do these terrorists continue to fund their operations despite sustained military offensives?

It is a question that has become increasingly difficult to ignore. Terrorism is not sustained by ideology alone. It thrives on money. Every attack carried out in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Kaduna, Niger or Zamfara is financed somewhere. Every rifle procured, every motorcycle purchased, every informant recruited and every explosive manufactured has a financial trail. The insurgent carrying an AK-47 in the bush is merely the visible face of a sophisticated financial network stretching from local collaborators to international facilitators.

This reality explains why the Federal Government has, over the last three years, shifted considerable attention from merely confronting terrorists on the battlefield to dismantling the financial ecosystem that keeps them alive. It is perhaps the least celebrated but arguably the most strategic aspect of Nigeria’s counter-terrorism policy.

The legal foundation had already been strengthened with the signing of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022, by former President Muhammadu Buhari. The legislation consolidated previous anti-terrorism laws, expanded the definition of terrorism financing, strengthened the powers of investigators and prosecutors, and established clearer procedures for freezing assets linked to terrorism. It also empowered the Nigeria Sanctions Committee to designate individuals and entities involved in financing terrorist activities.

President Bola Tinubu inherited this framework in May 2023 and, rather than allowing it to gather dust, has encouraged greater institutional coordination among the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), the Department of State Services (DSS), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The emphasis has become unmistakable: if terrorists cannot access money, their operational capacity will gradually diminish.

The results are becoming evident as security agencies have intensified investigations into suspicious financial transactions, illicit cash movements, informal money transfer networks and businesses suspected of serving as conduits for terrorist funds. Financial institutions have come under greater pressure to report unusual transactions, while designated non-financial institutions have equally been subjected to stricter compliance requirements. The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has become more proactive in analysing suspicious transaction reports and sharing intelligence with both domestic and international security agencies.

One of the strongest indications that Nigeria’s campaign has acquired an international dimension came with increased cooperation between Nigeria and foreign governments on terrorism financing investigations. The arrest of separatist agitator Simon Ekpa by Finnish authorities in November 2024 over allegations connected to terrorist activities demonstrated that financial and operational support for violent groups can no longer be viewed as purely domestic matters. International law enforcement agencies are increasingly collaborating to monitor financial flows across borders.

Equally significant has been Nigeria’s determination to improve its standing under the Financial Action Task Force, the global body responsible for setting standards against money laundering and terrorist financing. Nigeria’s inclusion on the FATF grey list in 2023 served as a diplomatic embarrassment and an economic warning that weaknesses in financial regulation could undermine investor confidence. Since then, the country has implemented several reforms aimed at strengthening anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing mechanisms. Those efforts culminated in Nigeria’s removal from the grey list in October 2025 after the FATF acknowledged substantial progress in addressing identified deficiencies.

That achievement deserves more public attention than it has received. Countries placed on the FATF grey list often face increased scrutiny by international banks, higher compliance costs for businesses and reduced investor confidence. Exiting the list therefore represents more than a diplomatic success; it signals growing confidence in Nigeria’s capacity to detect, investigate and disrupt illicit financial flows.

Yet, despite these gains, the challenge remains enormous because terrorism financing in Nigeria has become increasingly decentralised.

Gone are the days when insurgent groups depended almost exclusively on foreign sponsors. Boko Haram and ISWAP have developed self-sustaining financial models that resemble organised criminal enterprises. They generate revenue through kidnapping for ransom, illegal taxation of farming communities, cattle rustling, extortion of traders, smuggling, illegal mining, fishery activities around the Lake Chad Basin and cross-border commercial transactions. Some communities living under insurgent control reportedly pay levies not because they support terrorism but because survival demands compliance.

This evolution has complicated the work of security agencies. Financial transactions supporting terrorism are no longer confined to formal banking channels. Cash dominates rural economies where banking infrastructure remains weak. Informal value transfer systems operate outside conventional financial regulations, while technological innovations have introduced new risks associated with digital assets and online financial platforms.

The uncomfortable truth is that terrorism survives not only because of hardened extremists but also because ordinary citizens sometimes become willing collaborators. Transport operators who knowingly move weapons, traders who supply logistics to insurgents, businessmen who facilitate illicit financial transfers and corrupt officials who compromise security operations all become silent partners in sustaining violence. Their motivations are often economic rather than ideological, yet the consequences remain equally devastating.

It is here that Nigeria’s counter-terrorism strategy must become even more courageous.

Arrests alone cannot substitute for successful prosecutions. Nigerians have witnessed numerous announcements of suspects apprehended for alleged terrorism financing, only for many cases to disappear into the slow wheels of the justice system. The deterrent value of arrest diminishes significantly when prosecution is uncertain or endlessly delayed. The judiciary must therefore recognise terrorism financing cases as matters requiring exceptional urgency.

Another area demanding greater attention is border security. Nigeria shares long and porous borders with Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin Republic. These frontiers have facilitated not only the movement of fighters but also the trafficking of cash, fuel, livestock, food supplies and weapons. Effective border management requires stronger intelligence sharing, modern surveillance technology and closer collaboration with neighbouring countries.

Political neutrality is equally indispensable. Counter-terror financing cannot become selective depending on the influence, ethnicity, religion or political affiliation of suspects. Once credible evidence exists, investigations should proceed without fear or favour. Nothing undermines public confidence more than the perception that powerful individuals enjoy immunity while less influential suspects face the full weight of the law.

There is also the question of financial literacy within vulnerable communities. Many Nigerians remain unaware that seemingly harmless commercial activities can inadvertently support terrorist operations. Accepting suspicious payments, facilitating anonymous cash transfers or ignoring reporting obligations may ultimately strengthen violent organisations. Public education must therefore become an integral component of national security policy.

Equally important is economic development. Terrorist organisations flourish where legitimate economic opportunities disappear. Unemployment, illiteracy, weak governance and chronic poverty create fertile recruiting grounds for extremist groups. Countering terrorism financing must therefore go beyond freezing bank accounts to expanding access to education, agriculture, infrastructure, healthcare and youth employment. A young man earning a decent livelihood is far less susceptible to recruitment by insurgent organisations promising quick financial rewards.

Perhaps the greatest lesson from Nigeria’s experience over the last three years is that modern terrorism is sustained less by ideology than by economics. Terrorists may preach religion, ethnicity or political grievances, but they cannot wage war without money. Every disrupted financial transaction, every frozen asset, every suspicious transfer intercepted and every financier successfully prosecuted weakens the operational capability of violent groups far more quietly than military offensives ever could.

The war against terrorism will not be won solely on the battlefield. It will also be won inside banks, courtrooms, intelligence centres, border posts, regulatory agencies and financial institutions. Soldiers may neutralise terrorists, but investigators who follow the money prevent the next generation of attacks.

Nigeria has made commendable progress in recognising this reality. The challenge now is consistency. Financial investigations must become more sophisticated, prosecutions more decisive, institutions more coordinated and political commitment more unwavering. Terrorism is ultimately an expensive business. The day Nigeria permanently cuts off the flow of money into the hands of violent extremists is the day the guns will begin to fall silent.

Alabidun is a media practitioner and can be reached via alabidungoldenson@gmail.com